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SECTION 1: ACADEMIC
6ADULT MENTAL HEALTH ESSAY
SHOULD CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS USE THE TERM ‘SCHIZOPHRENIA’? 
JUSTIFY YOUR ANSWER WITH REFERENCE TO THE RELEVANT
LITERATURE.
Schizophrenia has been coined the ‘heartland of psychiatry’ (Kendell, 1986) and 
persists at the epicentre of its practice. It is estimated that, approximately, 5 out 
of every 1000 adults will have a diagnosis of schizophrenia at any one time 
(Hamilton, 1984). There is no doubt that those who have a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia are experiencing a set of psychological phenomena that can be 
highly distressing for themselves as well as family, friends and colleagues. The 
set of psychological phenomena are subsumed under the umbrella term of 
‘schizophrenia’. The term itself is fast reaching its hundredth birthday. However, 
the concept and its usage has been shrouded in controversy since its inception 
but rather more so in recent years. A recent paper by Bentall et al. (1988), after 
an analysis of the scientific validity of the concept, concludes;
‘Given that schizophrenia is an entity which seems to have no particular 
symptoms, which follows no particular course and which responds to no (or 
perhaps every) particular treatment, it is not surprising that aetiological research 
has so far failed to establish any particular cause. Hence the weak and 
ambiguous evidence for both the biological and environmental causation of 
schizophrenia.’ (p.314).
If Bentall and his colleagues are correct then it would be safe to assume that 
there would be little reason to feel confident about the validity of schizophrenia 
as a diagnostic category. The concept, as it stands, ought then to be abandoned 
in favour of a new classification and categorisation of psychotic phenomena of
8increased validity for research and clinical purposes. This type of critique might 
appear reactionary to the psychiatric establishment, it has been described as 
‘liberation psychology...nostalgic for the 1960s’ (Wing, 1988 p.328) but has 
heralded a new scientific analysis of the schizophrenia concept that should be 
taken seriously for the next hundred years of research into psychotic 
phenomena. The purpose of this essay is to discuss the issues by which the 
term ‘schizophrenia’ came into being, what assumptions have surrounded its 
existence and use and how it has persisted as a diagnostic tool in the face of 
counter argument. Finally, it will be concluded that a reappraisal of the concept 
and its usage ought to be made to advance our understanding of the nature of 
psychotic phenomena and, also, how reconceptualising these phenomena might 
aid more efficacious interventions including non-medical more psychologically- 
based therapies. Clinical psychologists are scientists as well as practitioners 
and, if there is a clinical role for them to play in the amelioration of distressing 
psychotic symptoms, therapies need to be constructed from scientifically valid 
conceptions of psychotic experiences.
Emil Kraepelin in the fifth (1896) edition of his ‘Lehrbuch’ is commonly credited 
with the first classification of ‘insanity’. He divided mental illness into ‘manic 
depressive insanity’ and ‘dementia praecox’. He believed that dementia praecox 
was a progressive disease that lead to either chronic invalidism or only partial 
recovery, if any improvement arose at all. The term ‘dementia praecox’ described
the characteristic early onset of the disease and the ensuing intellectual 
deterioration. Among the other major characteristics he described were 
hallucinations, delusions, negativism, attention difficulties, stereotyped behaviour 
and emotional dysfunction. In 1911 Eugen Bleuler published his ‘Dementia 
Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias’. He attempted to define the core nature 
of the disorder and avoid the prognostic emphasis of Kraepelin. Bleuler chose 
the ‘split mind’ concept as his emphasis was more psychological than 
neuropathological. He believed that at the core of schizophrenia lay a ‘loosening 
of associations’ in thoughts, speech, volitional acts and cognitive processes in 
general. He differed from Kraepelin in two major respects. He believed there was 
no necessary early onset and that there was no inevitable progress to dementia. 
However, both believed that underpinning their constructs lay a biological 
substrate. Kraepelin (1919) believed similar cerebral lesions as described by 
Alzheimer (1897) might ‘cause’ the ‘disease’, whereas Bleuler (1911) thought 
that a specific ‘schizotoxin’ was responsible. Therefore, from the very beginning 
of the formation of constructs to categorise deviant behaviour or ‘mental illness’ 
a psychobiological mechanism has been proffered as the prime candidate of the 
cause of schizophrenia.
Bleuler’s term ‘schizophrenia’ has persisted and was quickly taken up for clinical 
usage so much so that in the 1930s 20% of patients in the New York Psychiatric 
Institute were diagnosed as schizophrenic compared to a peak of 80% in 1952
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(Davison and Neale, 1986). Bleuler’s primary symptoms (loosening of 
associations or thought disorder, blunting of affect, autism and ambivalence) 
were used as the basis for diagnosis whether hallucinations were present or not.
Of great influence in the conceptualisation of schizophrenia were those terms 
collectively described by Schneider (1959). These ‘First Rank Symptoms’ were 
based on an appraisal of the acute stage of the illness. These symptoms 
consisted of auditory hallucinations, thought insertion or withdrawal, thought 
broadcasting, the sensation of actions being controlled externally, passive and 
reluctant recipient of sensations from an external agency and delusional 
perception. He admitted that these symptoms were distinguishable from 
symptoms such as perplexity and emotional blunting, but that these were 
secondary to the primary diagnostic symptoms described above. The influence of 
the Schneiderian conception of schizophrenia forms the basis of several 
diagnostic categories that are still in common usage i.e. Research Diagnostic 
Criteria (RDC) (Spitzer et al., 1978) and the Present State Examination (Wing et 
al., 1974).
A superficial glance, at the above potted history of the main protagonists of the 
schizophrenia concept shows, an inconsistency of which symptoms are 
considered most important for a diagnosis. Although the work of Kraepelin,
Bleuler and Schneider now rests in an exalted position in annals of psychiatric
history, a closer look at how each of these theorists came to conceive of their 
conceptualisations of deviant behaviour or ‘mental illness' casts considerable 
doubt on the accuracy of the processes forming these concepts. Firstly, the 
development of the concepts needs to be assessed in their historical contexts. 
Two issues concerning how medical practitioners came to dominate over the 
care and treatment of deviant behaviour, later to be described as schizophrenia, 
ought to be considered. Scull (1979), in an analysis of the development of 
psychiatry, points out that, originally, in Great Britain, asylum provision was 
controlled by the laity and not by the medical profession. The change in control 
took place after much political struggle- the General Medical Bill took 16 
attempts to be eventually passed in Parliament in 1858 (Parry and Parry, 1976). 
Also, the dominance of the medical profession was won in the absence of any 
scientific evidence to the efficacy of medicine in theorising or intervening in 
deviant behaviour. Boyle (1990) suggests that, on this basis, Kraepelin and 
Bleuler arrived at their study of deviant behaviour ill-equipped with little 
awareness of the problems of describing and recording behaviour. Also, that 
they approached their study with strong a priori beliefs about the patterns of 
behaviour they would find in groups of asylum inmates and the variables that 
controlled such behaviour. As indicated above, Kraepelin claimed to have 
observed a pattern of behaviour justifying an inference of dementia praecox by 
the criterion of similarities in onset and outcome. He was claiming that if he could 
identify a group of patients whose behaviour changed at one point (onset),
showed similar course and reached a similar end-point outcome then he would 
have observed a meaningful cluster of events and infer a new hypothetical 
construct. This premise was faulty for two main reasons. Firstly, onset, course 
and outcome are arbitrary conditions and were not defined. Also, the criteria 
offered no guidance as to the importance of specific similarities. In addition, if 
outcome was to be a defining criterion for diagnosis nothing could be concluded 
about diagnosis until the outcome was known!
Bleuler, although he emphasised that certain fundamental symptoms were 
present in every case and at every period of the schizophrenic ‘illness’, failed to 
show how he recognised such cases or to demonstrate how he identified a group 
of people in each of whom certain characteristics were always present. Neither 
Kraepelin nor Bleuler gave any indication of how they could know that any given 
behaviour should be interpreted as a symptom of dementia praecox or 
schizophrenia (Boyle, 1990). In fact, in the absence of a pattern of symptoms, 
both Kraepelin and Bleuler had carte blanche to call any behaviours they wished 
‘symptoms’ of their hypothetical constructs. Schneider (1959) was also guilty of 
taking schizophrenia as a valid construct without providing any empirical 
evidence. What these theorists overlooked was the necessity to provide valid 
and independent criteria for inferring their constructs in the first place. Despite 
these methodological issues, it has also been suggested that the actual patients 
that Kraepelin and Bleuler described would not be considered ‘schizophrenic’ 
today (Cutting, 1985). As they was no demarcation between psychiatry and
neurology at the turn of the century, the groups of patients under observation 
would have comprised, in part, those patients that would come under the care of 
a neurologist today. Because of this the actual behaviours described leading 
towards a categorisation of dementia praecox or schizophrenia have been 
suggested as representative of patients with the infectious disease encephalitis 
lethargica (Boyle, 1990). It can be concluded that an historical analysis of the 
inception of the term ‘schizophrenia’ is fraught with many methodological and, in 
deed, political issues that need to be considered before, as has become the 
custom in contemporary psychiatry, the work of Kraepelin, Bleuler and Schneider 
is accepted as received wisdom in the categorisation of deviant behaviour or 
‘mental illness’.
A contemporary diagnosis of schizophrenia involves the presence of two (or 
more) ‘characteristic’ symptoms; delusions, hallucinations, disorganised speech, 
grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour and negative symptoms such as 
affective flattening, alogia or avolition (American Psychiatric Association; DSM- 
IV, 1994). Continuous signs of the disturbance ought to persist for at least six 
months. Criticisms of using such criteria for diagnostic purposes fall under four 
main headings; reliability, construct validity, predictive validity and the 
aetiological specificity of the schizophrenia diagnosis. Reliability refers to the 
consistency to which clients are classified. As indicated above the founding 
fathers of classifying deviant behaviour differed as to which symptoms were of
primary importance for diagnosis i.e. Bleuler (1911) believed loosening of 
associations was of primary importance while delusions and hallucinations were 
secondary, whereas Schneider (1959) thought delusions and hallucinations to be 
of primary importance. On the basis of these types of disagreements 
'schizophrenia' has been termed a ‘disjunctive category’ for which any two 
patients may express no common symptoms (Bannister, 1968). If 'schizophrenia' 
is to be considered a disease entity in itself then there should be clear lines of 
demarcation between itself any other psychiatric categories. For instance, there 
is still controversy whether those patients with an additional affective component 
to their disorder ought to be classified as ‘schizoaffective’ (Kasanin, 1933) or that 
such an affective dysfunction as depression should be considered a core feature 
of schizophrenia itself (Hirsch, 1982; Liddle, 1994).
Reliability studies of schizophrenic diagnosis have yielded disappointing results. 
Brockington et al. (1978) found a reliability coefficient of only .29 when 10 
different sets of criteria were used with a sample of 322 patients. A significant 
high level of agreement was only found when pairs of criteria were compared to 
each other. This was only evident, however, with pairs such as Schneiderian 
criteria and the Present State Examination (PSE), which is not surprising as the 
PSE was devised with a Schneiderian view of schizophrenia in mind. If 
operationalised criteria such as these were used higher levels of reliability would
15
occur. The reality of medical practice is that many criteria are used with the 
concomitant unreliability attested to above.
The validity of the schizophrenic concept refers to its meaningfulness and utility 
as a diagnostic category. For instance, if schizophrenia is a valid syndrome, it 
should include a number of symptoms that go together or cluster so that if a 
patient is expressing one symptom there should be a high probability of suffering 
other specific symptoms. If schizophrenia is to be useful as a diagnostic tool, the 
concept should, also, show predictive validity. That is to say that diagnosis 
should predict outcome and a characteristic response to treatment. Finally, a 
valid diagnosis should also bear some relation to an underlying aetiology. 
However, it is not always common that accepted ‘disease entities’ fulfil these 
points of validity i.e. heart disease. Even so, heart disease is typified by certain 
symptoms that have a known common aetiology and has a known range of 
outcome(s) if not treated.
There appears to be little confidence to be had in the construct validity of 
schizophrenia. Delusions have been observed in affective as well as manic 
disorders (Winters and Neale, 1983; Andreasen, 1979). Hallucinations also have 
been seen in a wide range of other psychiatric disorders (Asaad and Shapiro, 
1986). The problems with the construct validity of the schizophrenia concept 
have been addressed, in part by attempts to recategorise the accepted
symptoms into subtypes of the condition. A common subtyping of schizophrenia 
has been to analyse the constituent symptoms by factor analysis and patient 
groups by cluster analysis. An extraction of common factors underlying various 
schizophrenic symptoms might imply, at least, subpathologies of the condition 
that may have common aetiology and construct validity. The identification of 
distinct patient groups with similar symptoms would implicate a specific ‘disease’ 
entity affecting those patients again with a greater probability of fulfilling 
minimum criteria for a disease with common aetiology and course. Advances in 
these techniques will be discussed later with regard to reconceptualising 
psychotic symptoms for more valid research and clinical purposes.
For clinical purposes, from a diagnosis of a condition, the clinician needs to be 
able to predict what kind of outcome can be expected and what treatments will 
be effective for that type of patient. As has been established above, 
schizophrenia is a category whereby one patient may be expressing completely 
different symptomatology from another but still receive the same diagnosis. On 
the basis of this evidence alone one can conclude that being a ‘schizophrenic’ is 
a heterogeneous condition. Much longitudinal research has been carried out into 
the analysis of outcome of those patients diagnosed as schizophrenic. The 
results of such research serve to emphasise the condition as heterogeneous and 
that a diagnosis of schizophrenia has poor predictive validity. Although Kraepelin 
(1896) believed that dementia praecox was a condition with inevitable poor
outcome, he later observed that some 13% of his ‘diagnosed’ patients apparently 
reached full recovery (Kraepelin, 1919). This confounder to his original construct 
was retrospectively explained away as these were not considered to have had 
true dementia praecox in the first place. In a more recent review of the literature, 
Harding et al. (1992), after analysing 5 separate outcome studies, reported that 
at least half of each cohort had significantly improved or recovered when 
assessed at 20, 30 and 40 year follow-up. Another measure of outcome, 
treatment response, has also shown a wide range of response levels. Although 
neuroleptic drug therapy is the major therapeutic tool in clinical practice, it has 
been shown to be of no benefit with between 10-30% of schizophrenic patients 
(Davis et al., 1980). In addition, other studies have shown that a significant sub­
group of initially responsive patients will relapse within two years of maintenance 
treatment (Kane and Lieberman, 1987). A diagnosis, by itself, therefore dose not 
appear to have any predictive validity in determining overall outcome or 
response to treatment. In fact, variables such as pre-morbid level of social 
functioning and duration of symptoms before first admission appear to be 
correlated more significantly with outcome state (Lieberman and Sobel, 1993) 
than diagnosis. Also, environmental factors such as returning to a family 
intolerant of bizarre behaviour, highly critical or over-involved, so called high 
expressed emotion families, again, appear to be more predictive of relapse than 
diagnosis alone (Vaughn and Left, 1976).
The differences in outcome as measured by response to neuroleptic medication 
would indicate that there is little confidence to suppose a specific aetiological, 
moreover biological substrate, ‘causing' the hypothetical schizophrenic illness. 
The dominance of the medical profession in the care and treatment of the 
‘mentally ill' has resulted in a concentration on a biomedical model of causality 
for schizophrenia. The presumed biological substrate of schizophrenia has 
persisted for several reasons. Firstly, that a presumed biological substrate of 
‘madness’ has legitimised medical practitioners to control the care of the ‘insane’ 
(Scull, 1979). Therefore, the continued dominant role of the medical profession, 
and psychiatry as a legitimate specialisation within the medical fraternity, in the 
management and care of the psychoses depends on the continuous application 
of a biomedical approach (Bentall et al., 1988). Secondly, millions of pounds 
have been used to pursue the discovery of a biological substrate of 
schizophrenia and many advances have been made in the neurophysiological 
and neuropathological understanding of ‘schizophrenic’ brains. However, an 
overview of the literature shows that almost every biological variable known to 
affect behaviour, in man, has been implicated in the aetiology of schizophrenia. 
The major biological candidates for causality have been genetic and 
biochemical. A detailed description of this large area of research is not in the 
remit of this essay. However, considering the evidence for a genetic disposition 
for schizophrenia highlights a vulnerability to developing the condition.
Therefore, if vulnerability to schizophrenia is a product of polygenetic inheritance
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(see Gottesman and Shields, 1982), this would indicate a multidimensional 
model of schizophrenia than a traditional unitary one (Claridge, 1985).
The case for a biological substrate, underpinning schizophrenia, was more 
clearly an unfounded assumption until the discovery of antipsychotic medication 
in the 1950s. From the apparent efficacy of such drugs to ameliorate psychotic 
symptoms, neurotransmitter dysfunction hypotheses were proffered as the most 
likely candidates to date to explain schizophrenic dysfunction on a biological 
level. The main action of these drugs as dopamine antagonists lead to a 
hypothesis of dopamine overactivity in the formation of psychotic experiences 
(Randrup and Munkvad, 1972). In fact, the discovery of elevated numbers of D2 
receptors in, particularly, subcortical structures of neuroleptic free schizophrenic 
patients would indicate that dopamine overactivity does play some role in 
‘schizophrenia’ (Owen et al., 1984). However, many of the observed dopamine 
system abnormalities have been attributed to prolonged exposure to neuroleptics 
(Gattaz, 1983). It may be the case that dysfunction of dopamine systems (and 
other separate and associated neurotransmitter systems) may have a role to play 
in the formation of, particularly positive, psychotic symptoms. However, as 
indicated above since not all diagnosed schizophrenic patients respond to 
antipsychotic drugs the biochemical association between transmitter systems 
and symptoms appears much more complex. In fact, the causal pathway might 
work in the other direction and that mood, behaviour or environmental events
themselves might have a significant influence on brain physiology. To explain 
psychotic symptoms as being ‘caused’ by biochemical abnormalities might be a 
misguided exercise itself by mixing up levels of explanation (Mortimer and 
McKenna, 1994). Psychotic experiences are primarily psychological phenomena 
and ought to be explained in psychological terms before being mapped onto 
putative dysfunctional brain sites (Frith, 1992). This would lend support for 
psychologists of either clinical or research background to divert the emphasis of 
aetiological explanation and management of psychotic experiences from a 
medical to psychologically based methodology with, perhaps, subsequent 
biological associations.
The above evidence would indicate that within both research and for clinical 
usage the term ‘schizophrenia’ provides little in the way of scientific validity (or 
reliability) and that the aetiological assumption that ‘schizophrenia’ is an organic 
condition is not supported empirically and has been proliferated by a profession 
with an interest in self preservation. It is of interest to note that clinical 
psychologists among other care professionals may have, unwittingly or 
otherwise, colluded in the medical dominance of the care and treatment of 
psychotic experiences and the persistence of the ‘schizophrenic’ biomedical 
concept of psychosis as a convenient split of work practices. Psychiatry might 
have been left alone to work with the most disturbed of patients, while 
psychologists working in the ‘safe’ area of the neuroses avoided having to invest
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time an effort in the construction of suitable therapies for the amelioration of the 
‘harder’ psychoses.
A preliminary conclusion from this essay is that clinical psychologists ought not 
to use the term ‘schizophrenia’ at all but discuss psychosis in more valid and 
reliable terms. Whether this would encourage tensions between therapists 
involved in the management and treatment of schizophrenia, including 
psychologists, and psychiatrists is a moot point, but what has been shown above 
is that the concept as it stands is not a scientifically valid term, therefore, there is 
little wonder that traditional ‘schizophrenia’ research and options for therapeutic 
interventions are in somewhat of an impasse presently. Alternative more valid 
categorisation of psychotic symptoms are now warranted if the care for patients 
suffering these experiences is to become more efficacious. An additional point of 
note is that the persistence of the ‘schizophrenia’ as a biomedical concept might 
also, in part, be due to the collaboration of sufferers and families, as well as the 
clinician (Scott, 1973) in order to abjugate responsibility of a distressing 
condition from the individual, family and society at large. Such issues must be 
kept in mind when seeking to provide categorical and aetiological alternatives to 
the presently perceived use of the term.
The final part of this essay will deal, briefly, with how a new conceptualisation 
might help the clinical psychologist as researcher as well as clinician in
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theorising and planning interventions in the understanding and management of 
psychotic symptoms. Firstly, as attested to above, new statistical techniques 
might provide a subtyping of the constituent symptoms traditionally associated 
with ‘schizophrenia’ (and even other psychiatric disorders) to isolate putative 
subpathologies of illness that might provide greater validity as constructs.
Initially, Crow (1980) provided a subtyping of schizophrenic symptoms into Type 
1 and Type 2 schizophrenia in an attempt to account for the heterogeneity of the 
condition with special regard to treatment response. Type 1 schizophrenia was 
typified by positive symptomatology, probable aetiology in a dysfunctional 
dopamine system and, on this basis, good response to neuroleptic medication. 
Type 2 schizophrenia was characterised by poor prognosis, probable aetiology 
in structural abnormalities and concomitant intellectual deterioration. Liddle 
(1987) and Liddle and Barnes (1990) in an empirical factor analysis of symptoms 
provided a tripartheid sub typing of psychotic symptoms of psychomotor poverty, 
disorganisation and reality distortion and was able to infer that these 
subpathologies might be due to differing disease processes on account of them 
being associated with different neuropsychological profiles (Liddle and Morris, 
1991). These approaches still rely on an organic assumption of the underpinning 
dysfunction associated with the ‘illnesses’. Rawlings and Claridge(1984) 
suggested that psychotic symptoms should be seen as lying on one end of a 
spectrum of ‘normal’ behaviour as many ‘normal’ subjects have been shown to
express ‘schizotypal’ traits. This was offered in support of a multidimensional 
appreciation of psychotic symptoms which, in turn, provides support for the 
multidimensional modelling approach derived from biological investigations, 
especially, the spread of dispositional genes. However, to consider such a 
concept as ‘schizoptypal’ may be just replacing one controversial construct with 
an even more fragile one (Wing, 1988). Finally, a single symptom approach has 
been put forward (Bentall et al., 1988) that may have five major advantages for 
research and clinical use. It avoids the issues of diagnosis and classification, 
can focus on phenomena that are often overlooked, might facilitate theoretical 
development, recognises that clinical behaviours may have common roots in 
‘normal’ behaviour and might herald a better overall classification of symptoms 
through better understanding of individual symptoms. Recent research focusing 
on single symptoms such as paranoid persecutory delusions has enabled the 
fulfilment of most of these points (Bentall, 1994). From Bentall’s research it is 
clear that considering single symptoms allows the clinical psychologist to focus 
on a concept whose aetiology is easier to isolate in psychological terms and, 
therefore, can be dealt with using complementary psychological interventions. 
The single symptom approach might be a promising starting point for clinical 
psychologists to advance the understanding and management of psychotic 
behaviour. It provides, by no means the final chapter to the story as many 
symptoms are seldom experienced in isolation (Frith, 1992). However, if clinical 
psychologists are to involve themselves at the coal face of understanding and
treatment of psychotic phenomena they must abandon outdated, scientifically 
invalid concepts such as ‘schizophrenia’ along with the accompanying 
biomedical assumptions about psychotic behaviour. Clinical psychologists must 
develop the confidence to construct new more valid approaches to categorising 
this type of behaviour, that might warrant multidimensional modelling, but speeds 
up research and intervention plans for the benefit of those who, despite how 
psychotic phenomena are categorised, are still greatly disturbed by such 
experiences.
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LEARNING DISABILITIES ESSAY
‘PEOPLE WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES ARE MORE AT RISK OF BEING 
SEXUALLY ABUSED AND COMMITTING SEXUAL OFFENCES’ DISCUSS 
THE CONTRIBUTION CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY CAN MAKE TO THESE
ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIETAL ATTITUDES.
This essay will deal with the issues contained in the title on three fronts. Firstly, 
the literature needs to be analysed to address the argument that people with 
learning disabilities are more susceptible to being sexually abused and 
committing sexual offences than the general population. Secondly, how may 
clinical psychologists use the conclusions from such an analysis in their work, 
within the immediate field of learning disabilities, in terms of the attitudes of the 
individual with learning disabilities, their families and other carers/professional 
workers? Lastly, there is a need to consider what implications sexual abuse and 
learning disabilities issues have for individuals with learning disabilities in a 
wider social context.
Presently, there has only been limited studies carried out into the prevalence 
and nature of sexual abuse with adults (and children) with learning disabilities 
(Fenwick, 1994). The largest survey to date was carried out by Turk and Brown 
(1992) in the South East Thames area. This two year study uncovered 119 new 
cases of sexual abuse of adults with learning disabilities, 84 of which were 
proven or ‘highly suspected’. In this sub cohort 61 (73%) of the victims were 
female and 23 (27%) were male. These figures represented instances of sexual 
abuse across the range of learning disabilities. 16 (19%) had severe or profound 
learning disabilities (IQ 35 or less), 33 (40.2%) had severe/moderate to 
moderate learning disabilities (IQ 36-50) and 33 (40.2%) had mild or borderline 
learning disabilities (IQ 51-80). It was noted, therefore, that approximately 60%
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of the sample were legally unable to give consent to sexual intercourse (Turk 
and Brown, 1992). The most likely source of disclosure was the victim 
themselves, in over two thirds of the cases. Professional/care worker reports 
were evident in less than 25% of the cases which, when considering clients 
might not be able to verbally disclose sexual abuse, is a worrying statistic.
Almost 70% of the sample had significant communication problems.
When considering who were the abusers, a man was the perpetartor in 97% of 
cases. However, by far the largest proportion of perpetrators were other people 
with learning disabilities. In 35 (42%) of the cases the perpetrator had a learning 
disability, compared to family members (15 cases), staff/volunteers (12 cases) 
and other known and ‘trusted’ individuals i.e. family ‘friends’ (14 cases). It was of 
interest that the figures for the perpetrators with learning disabilities uncovered 
evidence of multiple offending. The 35 cases involving a person with learning 
disabilities, represented offending by only 23 perpetrators. The family cases 
were all single offences by the perpetrator. The issue of multiple offending raises 
issues for staff to investigate further evidence of offending if the individual in the 
institution or home has access to other potential victims. Brown and Turk (1993) 
suggested that the incidence of sexual abuse being perpetrated by a person with 
learning disabilities might be exaggerated due to the likelihood of such offences 
happening in public and, generally, easier to detect than in instances of close
35
family abuse where the private nature of the abuse and familial power relations 
might make disclosure less likely.
Other studies appear to confirm that people with learning disabilities have 
experienced incidents of sexual abuse above the rate reported in the general 
population (Fenwick, 1994). Chamberlain et al. (1984), in a study of 87 girls and 
young women with learning disabilities, found 25% had a history of sexual abuse 
defined as attempted or ‘successful’ intercourse. In a postal survey of British 
Consultant Psychiatrists specialising in learning disabilities, the prevalence of 
abuse was estimated to be between 4-5% with sexual abuse being more 
common than physical abuse or neglect (Cooke, 1989). The prevalence of the 
sexual abuse of people with learning disabilities appears to be higher than 
estimates of child sexual abuse in the general population (i.e. 1 in 10 for children 
in Britain; Baker and Duncan, 1985). Reasons for this disproportionate 
experience of sexual abuse have been given as people with learning disabilities’ 
dependence on care givers (for most of their lives), emotional and social 
insecurity, reduced ability to disclose, lack of education (social and sexual) and 
additional physical disabilities (Brown and Craft, 1989). The implications of the 
heightened prevalence of sexual abuse of people with learning difficulties and 
possible disposition to abuse raise serious questions for individuals with learning 
disabilities, care workers and professionals within learning disability services. 
Issues also arise concerning the attitudes of society at large with regard to the
sexuality of people with learning disabilities. It is of concern that in the Turk and 
Brown (1992) study few cases, of likely sexual abuse resulted in court or formal 
proceedings. No action was taken against the perpetrator in almost half of the 
reported cases. In the whole sample prosecution or staff disciplinary hearings 
took place in only 15 (18.5%) of cases. At the time of publication only 7 cases 
had been successfully proven; 4 prosecutions and 3 disciplinary hearings. The 
authors concluded that such a poor rate of prosecution warrants a higher level of 
service competency in the collecting of evidence to secure successful 
prosecutions, where appropriate. However, it was not reported whether this rate 
of prosecutions was reflective of general sexually related crimes.
It is difficult to make any general conclusions about sexual abuse and sex 
offending involving people with learning disabilities on a superficial glance at the 
results of the studies cited above. To do so has the propensity to shape and, 
perhaps maintain, ill- informed and regressive societal attitudes, including 
families, staff and the individuals themselves, concerning the sexuality of people 
with learning disabilities. The results of the above studies cannot be seen in 
isolation from problems in defining sexual abuse and identifying instances i.e. is 
it easier to detect abuse perpetrated by a person with a learning disability? and, 
when considering alleged sexual abuse involving persons with learning 
disabilities as offender and victim, issues involving consent ought to be 
accounted for (Brown and Turk, 1992). These authors noted that without
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information about the circumstances surrounding the abuse and detailed 
considerations of the consent issues, the actual details of the act itself constitute 
virtually neutral information.
Although consideration of the above issues is vital in establishing co-ordinated 
policy documents and procedural guidelines for investigating suspected sexual 
abuse, the remit of this essay is to focus more on what role clinical psychology 
might have in the context of societal attitudes towards the sexuality of people 
with learning disabilities within the background of the data on the prevalence of 
sexual abuse and offending of learning disabled people.
Attitudes towards the sexuality of people with learning disabilities appear to be 
dichotomised presently between those who advocate greater sexual freedom and 
those who urge caution and protection (Brown and Turk, 1994). The data being 
accumulated on the prevalence of sexual abuse and offending, within this group, 
highlights the need of service providers to prioritise issues surrounding the 
sexuality of people with learning disabilities. In the debate between those 
advocating more freedom and those urging protection, families tend to support 
the later stance (Brown, 1987). Although this recognises that freedom or rights 
require complementary responsibility, their stance does reinforce an enduring 
historical attitude that people with learning disabilities are to be considered no 
more than children, who although physically mature are to be denied appropriate
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sociosexual education and opportunities to exercise appropriate sexual 
behaviour (Craft, 1987). This attitude can apply to all carers of people with 
learning disabilities not just parents. This situation is far from satisfactory as it 
may reduce the anxiety of families and care-workers concerning potential 
exploitation or inappropriate behaviour but it serves no purpose in addressing 
the rights of people with learning disabilities who wish to express themselves 
sexually. There needs to be some squaring of these two needs. It is plainly 
useless to accept the survey findings at face value and, thus, maintain an 
attitude of threat towards the sexual behaviour of people with learning 
disabilities. Rather the picture appears to indicate that the protective stance of 
parents and care workers, for whatever reason, has served to ignore the status 
of people with learning disabilities as active sexual beings. It is ironic that such 
agencies panic at the statistics when the group they seek to protect, or be 
protected from, has been denied access to sex education and opportunities to 
see themselves positively as sexual beings and to express their sexuality 
appropriately.
The revelations of the prevalence of abuse and abusing involving people with 
learning disabilities might, in fact, enable social agencies to ignore issues 
surrounding the sexuality of people with learning disabilities no longer. Brown 
and Turk (1994) suggested that the present state of affairs is ripe for dealing with 
issues of sexuality through self-advocacy, parental lobbies and professional
expertise which can be developed separately then brought together. They 
suggested that this type of approach constitutes the best hope of empowerment 
and protection for people with learning disabilities in facing sexual issues. 
Hopefully, such a partnership might also serve to change the different 
perceptions of each others’ roles in the decision making and policy forming 
process of such an integral part of the lives of people with learning disabilities. 
The role clinical psychology can make in the achievement of more constructive 
attitudes and positive promotion of people with learning disabilities’ sexuality can 
involve advocating sexual rights, working with parents’, care workers’ and 
systems’ preconceptions and fears surrounding the sexuality of people with 
learning difficulties. Clinical psychologists have a role to play in the education of 
parents and care workers in how to deal emotionally and practically with 
sexuality issues and also in the construction of policy statements and documents 
for homes and institutions to supplement the law and to implement and highlight 
the limitations of the rights of people with learning disabilities concerning their 
sexuality. Attitudinal and behavioural intervention on the part of the clinical 
psychologist is possibly essential in individual work with survivors of abuse and 
education of abusers.
The issue of fundamental rights in the realm of sexuality and learning disability 
has been comprehensively addressed by Ann Craft (1987). Based on the 1971 
United Nations Declaration of Rights for the mentally handicapped, she
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proposed six basic rights for people with learning disabilities that emphasise 
their value as sexual beings. These are:
1. The rights to grow up: to be treated with the respect and dignity accorded to 
adults.
2. The right to know: to have access to as much information about themselves 
and their bodies and those of other people, their emotions, appropriate social 
behaviour etc., as they can assimilate.
3. The right to be sexual and to make and break relationships.
4. The right not to be at the mercy of the individual sexual attitudes of different 
care-givers.
5. The right not to be sexually abused.
6. The right to humane and dignified environments.
In the establishing of these rights the author advocated an attitude, on behalf of 
parents and care workers to acknowledge the first signs of sexuality in their 
children/clients and to celebrate this as another milestone of normal 
development. Parents, care workers and individuals, who perhaps have been 
embarrassed to discuss matters of sexuality, ought to be engaged in sex 
education programmes in the context of social and health education. It has been 
noted that a knowledge of basic facts can engender a feeling of relief in both 
teachers and students that may lead on to deal with more personal issues of 
sexuality in a mature manner (Brown, 1983).
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Johnson and Kempton (1981) described four attitudes towards the sexuality of 
people with a learning disability; the elimination of their sexuality, tolerate their 
sexuality, accept their sexuality or cultivate their sexuality. People with learning 
disabilities need to be given positive options to express themselves sexually. As 
Craft (1987) noted ‘...we often go to great lengths to discourage unacceptable 
behaviour in terms of the wrong time..place..person, but do not expend nearly so 
much effort in considering what would be the right time..place..person’ (p.23). In 
the context of promoting the establishment of relationships parents, care workers 
etc., and individuals with learning disabilities must be aware that despite 
education and counselling, the individual must be given the ‘dignity of risk’ 
(Perske, 1972) that rights to relationship formation may also entail break up i.e. 
clients cannot be protected from all risks.
Policy guidelines have been considered integral documents for homes, 
institutions etc., not only to protect the individual with learning disabilities from 
the personal feelings of staff members to their sexuality but to provide consistent 
and clear guidelines for the staff to follow and implement (Craft, 1987). Such 
guidelines may be constructed to promote the sexual rights of people with 
learning disabilities within the context of proper sociosexual education and an 
environment that values relationships, enhances respect and provides privacy to 
pursue such behaviour and counselling if necessary. The staff should be aware
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of the boundaries of accepted sexual behaviour, of legal issues, have access to 
counselling themselves and given baselines for discussions with parents. The 
involvement of both individual clients and staff, perhaps co ordinated by clinical 
psychologists, in the production of such guidelines may serve at once to 
empower clients and strengthen commitment to the policy on behalf of the staff.
In a wider social context, a well constituted policy might provide a strong base to 
counter sensationalist stories proliferated by the tabloid press that may have, in 
the past, reinforced negative and prejudiced attitudes towards the sexuality of 
people with learning disabilities. Koheeallee and Dustin (1989) reported that 
units that had constructed and implemented policy guidelines had found them 
useful in setting out legal and ethical boundaries of permissible behaviour which, 
in turn, provided a framework for training and education and which specific cases 
could be referred.
The results of the surveys leave the reader in no doubt that the sexual abuse 
and offending of people with learning disabilities are issues of great concern 
especially with regard to how parents and services provide for the expression of 
sexuality of people with learning disabilities as a whole. Clinical psychologists 
may be involved in issues surrounding sexual abuse as investigators, sources of 
disclosure and therapists to victims. These roles are extremely important but 
constitute involvement ‘after the fact'. It has already been established that
clinical psychologists might be able to be primary movers with managers in the 
development of policies that might promote the sexual rights of people with 
learning disabilities and cater for the anxieties of staff in institutions. The 
successful implementation of such policy documents may serve to change the 
attitudes of parents and staff from embarrassment and overprotective behaviour 
to a more positive outlook on such matters. The active sexuality of learning 
disabled person's is a fact, it is up to parents and staff to address these issues 
positively and to develop more constructive attitudes towards their 
offspring/clients. Clinical psychologists may have a pivotal role to play in the 
adjustment of the attitudes of these groups through forming positive education 
plans for parents/staff as well as their clients.
The major influence of clinical psychologists appears to be restricted to the close 
personal environment of people with learning disabilities. Apart from the wider 
ramifications of policy documents it is difficult to see what role clinical 
psychologists might have in the context of wider societal attitudes. A wider 
contribution in the context of societal attitudes concerning the fears and 
misconceptions of the sexuality of people with learning disabilities, on behalf of 
clinical psychologists, may be speculative at this point. However, the message 
that parents and care workers cannot at the same time fear the ‘uncontrolled’ 
sexual behaviour of the learning disabled and ignore the need to educate clients 
in the expression of appropriate sexual behaviour should be made clear to all.
Although people with learning disabilities are no longer sterilised without consent 
even in the 1990s reports appear of local residents protesting about the setting 
up of a new home/hostel for people with learning disabilities on the grounds of 
‘protecting their children’. There is obviously a need to re-educate society at 
large to be aware of the issues that underpin the research findings. Clinical 
psychologists as educators and experts in this field may do well to correspond 
with schools and the media in the positive understanding and promotion of 
issues of sexuality and the general perception of people with learning disabilities’ 
place in society as a whole.
It is no longer acceptable to ignore the needs of a group of people who have 
been disempowered from most forms of normal interaction, particularly sexual, 
through fear and then ignore the responsibility of rectifying the situation. Clinical 
psychologists and other health educationalists should be better equipped to 
contribute their expertise in this controversial but important area.
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CHILD AND ADOLESCENT ESSAY
DOES «COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL THERAPY WORK FOR CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS ?
* for purposes of brevity ‘cognitive-behavioural therapy’ will be abbreviated to 
CBT in this essay.
In general terms CBT describes a range of psychotherapeutic techniques where 
psychological distress and maladaptive behaviour are treated by changing an 
individual’s style of thinking and behaviour (Kaplan et al. 1995). Originally 
conceived by Aaron Beck (1967, 1976), CBT has been widely used in the 
treatment of adult mental health disorders particularly in the area of depression 
(see Beck et al., 1987). Presently CBT techniques are being progressively used 
to treat psychological disorders in childhood and adolescence not only in terms 
of formal psychiatric disorders but also in generalised areas of emotional 
distress and behavioural dysfunction.
The purpose of this essay is to evaluate whether CBT does in fact prove 
therapeutically beneficial for childhood and adolescent psychopathology. 
However, it is important to give a definition at the outset as to what one means 
by CBT ‘working’ or otherwise. In the review of the literature it will become 
apparent that a common understanding of the efficacy of CBT relates to ratings 
of symptomatology whether self-report or by interview/psychometrics or 
observational criteria in a comparison of pre-treatment and post-treatment states 
using both within and between subject designs. However, the evaluation of 
something called CBT is a complex and problematic area for stringent 
comparative research. CBT is not a monomodal intervention used uniformly 
across different clients and different types of disorders. Although most CBT 
interventions may have similar goals, the means to reach those goals can and
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often have to be flexible and creative. Therefore, it is important to note that the 
difficulties in evaluating CBT with tight research criteria might result from its 
inherent advantages as a goal- but not rule-driven style of intervention. Some of 
these research issues will be discussed in greater detail later.
Despite the above caveat, this essay will attempt to analyse the relevant 
literature to clarify the efficacy of CBT. In this pursuit a brief general description 
of CBT will be given-from its theoretical basis to clinical applications. Secondly, 
the use of CBT will be discussed with reference to several areas of childhood 
and adolescent psychopathology and how effective its application has been 
within these areas. Finally, there will be a general discussion of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the use of CBT in childhood and adolescent psychological 
disorders. From the literature to date implications for future research will also be 
discussed.
CBT use in childhood and adolescent psychological disorders
The aim of CBT is to integrate the demonstrated positive effects of behavioural 
therapy with the cognitive activities of the client to produce therapeutic change 
(Kendall and Hollon, 1979). Effective change via CBT necessitates the 
consideration of both a child’s internal and external environment (Meichenbaum, 
1977). In fact, proponents of CBT state that it encompasses a wide range of
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therapeutic techniques not only to alter behaviour and cognitions but also 
emotional and social functioning (Kaplan et al., 1995).
Kendall (1985) dichotomised the types of information-processing abnormalities 
underlying childhood psychopathology into cognitive deficits i.e. the failure to 
apply adaptive cognitive strategies to particular situations and cognitive 
distortions i.e. biased or dysfunctional information-processing in terms of 
judgement errors or dysfunctional belief systems. Beck (1976) proposed that it is 
through the examination of an individual’s beliefs about an event and the 
proffering of certain alternatives that changes in feelings and behaviour can 
occur.
In essence the CBT model places greatest emphasis on the learning process, 
the influence of environmental contingencies and models and an individual’s 
cognitive style in the understanding and amelioration of psychological problems 
and distress (Kendall and Lochman, 1994). However, of great importance, 
especially in consideration of the efficacy of CBT, is the premise that any 
changes brought about should generalise to other functional domains and be 
maintained over time (Kaplan et al., 1995).
The crux of CBT is the change of maladaptive cognitive structures called 
‘schemas’ into adaptive or ‘coping’ schemas. A schema is an information-
processing template through which an individual perceives and makes sense of 
the world. Thus a schema constitutes the basis for screening out, differentiating 
and encoding stimuli that confronts an individual (Beck et al., 1979; 1987). The 
object of treatment, therefore, is to develop a new template (or modify a previous 
one) to facilitate coping that can be used to re-evaluate previously 
problematic/distressing situations. The therapist facilitates this change by 
analysing the child’s attributions about previous behaviour and expectations for 
future behaviour then aids the child in acquiring cognitive structures for future 
situations involving the development of adaptive skills and appropriate 
cognitions associated with adaptive functioning (Kendall and Lochman, 1994).
In considering what constitutes appropriate and adaptive behaviour, close 
attention should, of course, be paid to internal and external constraints. It is of 
the utmost importance that, during CBT with children and adolescents, the 
therapist and significant others e.g. parents, teachers etc., who may act as ‘co­
therapists’, observe ‘normal’ psychological/social development levels in their 
conceptualisation of the problem and are aware that such developmental 
processes continue throughout childhood to adulthood (Kaplan et al., 1995).
The role of the therapist is vital in CBT on a number of fronts. Kendall and 
Lochman (1994) described the role of the therapist as ‘consultant, diagnostician 
and educator’. Therapy is a structured and goal driven exercise based on a
thorough assessment of the client’s cognitions and behaviour as well as 
emotions and family, school and peer relationships. The therapist is a source of 
ideas that both s/he and the client can evaluate collaboratively to seek solutions 
tailored to that individual. It is important that the therapist has an independent 
perspective of the client’s needs (and strengths) apart from the opinions of 
parents, teachers and other health professionals who might have unrealistic 
expectations of the client’s behaviour or might mislabel the client’s difficulties 
masking a more accurate appraisal and labelling of the client’s particular 
difficulties. Finally, in the therapeutic relationship, there needs to be clear 
communication between both parties (and the parents etc.) and the building of 
trust so that solutions might have credibility for the client and that the social 
reinforcement of the therapist is a motivating factor in the client’s practice of 
solutions and general involvement in therapy.
CBT applied to specific psychological disorders of childhood/adolescence 
and outcome research
Anxiety
Although anxiety can be a normal and adaptive response, it is clinically 
significant before adulthood when fear is excessive, not developmentally 
congruent and disruptive or maladaptive (Kendall and Lochman, 1994). There
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are three particular types of pre-adult anxiety disorder that have been 
distinguished in DSMIII- R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987); 
overanxious disorder, separation anxiety disorder and avoidance disorder. 
Overanxious disorder emphasises excessive worrying about the future and 
preoccupation with the past. Such clients find relaxing difficult and need constant 
reassurance concerning their competence. Their anxiety is generalised and is 
not related to specific environmental events. Separation anxiety manifests as 
excessive distress when separated from attachment figures (Strauss and Lahey, 
1987). Separation anxiety can lead to more specific problems such as school 
phobia, through avoidance. In terms of developmental processes such an anxiety 
might be congruent with the behaviour expected of a very young child but be 
inappropriate expressed by a 10 year old. Avoidance anxiety is characterised by 
persistent avoidance of social situations with unfamiliar people although the 
same individual may enjoy healthy social relations with known persons. Timidity 
and unassertiveness are characteristic of such a disorder. As will become clear 
later, researchers have not always used such rigid classifications of the 
treatment groups under investigation.
As with the conception of adult anxiety disorders (see Clark, 1991) children’s 
anxiety disorders can involve physiological, behavioural and cognitive 
components. Particular behaviours associated with childhood anxiety are 
avoidance, clinging, thumb-sucking, crying and nail-biting. Childhood thinking
associated with anxiety states appears to be characterised by fear of being 
scared or hurt, self-criticism and danger (Barrios and Hartman, 1988). Highly 
anxious children appear to anticipate failure in performance and are excessively 
fearful of the negative evaluation of others (Prins, 1985) and tend to misinterpret 
somatic symptoms of anxiety as catastrophic which reinforces their anxiety states 
(Kendall and Chansky, 1991).
The treatment of childhood anxiety states usually follows the adult paradigm and 
combines different strategies to address the multidimensional nature of the 
disorder. Kendall and Lochman (1994) suggested successful treatment depends 
on working towards ‘intercomponent awareness, communication and control’. 
Physical symptoms are usually dealt with ‘traditional’ relaxation training. 
Behavioural modelling has shown to be a highly effective strategy with anxious 
children with the therapist modelling coping in anxiety provoking situations as 
well as being able to verbalise associated cognitions to the client (Kendall et al., 
1992). In terms of cognitive style maladaptive self-talk has been implicated in 
mediating childhood anxiety (Kendall and Hollon, 1989). Thus the teaching of 
positive self-talk is a central part of cognitive therapy. Kendall et al. (1992) 
suggested that optimal efficacy of psychological intervention in anxiety disorders 
involves the combination of the type of techniques described above.
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As with much of the outcome research into childhood/adolescence therapy, the 
literature pertaining to the success of using CBT with anxiety disorders is not 
extensive. However, in an early study CBT involving positive self-talk and 
stimulus-oriented talk (e.g. Tm enjoying this particular situation’), significantly 
increased the duration of staying in the dark of a treatment versus a control 
group of children suffering night fears (Kanfer et al., 1975). Interventions 
emphasising such cognitive coping strategies have been seen to have 
therapeutic advantage over solely educational material, with children’s levels of 
anxiety surrounding a trip to the dentists, in terms of co-operation and pulse 
levels (Siegel and Peterson, 1980). Although this is a good example of the 
comparative effectiveness of CBT in a reality-based situation, the group was 
non-clinical which questions the generalisability of such research findings to 
clinical populations. This problem also occurs in a contemporary analysis of 
whether the modality of CBT interventions should mirror the client’s anxiety state 
(see Terry et al., 1995). In this study of performance anxiety the mode of CBT 
intervention was deemed non-significant to the levels of anxiety reduction. Thus, 
with the above caveat concerning non-clinical group research, generic CBT 
techniques might be as beneficial as specific strategies dictated by the 
characteristics of the anxiety disorder. Future studies ought to clarify this 
involving clinical groups.
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In a comprehensive use of CBT using relaxation training, imagery, problem­
solving and modification of self-talk to develop schema that perceives anxiety as 
manageable, Kendall (1989) found significant reductions in self-reported coping 
in a treatment group of children with diagnosed anxiety disorders compared to a 
waiting list condition. However, the use of such heterogeneous groups can only 
indicate generalised group effects of CBT. However, in this study 60% of the 
treatment group had no diagnosis of anxiety disorder posttreatment compared to 
7% of the control group which is a convincing example of CBT intervention with 
this type of client.
The role of parents, teachers etc., has been highlighted above in terms of the 
generalising and maintaining therapeutic change. However, in a multimodal CBT 
intervention of anxiety disorder in a large group of 9-13 year olds (Kendall, 1994) 
the significant reduction in anxiety symptoms observed in the treatment group, 
compared to controls, was not related to ratings of the children’s perception of 
the therapeutic relationship or the therapists perception of parental involvement. 
This later point being of added note as at a one year follow-up the therapeutic 
gains recorded at posttreatment had been maintained. Assuming these 
subjective perceptions of the ‘environmental’ aspects of therapy hold a measure 
of significance, it appears that individual motivation factors concerning the use of 
therapy, in this study, might signify a greater predictor of outcome. However, in a 
multimodal CBT intervention with a small group of social phobic adolescents,
significant pretreatment-posttreatment effects were observed and at one year 
follow-up (Albano et al., 1995). There was also a significant decline in ratings of 
depressive symptoms within the group over the aforementioned time points. The 
multimodal design deliberately involved the presence of parents in selected 
sessions. There was no control group in this study. However, the above two 
studies suggest that the role of therapist and parental involvement in the success 
of CBT treatment of anxiety disorders requires further controlled studies.
It appears that CBT can be highly effective with childhood/adolescent groups of 
client’s with anxiety disorders and also with non-clinical groups. However, most 
studies compared CBT interventions incorporating multidimensional 
interventions, as is warranted by the multidimensional nature of the disorders. 
This, however, does not indicate which strategies are the most effective 
singularly or in combination or which strategies within a single dimension of 
therapy i.e. cognitive: positive self-talk versus problem solving, are the most 
efficacious. Generalised findings across studies are also difficult to determine as 
the number, structure and content of the sessions varies so widely as do the 
outcome measures used. Groups representing more homogeneous subtypes of 
anxiety disorders, as defined in DSMIII-R/IV are also required as only limited 
conclusions about specific disorders can be obtained from groups representing 
an amalgam of undefined ‘anxiety disorders’. Some of these problems may be 
insurmountable due to the idiosyncratic nature of particular CBT regimes that
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have to acknowledge clinical considerations before research demands. Future 
studies do, however, need to face these challenges if the encouraging emergent 
results of CBT with anxiety disorders is to be analysed scientifically to produce 
clearer empirical data for even more effective interventions in the future.
Depression
Childhood/adolescent depression is relatively common, Rutter et al. (1970), in 
the Isle of Wight Study found 40% of 14-15 year olds reporting depressive 
symptoms. Depression in this age group also carries significant morbidity and 
mortality (Harrington, 1990), with suicide ranking as the fourth major cause of 
death in this group (Petti and Larson, 1987).
Depressed children show a negative perspective of themselves, their 
environment and the future and distort information resulting in self-devaluation 
and hopelessness (Kaslow et al., 1984). They also have reduced levels of self­
esteem and perceived academic and social competence (Asarnow et al., 1987). 
Common CBT includes emphasis on self-control skills, social skills and cognitive 
restructuring (Stark et al., 1991). Self control skills include increasing self-reward 
and decreasing the frequency and intensity of self-punishment, self-monitoring of 
positive self-attributes, reduction of perfectionist standards and improvements in 
assertion skills. Social skills training concentrates on methods to initiate and
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maintain interactions, dealing with conflict and concomitant relaxation training. 
Cognitive restructuring challenges the client's evidence for their distorted 
perceptions. The above list is comprehensive but not exhaustive.
Presently there exists very little research on the effectiveness of CBT with 
childhood/adolescent depression. The small literature that does exist is notable 
for its lack of large scale studies and studies analysing the mechanisms by which 
children and adolescents might have benefited from CBT.
In a randomised study design involving 30 moderately depressed adolescents, 
CBT was compared to relaxation training and waiting list conditions (Reynolds 
and Coates, 1986). Interventions occurred twice weekly for five weeks. There 
were significant reductions in self-report and clinical ratings of depressive 
symptoms compared to the control group of the CBT and relaxation training 
groups. The therapeutic effects were maintained at five week follow-up and were 
accompanied by reductions in anxiety and an increase in perceived academic 
competence and self-concept. One can conclude from this study that active 
intervention works better than none, however, not to the greater efficacy of CBT 
over standard relaxation therapy. Stark et al. (1991) found significant 
improvement in depressive symptomatology of a ‘self-control’ group and a 
behavioural problem-solving group over a waiting list group with moderate to 
severely depressed 9-12 year olds at posttreatment and follow-up. However,
there was little evidence of generalising the effects of the cognitive and 
behavioural groups to their home settings which does not augur well for the 
transfer of CBT techniques with childhood depressives across situations. One 
promising study has investigated the prevention of unipolar depressive disorder 
in high school students (see Clarke et al., 1995). One hundred and fifty subjects 
considered ‘at-risk’ for future depression were randomised to either a 15-session 
cognitive group prevention intervention or a control condition. At 12 month 
follow-up a significant advantage in favour of the prevention group was recorded 
with DSM-IIIR affective disorders affecting 14.5% of the treatment group 
compared to an incidence of 25.7% in the control group. Resources permitting, 
therefore, this type of preventative approach to childhood/adolescent depression 
represents a promising use of CBT with these clients. Future research into this 
type of approach, as well as in the others mentioned, necessitates an analysis of 
the mechanisms of cognitive-behavioural change so that therapists can be aware 
of the effective components of change and not that behavioural change is an 
artefact of any sort of active intervention.
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Anger, aggression and conduct disorder
Anger and aggression in childhood is a relatively stable phenomenon (Kaplan et 
al., 1995) with a high risk factor for subsequent substance misuse (Robbins and 
Price, 1991), delinquency and poor educational achievement (Lochman et al.,
1990). Clinically significant aggressive behaviour occurs in 5-10% of children 
with a boy to girl ratio of 3:1 (Quay, 1986). Aggressive children display a range 
of cognitive deficits and distortions, particularly hypervigilance to their social 
environment for hostile cues and a tendency to perceive hostile intentions in 
others leading to the use of action-oriented solutions rather than verbally 
assertive ones in problematic situations (Lochman and Lampron, 1986; Kendall 
and Lochman, 1994). Aggressive children also show a tendency to label affect 
inaccurately (Garrison and Stolberg, 1983). Due to this type of distortion any 
general arousal felt in a problematic situation is labelled as anger on account of 
an inabiltiy to cope in a nonaggressive assertive manner.
CBT interventions in anger and aggressive disorders, based on the research 
findings, focus on a client’s attributional processes, problem-solving, affect- 
labelling and pervasive cognitive schema to obtain social goals and their 
outcome expectations of social interactions (Kendall and Lochman, 1994). Self­
monitoring, self-instruction, perspective-taking, social problem-solving, affect- 
labelling and relaxation training are common CBT techniques used with this type
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of disorder (Lochman et al. 1991). The emphasis is placed on the recognition of 
personal arousal and appropriate expression in problematic situations, 
recognition of anger/aggression-provoking situations before automatic non­
verbal action is taken, awareness of alternative interpretations of others 
intentions and the provision of alternative social coping mechanisms for 
assertive as opposed to aggressive behaviour.
The above ‘packages’ of CBT intervention have shown a degree of successful 
intervention in an area of childhood psychopathology characterised by poor 
prognosis (Kaplan et al., 1995). The ‘Problem Solving Skills Training’ (PSST) 
programme (Kazdin et al., 1987) produced a significant reduction in parents and 
teachers ratings of aggressive behaviour at posttreatment (after 20 sessions) 
and at a 1 year follow-up. It is uncertain as to what component of the PSST 
package mediated the reduction in aggressive behaviour in this study. However, 
as the sample involved inpatients, CBT appears to be effective with particularly 
problematic aggressive children. Success has also been shown using a CBT 
anger coping programme in a study of disruptive classroom behaviour in terms of 
reduced independent and parental ratings of aggression and self-reported 
improvements in self-esteem (Lochman et al., 1984). Although the later study 
involved a non-clinical group, a similar anger coping programme has shown 
significant improvements in self-esteem, social problem-solving and lower
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incidence of substance misuse in a 3 year follow-up of aggressive boys 
(Lochman, 1991).
In a different perspective of analysing the efficacy of CBT intervention, kazdin 
(1995), in order to maximize treatment effects, tried to isolate factors that 
moderate outcome. From a clinical perspective, the pursuit of predictors of 
outcome ought to identify cases that respond or fail to respond to treatment. This 
would aid the administration of interventions more likely to be effective for 
positive responders and, for the cases that do not respond to such interventions 
as CBT, the development of novel or multicomponent interventions. The study 
examined factors that predicted favourable outcomes with a large sample of 
clinically diagnosed conduct problem children (aged 7-13), recieving CBT 
intervention. The hypothesis that severity of the disorder, parent stress and 
family dysfunction were predictors of outcome was only partly supported. Less 
dysfunction in each of these domains did predict outcome on parental rating of 
deviance and prosocial functioing but not on teacher ratings. Even in the case of 
the later, further research needs to clarify how the domains interrelate to 
influence outcome and how they mediate favourable outcome. Although this type 
of study might pave the way to the types of conduct disordered children might 
profit from CBT intervention, in a review by Offord and Bennett (1995), CBT 
interventions, in terms of long term outcome, appear to advocate preventive use 
of CBT as particularly successful in ensuring better prognosis of ‘at-risk’ conduct
65
disordered children than clinical intervention that has produced equivocal results 
of CBT efficacy to date. However, stringent comparative research is, as yet, 
lacking.
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is a multifacted condition 
charaterised by educational difficulties, disruption in social relationships and 
behavioural problems (including conduct disorders) (Kaplan et al., 1995). Drug 
therapy, ususally amphetamine derivatives, has constitued a common form of 
intervention in ADHD, especially in the U.S., over recent years. The use of 
medication, with often very young children, remains controversial as it appears to 
ameliorate some of the behavioural difficulties associated with ADHD but not all 
facets of the disorder and can produce serious side effects with prolonged use 
(Schachar, 1991).
ADHD involves both cognitive and behavioural difficulties. Prominent cognitive 
deficits include deficiencies in self-regulation, sophisticated problem-solving and 
adjusting appropriately to environmental demands (Hindshaw and Erhardt,
1991). An advantage of CBT intervention over medication is that techniques 
such as behavioural modification have the potential to develop more appropriate 
behaviours and, with parental training, can improve general parenting skills
(Hechtman, 1986). However, drug therapy has been suggested as a possible aid 
to CBT intervention by increasing attention levels in the ADHD child (Gittelman 
et al., 1980). It is unclear that CBT and medication in combination are more 
effective than just medication alone as although medication might serve to 
augment CBT, CBT does not appear to augment medication effects (Abikoff et 
al., 1988). A criticsm of this last study, however, is that in the CBT protocol full 
use of the behavioural component of contingent reinforcement in problem-solving 
skills training was not apparent (Kendall and Reber, 1987).
The research to date indicates that CBT interventions with ADHD are able to 
ameliorate impulsivity but have little effect on restless and distractibility (Kendall 
and Braswell, 1985). There was only qualified success of CBT in this study 
despite the integration of rewardand response-contingencies, self-instructional 
training, coping modelling and role-playing under conditions of emotional arousal 
in a comprehensive package.
At best CBT interevntion appears to have only partial therapeutic benefit in 
treating ADHD. Successful treatment of ADHD might, therefore, involve the use 
of CBT within a broader range of treatment alternatives or therapeutic 
techniques as psychological intervention might have to reflect the multifaceted 
nature of the disorder.
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General discussion of the efficacy of CBT with children/adolescents and 
implications for future research and therapy
A general conclusion from the above studies, as to the efficacy of CBT 
intervention with childhood/adolescent disorders, is that few conclusions can be 
made! It is apparent that CBT can reduce symptomatology across a range of 
disorders but what has not been established is how these changes are mediated 
in single studies or if a study’s results, using a idiosyncratic CBT intervention, 
can be generalised to other clinical groups. It is also apparent that on the basis 
of the studies to date CBT might be less effective than other available therapies 
i.e. medication in ADHD. A less facetious conclusion, presently, is that research 
into CBT in children/adolescents has not produced robust outcome studies and 
that the evaluation of such an approach requires further extensive research.
Several issues arise from the outcome studies to date concerning the successful 
use of CBT with children/adolsecents. Firstly, CBT research has ignored the 
important area of generalisation of therapeutic effects across settings, domains 
of functioning and overtime (maintenance). Kendall and Lochman (1994) 
suggested that therapists have been naive in ignoring the importance of 
generalisation during therapy and that generalisation through aiding the client to 
manage persistent psychopathology should be a central goal of therapy at the 
beginning of intervention.
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Secondly, research to date has failed to provide how any change in behaviour 
has been mediated. It is of the utmost importance that therapists and 
researchers alike are aware of any causal links between behavioural changes 
and cognitive restructuring. However important the internal mechanisms of 
change are, as in the study of Kazdin (1995)-see above-complementary 
research needs to be carried out assessing any environmental facilitators of 
change i.e. therapuetic relationship, family functioning or peer relations, as 
predictors of outcome. The isolation of such internal and external mechanisms of 
change has the potential for accurate targeting of CBT techniques to specific 
disorders and the application of techniques more likely to suceed with particular 
groups of clients. To clarify causal links between cognitions and behaviour, 
Lochman et al. (1991) suggested that future outcome research should employ 
methodology that can predict behavioural changes by changes in cognition using 
multiple regression techniques.
In general the research to date has lacked adequate specification concerning the 
details, methods and quality of CBT techniques used. In addition, there has been 
little stringent use of criterion based experimental groups i.e. demonstrating 
disorders according to DSMIII-R/IV type classification, matched control groups, 
long term follow-up data (perhaps into adulthood). There has also been a 
tendency to use non-clinical groups in research that, although may provide
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interesting results, are of questionable clinical significance. Future research 
might also profit from a wider analysis of CBT versus alternative psychological 
therapies across disorders, as well as pharmacotherapy especially in anxiety 
and depression studies.
As mentioned in the section on ADHD, the medication of often very young 
children is fraught with ethical difficulties as well as limitations in its efficacy. 
CBT interventions have shown promising results to date but these need 
extensive clarification for improved applications. CBT does have advantages 
over such interventions as pharmacotherapy which should not be ignored in the 
light of the ambiguous outcome research presently available. The emphasis on 
therapist collaboration with the client and significant others should bode well for 
generalisation and maintenance of therapeutic change as well as providing vital 
social-reinforcement for a client’s motivation towards change. The techniques 
learned at such an early stage, if generalised and maintained, might serve the 
client well when coping with future episodes of psychological distress (into 
adulthood) not necessarily related to their particular childhood/adolescent 
disorder. Although CBT is a structured intervention it can be a creative and 
flexible therapeutic medium incorporating a client’s strengths and weaknesses 
and personal perspectives in the pursuit of the therapeutic goals.
In summary, the small literature to date has shown CBT to be effective in treating 
a range of childhood/adolescent psychopathologies. The literature also exposes 
a lack of vital empirical data therapists should be party to in order to improve 
CBT interventions. CBT is an encouraging approach in the treatment of 
childhood/adolescent disorders and, at face value, provides the therapist with a 
wide range of theoretically appropriate techniques to add to his/her armament. 
Without stringent research, however, to show causal relations between cognitive 
change and behavioural change and its therapeutic advantage over other forms 
of therapy, CBT might be seen as just another alternative therapy useful but not 
integral in ameliorating childhood/adolescent psychological distress.
71
REFERENCES
Abikoff, H., Ganeles, D., Reiter, G., Blum, C., Foley, C. and Klein, R.C. (1988). 
Cognitive training in academically deficient ADHD boys receiving 
stimulant medication. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 16,411-432.
Albano, A.M., Marten, P.A., Holt, C.S., Heimberg, R.G. and Barlow, D.H. (1995). 
Cognitive-behavioural group treatment for social phobia in adolescents: A 
preliminary study. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 183(10), 649- 
656.
Asarnow, J R., Carlson, G.A. and Guthrie, D. (1987). Coping strategies, self- 
perceptions, hopelessness and perceived family environments in 
depressed and suicidal children. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology 55, 361 -366.
Barrios, B.A. and Hartmann, D.B. (1988). Fears and anxieties. In E.J. Mash and 
LG. Terdal (Eds.) Behavioural Assessment of Childhood Disorders, 2nd 
edition pp. 196-264. New York:Guildford Press.
Beck, A T. (1976). Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders. NY: 
International Universities Press.
72
Beck, AT., Rush, A.J., Shaw, B.F. and Emery, G. (1979; 1987). Cognitive therapy 
of Depression. New York: Guildford Press.
Clark, D.M. (1991). Anxiety States. In K. Hawton, P.M. Salkowskis, J. Kirk and 
D M. Clark (Eds.) Cognitive-behaviour Therapy for Psychiatric Problems 
(3rd edn) pp. 52-96. New York: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, G.N., Hawkins, W., Murphy, M., Sheebar, L.B., Lewinsohn, P.M. and 
Seely, J R. (1995). Targeted prevention of unipolar depressive disorder 
in an at-risk sample of high school adolescents: a randomised trial of a 
group cognitive intervention. Journal of the American Academy of Child 
and Adolsecent Psychiatry 34(3), 312-321.
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd edn-revised) (1987). 
Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association (APA)..
Gittelman, R., Abikoff, H., Pollack, E., Klein, D.F., Katz, S. and Mattes, J.A.
(1980). A controlled trial of behaviour modification and methylphenidate in 
hyperactive children. In C.K. Whalen and B. Henker (Eds) Hyperactive 
Children: The Social Ecology of Identification and Treatment pp. 221-243. 
New York: Academic Press.
73
Harrington, R.C. (1990). Depressive disorder in children and adolescents. British 
Journal of Hospital Medicine 43,108-112.
Hinshaw, S.P. and Erhardt, D. (1991). Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder. In 
P C. Kendall (Ed.) Child and Adolescent Therapy: Cognitive-Behavioural 
Procedures pp. 98-130 NY: Guildford Press.
Kanfer, P., Karoly, P. and Newman, A. (1975). Reductions of children’s fear of 
the dark by competence-related and situational verbal cues. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 43, 251-258.
Kaplan, C.A., Thompson, A.E. and Searson, S.M. (1995). Cognitive behaviour 
therapy in children and adolescents. Archives of Disease in Childhood 73, 
472-475.
Kaslow, N.J., Rehm, L.P. and Siegal, A.W. (1984). Social and cognitive
correlates of depression in children: developmental perspective. Journal 
of Abnormal Clinical Psychology 12, 605-620.
74
Kazdin, A.E. (1987). Conduct Disorders in Childhood and Adolescence.
Developmental and Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry, vol 9. Newbury 
Park CA: Saga Publications.
Kazdin, A.E. (1995). Child, parent and family dysfunction as predictors of 
outcome in cognitive-behavioural treatment of anti-social children. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy Z2(3), pp. 271-281.
Kendall, P C. (1985). Toward a cognitive-behavioural model of child
psychopathology and a critique of related interventions. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology 13, 357-372.
Kendall, P C. (1989). The generalisation and maintenance of behaviour change: 
comments, considerations and the ‘no-cure’ criticism. Behaviour Therapy 
20, 357-372.
Kendall, P C. (1994). Treating anxiety disorders in children: results of a
randomised clinical trial. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 
62(1), 100-110.
Kendall, P C. and Hollon, S.D. (Eds) (1979). Cogntitive-behavioural
Interventions: Theory Research and Procedures. NY: Academic Press.
75
Kendall, P.C. and Braswell, L. (1985). Cognitive-behavioural Therapy for 
Impulsive Children. NY: Guildford Press.
Kendall, P C. and Reber, M. (1987). Reply to Abikoff and Gittelman’s evaluation 
of cognitive training with medicated hyperactive children. Archives of 
General Psychiatry 8, 77-79.
Kendall, P C. and Hollon, S.D. (1989). Anxious self-talk: development of the
Anxious Self-Statements questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy and Research 
13, 81-93.
Kendall, P.C., Chansky, T.E., Kane, M., Kim, R., Kortlander, E., Ronan, K.R.,
Sessa, F. and Siqueland, L. (1992). Anxiety Disorders in Youth: Cognitive- 
behavioural Interventions. Needham MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Kendall, P C. and Lochman, J.E. (1994) Cognitive-behavioural therapies. In M. 
Rutter, L. Hersov and E. Taylor (Eds.) Child and Adolesecnt Psychiatry 
(3rdedn.) pp. 844-857.Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications
Lochman, J.E., Wayland, K.K. and Cohen, C. (1990). Predication of adolescent 
behavious problems for subtypes of aggressive boys. Paper presented at
76
the Annual Convention of the American Psychiatric Association, Boston 
MA. In P.O. Kendall and J.E. Lochman (1994). Cognitive-behavioural 
therapies. In M. Rutter, L. Hersov and E. Taylor (Eds.) Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry (3rd edn.) pp 844-857. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific 
Publications.
Lochman, J.E. (1991). Cognitive-behavioural intervention with aggressive boys: 
three year follow-up and preventive effects. Unpublished manuscript. In 
P C. Kendall and J.E.Lochman (1994). Cognitive-behavioural therapies. In 
M. Rutter, L. Hersov and E. Taylor (Eds.) Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 
(3rd edn) pp. 844-857. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.
Meichenbaum, D. (1977). Cognitive Behaviour Modification: An Integrative 
Approach. NY: Plenum.
Offord, D R. and Bennett, K.J. (1994). Conduct disorder: long term outcomes and 
intervention effectiveness (review). Journal of the American Academy of 
Child and Adolsecent Psychiatry 33(8), 1069-1078.
Petti, T.A. and Larson, C.N. (1987). Depression and suicide. In V.B. Van Hasselt 
and M. Hersen (Eds.) Handbook of Adolescent Psychology pp.288-312. 
Oxford: Pergammon Press.
77
Quay, H.C. (1986). Conduct disorders. In H.C. Quay and J.S. Werry (Eds.). 
Psychopathological Disorders of Childhood (3rd edn) pp. 35-72. NY: 
Wiley.
Reynolds, W.M. and Coates, K.I. (1986). A comparison of cognitive-beahioural 
therapy and relaxation training for the treatment of depression in 
adolescents. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 54,653-660.
Rutter, M.R., lizard, J. and Whitmore, K. (Eds.) (1970). Education, Health and 
Behaviour. London: Longman.
Schachar, R. (1991). Childhood hyperactivity. Journal of Psychological 
Psychiatry 32,155-191.
Siegel, L. and Peterson, L. (1980). Stress reduction in young dental patients 
through coping skills and sensory information. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology 48, 785-787.
Stark, K., Rouse, L. and Livingston, R. (1991). Treatment of depression during 
childhood and adolescence: cognitive-behavioural procedures for the 
individual and family. In P C. Kendall PC (Ed.) Child and Adolescent
78
Therapy: Cognitive-behavioural Procedures pp. 165-208. NY: Guilford 
Press.
Strauss, C.C. and Lahey, B.B. (1987). Anxiety. In V.B. Van Hasselt and M.
Hersen (Eds.) Handbook of Adolescent Psychology pp.332-350. Oxford: 
Pergammon Press.
Terry, P., Coakley, L. and Karageorghis, C. (1995). Effects of intervention upon 
precompetition state anxiety in elite junior tennis players: the relevance of 
the matching hypothesis. Perceptual and Motor Skills 81(1), 287-296.
79
OLDER ADULTS ESSAY
WHAT FACTORS ARE INVOLVED IN SUICIDAL BEHAVIOUR IN OLDER
PEOPLE?
In the following discussion of suicidal behaviour in older adults we shall consider 
three aspects of suicidal behaviour; ‘successful’ suicide, attempted suicide and 
suicide ideation. The object of this essay is to evaluate those factors involved in 
suicidal behaviour regarding an older adult population i.e. those 65 or over. It 
has been suggested that if health professional are to have an important role in 
suicide prevention, explicit in the ‘Health of the Nation (1992)’, then it is 
necessary to identify groups at risk, antecedent causes and consider practical 
means of prevention (Cattell and Jolley, 1995).
The research pertaining to suicidal behaviour in older adults is characterised by 
much survey data providing an array of associated psychosocial factors. What is 
clear from such research is a lack of not the ‘whos?’, ‘whens?’ and ‘hows?’ of 
suicide but the ‘whys?’. However, the data should precipitate future studies to 
address the psychological mechanisms that result from the emergent 
psychosocial factors that leads one group of older adults to take their own lives. 
The findings of the recent survey-type research will be presented in this essay as 
will a discussion of their implications for health care strategies and future 
research.
Older adults have consistently been found to have the highest risk of suicide for 
any age group (Leenaars et al., 1993). Men of age 75 or over, as a group, have 
the highest risk of all (Diekstra, 1989; Clark and Fawcett, 1992). In the U.S. older
adults die by suicide at the rate of 22/100 000 compared with 13/100 000 for the 
general population, accounting for 21% of the suicides although they composed 
only 12.3% of the population (National Centre for Health Statistics, 1990). Of 
3675 suicides in England and Wales in 1992, 688(19%) were aged 65 or over 
(Cattell and Jolley, 1995). These official mortality statistics show an over­
representation of older adults as they compose only 15% of the population. The 
statistic is also more alarming when one considers that the suicide rate in the 
over 65s is approximately three times that found in the 15-24 age group and 
continues to rise into the ninth decade (Katona and Watkin, 1995). These 
statistics refer to 'successful' or completed suicide and do not account for 
attempted suicides (discussed later). They are particularly salient for health 
workers and society at large who may have tended to concentrate more on the 
rising trends in adolescent suicide at the risk of ignoring, statistically, a greater 
health care problem.
Firstly, we shall consider those factors that have been associated with cases of 
'successful' or completed suicide in the older adult population. In a very recent 
paper, Cattell and Jolley (1995) examined one hundred cases of suicide in the 
Manchester area to assess the social, physical and psychological antecedents 
associated with suicide in older adults. Their evaluation was based on a close 
examination of data from coroners' inquests and from psychiatric notes where 
available. In this sample males again were over represented compared to
females with a large proportion of the males widowed or single. There was no 
significant difference between females who were married or widowed/single. It 
appears, therefore, that marriage or a steady partnership might provide a 
‘protective’ factor in the expression of suicidal behaviour in males. The vast 
majority of suicides took place at home (87%). Although 49% of the cohort were 
living alone, their domiciliary arrangements were not significantly different from 
the age-related general population. Of the methods used in the suicides drug 
overdose (44%) was by far the most widely employed. Hanging was employed in 
24% of cases. Other notable methods were asphyxia (12%), jumping from height 
(8%), drowning(6%) and motor vehicle exhaust gas(1%). The males showed a 
far greater tendency to use violent methods i.e. hanging, whereas females were 
much more likely to take drug overdoses. The most widely used drugs employed 
in the suicides were analgesics and to a lesser extent tranquillisers and 
hypnotics, barbiturates and least of all antidepressants. It should be noted that 
all these drugs are easily available either over the chemist’s counter or on 
prescription.
The role of physical pain has long been associated with proclivity to suicidal 
behaviour in older adults (Barraclough, 1971). It was not surprising that Cattell 
and Jolley (1995) found that 65% of their cohort had recorded data of ill health at 
the time of the suicide representing a wide variety of conditions. The highest 
complaints were of unspecified pain(27%) with 16% (of the original sample)
experiencing ‘severe’ pain. The authors, perhaps surprisingly, found no cases of 
terminal disease e.g. cancer in their cohort. Dobovsky (1978) suggested that, 
with supportive interventions, terminally-ill cancer patients could find meaning in 
their lives that reduced their suicidal impulses. In addition, because of the 
seriousness of such conditions the gravitation of professionals, remaining family 
and friends around the sufferer might confound factors such as loneliness and 
reduced self-esteem implicated in suicidal behaviour.
Depression has been suggested as the most common precursor of suicide 
(Valente, 1994). In the U.S. it has been estimated that between 45 and 70% of 
older adults were experiencing major depression at the time of their suicides 
(Steiner and Marcupolis, 1991). In the Cattell and Jolley (1995) survey 61% were 
found to be clinically depressed at the time of their suicide. Only one individual 
had a previous diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, one had dementia and 
three were considered alcohol dependent. Therefore, once again depression has 
been shown as a major antecedent of suicidal behaviour. It is somewhat 
alarming in terms of medical attention that only 25% of the cohort were taking 
antidepressant medication at the time of their suicides. In addition, the present 
study might have underestimated the scale of depression as it excluded cases 
concerning bereavement.
The Cattell and Jolley (1995) study also exposed the poor integration of services 
available to older adults contemplating suicide. Although over half the cohort had 
consulted their GPs in the month preceding their suicide only 14% had any 
contact with secondary care services i.e. psychiatry in the same period of time. 
This poverty of referral would imply a reconsideration of GP training and 
expertise in the assessment of depression and/or suicide intent in older adults to 
facilitate more appropriate use of the secondary care services. This may lead to 
more effective suicide prevention strategies and a reduction in the overall rate 
(these issues will be discussed later).
Therefore, as far as data referring to completed suicides is concerning, the 
emergent factors of depression and pain as well as males living alone appear to 
be major antecedents of this type of behaviour. Although how these variables 
interact is uncertain it has been suggested that, on one level, physical pain is 
seldom directly associated with suicidal behaviour but is usually mediated by 
mood i.e. depression (Barraclough, 1987). Also, at this juncture, a pattern is 
emerging that professionals, and perhaps families, are not aware of the scale 
and implications of factors such as depression and pain as antecedents of 
suicidal behaviour in older adults and the need to involve other services if 
suicide prevention is to improve.
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As stated above suicidal behaviour in older adults not only involves those that 
successfully commit suicide but also those that attempt suicide and survive. 
Draper (1996) reviewed the literature between 1985 and 1994 to evaluate what 
antecedents are associated with specifically attempted suicide in terms of 
parasuicide and deliberate self-harm. The studies consistently identified a 
number of factors long recognised as general précipitants of suicidal behaviour 
in old age (see Batchelor and Napier, 1953). These factors closely resembled 
those associated with ‘successful’ attempts expounded above i.e. unmarried 
(particularly males), social isolation, impaired physical health, and mental illness 
especially major depression. It is of note that the ratio of older adults attempting 
suicide to those completing suicide is much less than in the general population in 
England (4:1 compared to 8-20:1; McIntosh, 1992). One might conclude that the 
expression of suicidal behaviour in old age is more likely to have fatal outcomes 
which, in turn, might signify greater intent.
Differences have been revealed between attempted and ‘successful’ suicide as 
55-65 age group appear to represent a peak in attempted suicides and male to 
female rates are similar (Hawton and Fagg, 1990). However, there is a trend for 
the proportion of males attempting suicide to increase with age especially after 
75 (Hawton and Fagg, 1990).
Other factors of note associated with attempted suicide are lower social class 
(De Leo et al., 1994), unresolved grief, especially that of spouse (Draper, 1994) 
and relationship problems involving family difficulties (Draper, 1994; Schmid et 
al., 1994). A prospective study has shown suicide attempts to be associated with 
strain in the patient-carer relationship (Zweig and Hinrichsen, 1993). Such 
relationship difficulties may also have an effect on recovery rates from the 
suicide attempt as inappropriate ‘do not resuscitate’ messages have been 
recorded from stressed relatives (Wasserman, 1989). Despite the above 
extensive list of suicidal factors, Draper (1996) highlighted two factors of 
particular interest for closer consideration. Firstly, Rifai et al. (1994) found that 
those older adults with major depression and a history of suicide attempts had 
significantly elevated scores on the Beck Hopelessness Scale which persisted 
after the remission of their depression and were more likely to discontinue 
treatment. Therefore, the degree of hopelessness experienced by an individual 
might be a more accurate psychological appraisal of those more likely to attempt 
suicide rather than concentrating on depression per se as the important 
precipitant. It is of additional note that after 12 months of the index suicide 
attempt 9-18% of patients repeated the attempt but there was little data on the 
frequency of completed suicide. The proclivity to repeat the attempted suicide 
was investigated by Pierce (1987) who found 2.8% of patients completed suicide 
in a variable period from 1-12 years. Of significance was that on the Beck Scale 
the intent scores for patients later committing suicide were significantly higher
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than those who did not. Therefore, a pattern might be emerging showing it is the 
degree of intent and hopelessness that might be predictive of repeated suicidal 
behaviour.
Secondly, on a physiological level, low levels of CSF serotonin have been 
reported in those attempting suicide (Jones et al. 1990). This would highlight the 
poor prescribing habits of GPs etc. in terms of depression in older adults and the 
need to consider the use of serotonin agonists or SSRIs in their treatment. This 
avenue of inquiry, of course, needs further appropriately controlled studies.
Although the above research attests to a substantial body of literature evaluating 
the antecedents of suicidal attempts in older people, Draper (1996) suggested 
that research needs to improve on both methodological and interpretative 
grounds. The studies to date have ignored prospective designs with structured 
diagnostic interviews and have lacked independent validation. Also, it is 
uncertain as to whether the wealth of survey-type research providing much 
‘association’ type data has been followed by a similar increase in understanding. 
These criticisms ought to provide the basis for future research designs.
As a final research analysis of suicidal behaviour in older adults Schmid et al. 
(1994) compared suicide attempters to suicidal ideators. They used inpatient 
data which might not be representative of the older adult population at large as
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‘suicidal ideation’ is less likely to be considered grounds for hospitalisation 
compared to an intentional act. Despite this caveat, the authors found the 
emergent ‘core’ risk factors for suicidal behaviour in older adults to be similar 
between ‘attempters’ and ‘ideators’ i.e. male, widowed, divorced, isolation, 
physical health and depression. The ideators were considered to have more 
anxious and agitated characteristics of depression than the attempters. The 
cultural factor of religion appeared to be the most distinguishing between 
attempters (more likely to be Protestant) from the ideators (more likely to be 
Catholic or Jewish). Therefore, the cultural acceptability of suicidal behaviour 
may have been previously underestimated although this may be a fluid factor 
corresponding to historical and geographical trends in religious belief.
In terms of living arrangements, suicide ideators were more likely to be living in a 
nursing home than the attempters. This may be unsurprising due to the differing 
chances of attempting suicide cohabiting than living on one’s own. Also, those 
living in nursing homes might be exhibiting more ‘silent suicide’ as ideation is 
high but suicide attempts go unreported due to their covert nature i.e. self- 
starvation, refusal of medication or other passive methods (Simon, 1989). 
Ideators were also noted as less well presented and more behaviourally 
disorganised than attempters. The determination to actually attempt suicide 
rather than being preoccupied with suicidal ideation may, therefore, stabilise the 
patient’s behavioural organisation. Unlike many other studies the Schmid et al.
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(1994) study incorporated those patients (48%) who had dementia. There was no 
significant difference between the ‘attempters’ and ‘ideators’ as to the proportion 
of those with dementia but as most of these patients had depression as well, the 
finding highlighted the potential contribution cognitive impairments have in at 
least these two expressions of suicidal behaviour.
Although suicide attempters and ideators share many of the same antecedents 
of suicidal behaviour expressed by ‘successful’ suicides, through an interaction 
of living arrangements, cultural factors and organisational characteristics suicide 
ideation is not carried through to intentional acts. The emergent agitated and 
anxious behaviour, along with cognitive difficulties, may lead the ideator to 
ruminate on their suicidal thoughts for longer periods than those who attempt 
whose depressed and more organised behavioural characteristics lead to 
greater intent but are more easily overlooked by family and professionals alike.
The above research suggests similarities and differences between those older 
adults that complete, attempt and contemplate suicide. Although each 
expression should be considered on its own terms, there may be a core set of 
features common to a general conception of suicide in older adults. These would 
appear to be male gender, isolation, single/widowed/divorced status, physical 
health problems (especially pain but perhaps surprisingly not terminal states) 
and major depression. From the literature on suicide attempts the influence of
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depression on suicidal behaviour may be more accurately interpreted as 
hopelessness. The studies from which these factors have been derived have 
been subject to methodological criticism, future research should take account of 
the need for more prospective designs, use of appropriate control groups and 
validated data. However, the major difficulty from such research is the derivation 
of causal factors from studies of association. Along with Draper (1996), 
understanding of what underpins suicide behaviour in the elderly will not 
progress until we understand how the emergent factors interact psychologically 
as well as in a social context.
Old age is characterised by a series of personal, interpersonal and social 
adjustments. Suicide in older adults may arise from an inability to cope with 
these adjustments on a personal level and an ignorance, on the part of society in 
general, to see the difficulties characteristic of this period of life as deserving 
serious consideration and purposeful attention. Sternback (1980) suggested that 
underpinning suicidal behaviour in older adults was a process of ‘egoism’ when 
few commitments to interpersonal and cultural values are experienced stemming 
from social isolation. This process derives from Durkheim’s theory of ‘anomie’, 
that suicide arises from increased isolation in industrial societies (Durkheim, 
1951) and can lead to further isolation through others’ perception of the 
individual’s progressing helplessness, perhaps leading to the feelings of 
hopelessness (Rifai et al., 1994) described above. The experience of serial and
cumulative loss i.e. personal and occupational, may fuel the hopelessness. It has 
been suggested that the role of grief in hopelessness and, therefore, suicide 
behaviour is not only due to the loss of a loved one but also the perception of the 
inability to replace them (Stenback, 1980). There is little evidence that retirement 
is causally related to suicidal behaviour as retirement can be seen as a positive 
or negative experience due to the individual's own values (Hayslip and Panek, 
1989). The loss of status gained from work, however, may go far to explain the 
gender differences in older adult suicidal behaviour. Gerner (1979) suggested 
that female suicidal behaviour is characterised more by relationship or 
interpersonal difficulties that might decrease with age whereas male suicidal 
behaviour may be due to loss of self-esteem/concept and the threat to these may 
increase with age. The salience of these conclusions needs to be addressed 
from generation to generation as career lives become more homogenised 
between the sexes.
The interaction between pain and depression has been highlighted above. The 
constant experience of these two covarying factors appears to dictate much 
suicidal behaviour in older adults. In an existential sense the chronic experience 
of these two factors may breed the feelings of hopelessness referred to above. 
Suicidal behaviour in its varied guises could possibly be perceived as the 
individual's final act of control over their lives from which they feel no real 
‘recovery’ is possible. Suicidal behaviour may also be preferred in this situation
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when the person’s isolation is taken into account; the fewer social contacts the 
less impact suicidal behaviour would have on others thus reducing guilt
Of course not all those that attempt suicide wish to die (Farberow and Litman,
1970). Because of the consistently high rates of depression exposed by the 
above studies it should be integral that primary and secondary health workers 
are trained and sensitive to the expression of depression in older adults and its 
potentially fatal consequences. It is evident that many who go on to attempt 
suicide see their GPs within days of their attempt. They register something is 
wrong but are not getting the specialist follow-up needed to address their 
despair. Depression may not be causally related to suicidal behaviour in this age 
group but unchecked, along with an undervaluing of co-morbid complaints such 
as pain, is likely to be so. Such factors as depression and pain have a proclivity 
to be considered ‘understandable’, especially by younger GPs, for someone of 
older age and may not be taken seriously or be underprescribed. Rutz et al. 
(1992) suggested that systematic postgraduate education for GPs designed to 
improve diagnosis and treatment of depressive disorders significantly reduced 
the frequency of suicides in the general population. This may be a pertinent idea 
specifically for an older adult age group. If most suicidal behaviour in older 
adults is taking place at home, more successful prevention programmes ought to 
consider community based support systems and projects to decrease the older 
adult’s sense of isolation and reduced social value.
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There are evidently a number of psychological, social and biological issues to be 
considered in an evaluation of the factors involved in differing expressions of 
suicidal behaviour in the elderly. If a person is intent on committing suicide they 
may have specific reasons to do so and perhaps the behavioural expression of 
that intent is their right. If suicidal behaviour in older adults can be distilled to 
certain factors working singularly or in concert to create the despair that results 
in suicide, families, colleagues and especially health workers have a social 
responsibility to use the emergent knowledge to address these insidious factors 
before suicide is contemplated. If potentially suicidal individuals want help we 
should be sensitive to their needs and be able to understand their complaints 
devoid of ageism and provide easier access to secondary specialist services. 
The research into the factors contributing to suicide in older adults can and must 
be improved upon. However, the knowledge to date can be used to educate and 
design improved suicide prevention strategies. It is estimated that from the 
present one in five people over 65 committing suicide the rate will rise to one in 
three by the year 2030 (McIntosh, 1992). Much can and still has to be done in 
understanding a phenomenon that presently is a crisis but could soon be an 
epidemic.
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NEUROPSYCHOLOGY ESSAY
DISCUSS THE CONTRIBUTION THAT CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY CAN 
MAKE TO THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS OF YOUR CHOICE
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This essay will discuss the contribution of clinical neuropsychology to the 
assessment, treatment and conceptualisation of schizophrenia as a 
neuropsychiatrie illness. The paper will consider the general aims and 
methodology of clinical neuropsychological inquiry, the nature of schizophrenia 
as a neuropsychiatrie illness and its assessment to date using 
neuropsychological instruments. The second part of the paper will examine the 
contribution of clinical neuropsychological practice to the development of 
contemporary neuropsychological models of schizophrenia. Implications for 
treatment strategies and rehabilitation programmes will also be discussed.
Cognitive deterioration has been implicated as part of schizophrenic illness since 
its first conceptualisation i.e. the ‘dementia’ of ‘dementia praecox’ (Kraepelin, 
1896). Although cognitive deterioration was seen as characteristic of the integral 
poor prognosis of dementia praecox, research has shown that the pattern of 
cognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia is complex and not solely 
associated with the deficit state (Corcoran and Frith, 1993). Clinical 
neuropsychological investigation is concerned with clarifying the information 
processing mechanisms giving rise to the behavioural signs and symptoms of 
schizophrenic illness. The methods of investigation have relied heavily on those 
derived from studies into known brain lesion pathology, the underlying 
assumption being that the psychopathology of psychotic states may be explained
in terms of brain dysfunction. Although there have been many advances in the 
study of the neurophysiology of schizophrenia (see Bilder, 1996), it is necessary 
to explain psychological phenomena at a psychological level first and then, 
perhaps, be able to map resultant models onto brain sites/systems (‘levels of 
explanation’; Mortimer and McKenna, 1994). It is the consideration of 
neuropsychiatrie illness on differing but integrated levels of explanation i.e. 
behavioural, psychological and biological that rigorous advances in 
understanding may occur.
Schizophrenia has been considered a ‘syndromic disease entity’ characterised 
by a collection of behavioural signs and symptoms (Bentall, 1992). It is 
increasingly clear, however, that the clinical presentation of schizophrenia is 
heterogeneous in form and outcome (Bilder, 1996); several researchers have 
challenged the validity and reliability of schizophrenic diagnoses on this basis 
(Bentall et al. 1988). Much of the research to date can be severely criticised by 
the use of heterogeneous samples. Contemporary approaches highlighting 
single symptom pathology or empirically related ‘factors’ or ‘sub-syndromes’ of 
illness possessing putative similar aetiology and/or single case studies may 
address issues of heterogeneity (see Bentall, 1992; Liddle, 1987; Liddle and 
Barnes, 1991; Shallice and Burgess, 1991). These considerations are of the 
utmost importance in clinical neuropsychological assessments as functioning 
must be related to specific symptoms or groups of related symptoms (Frith,
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1992). Assessment must also recognise the course of psychotic illness as 
schizophrenic illness may be episodic in presentation, especially the florid 
presentation of positive symptoms (Kendell, 1986). In addition, many patients 
suffering psychotic breakdowns are taking antipsychotic medication. Although 
there is no clear consensus of the effect of this type of medication on cognitive 
performance (Cassens et al. 1990), it is evident that concomitant medication 
taken for extra-pyramidal side effects e.g. procyclidine and atypical medication 
such as Clozapine possess strong anticholinergic properties that can 
significantly impair memory function independently of illness (Frith, 1984).
Clinical neuropsychological investigation in its purest form attempts to infer brain 
functioning from an analysis of information processing abilities based on test 
performance as explanations of behavioural phenomena (Lezak, 1983). The 
focus of this analysis has changed in the hundred or so years of 
neuropsychological application from a localisational to a modular appreciation of 
brain functioning. Localisation posited specific functions to discrete areas of the 
brain arising from the analysis of language expression and reception (i.e. 
Wernicke, 1861; Broca, 1874); focal brain damage producing local effects. 
Presently, a modular conception of functioning implicates related brain systems 
underlying specific information processing functions (Shallice, 1988). A modular 
conception accommodates assumptions that brain lesions can alter the 
functioning of anatomically and physiologically diverse regions (Vallar et al.
1988) and that that primary functional deficits may be ‘masked’ by the use of 
alternative cognitive coping strategies (Bradshaw and Mattingley, 1995). 
Contemporary neuropsychological analysis follows a modular conception which 
has been only relatively recently applied to the assessment of 
neuropsychological dysfunction underlying the signs and symptoms of 
schizophrenia.
Neuropsychological assessment of schizophrenic patients to date has focused 
mainly on the areas of general intellectual functioning, particularly pre morbid- 
current IQ discrepancies, executive or ‘frontal’ functioning, memory functioning, 
psychomotor ability, latéralisation and language and general attention. This 
essay does not have the scope to deal with all these areas in detail, however a 
brief overview of the above first five areas of interest demonstrates a major 
proportion of clinical neuropsychological assessment in relation to functioning 
associated with psychotic symptoms subsumed under schizophrenic illness.
As stated above, intellectual deterioration has been counted as fundamental in 
schizophrenic illness, especially with regard to chronic deficit symptoms or 
negative behavioural signs. Anatomical evidence in the form of structural brain 
scans i.e. Computerised Tomography and Magnetic Resonance Imaging, has 
suggested that increased ventricle-brain ratios are consistent with decreased 
general cognitive abilities (Flaum et al. 1994). However, structural abnormalities
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have not been found with all chronic samples (Andreasen, 1982) and have not 
been observed with schizophrenic patients in early stages of illness (Jerningen 
et al. 1982). It is important to note that pre morbid-current intellectual 
discrepancies are generally observed as static states (possibly present before 
illness onset) and not reflective of progressive deterioration (Barber et al. 1996) 
Within groups of chronic schizophrenic patients differences in pre morbid 
indices, as well as current functioning, between community based and 
hospitalised patients indicate that traditional measures of such functioning i.e. 
the National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982), may be unreliable with patient 
groups characterised by poor outcome as their illnesses may be early in onset 
and insidious in progression (Crawford et al. 1992). However, the NART is 
perhaps the best measure available (Jones et al. 1993) but must be used with 
caution with this type of patient and should be interpreted alongside other 
demographic and socially relevant information. Additional factors to be 
accounted for in an appreciation of overall intellectual functioning of 
schizophrenic patients are that they appear to perform badly on nearly all 
neuropsychological measures (compared to norms) (Chapman and Chapman, 
1973), possibly due to poor motivation/attention connected with their disturbed 
mental states. This latter point, of course, is relevant to the interpretation of all 
neuropsychological performance of schizophrenic patients. Ideally, 
neuropsychological assessment would seek to uncover dissociations in 
performance or account for general intellectual levels and/or educational levels
in the analysis of more specific functional investigations. Tests demonstrating the 
superior performance of schizophrenic patients versus healthy controls would 
represent the ideal but, as yet, have not been forthcoming (David, 1993).
Executive or ‘frontal’ functioning i.e. associated with functional deficits derived 
from frontal lesions or their connections, is specifically the ability to pursue goal- 
directed behaviour and those abilities to plan strategically and respond 
appropriately to novel situations i.e. the effective use of strategies in 
performance in changing circumstances, (Lezak, 1983). Many studies have 
shown deficits in neuropsychological performance on ‘frontal’ tests such as the 
Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST; Heaton, 1981), a test of cognitive shifting 
ability in the face of changing environmental demands, in terms of elevated 
numbers of perseverative errors, with heterogeneous groups of schizophrenic 
patients (Weinberger, 1988; Morrison-Stewart et al. 1992). Functional imaging 
data has suggested that such a performance deficit is associated with poor 
activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Weinberger, 1987). Liddle and 
Morris (1991) showed that poor WCST performance was associated with 
empirically related symptoms comprising a ‘psychomotor poverty’ subsyndrome 
of illness. Poor performance on the WCST, however, is not solely characteristic 
of schizophrenic patients as it has been observed in other groups of psychiatric 
patients e.g. with manic depressive patients (Morice, 1990) and with patients 
with known lesions outside the frontal lobes (Drewe, 1974). Poor planning ability
has been also demonstrated in heterogeneous groups of schizophrenic patients 
using such measures as the Tower of Hanoi/London Test (Shallice and 
McCarthy, 1982)- the moving of coloured rings or balls from an initial to a goal 
position requiring increasingly more minimum moves for successful completion- 
particularly with respect to those symptoms comprising a ‘psychomotor poverty' 
subsyndrome of illness (Nelson et al. 1991 ). The perennial use of such 
'traditional' measures as the WCST has been suggested as producing 
diminishing rewards (Corcoran and Frith, 1993) adding little to the extent of 
present knowledge, although may still be useful in a single case study approach 
(Shallice and Burgess, 1991). Such tests are multidimensional in that they tap 
various other cognitive functions other than the particular one of focus i.e. visuo- 
spatial ability, pattern and spatial recognition. Modern computerised batteries are 
being developed to account for these difficulties e.g. Cambridge Automated 
Neuropsychological Test Battery (CANTAB; Downes et al. 1991) comprising 
computerised versions of the Tower of London test and a cognitive shifting test 
with complementary component tests. Such tests, as yet, have been used mostly 
as research tools, but as normative and clinical research data is continuously 
being assimilated, clinical assessment and diagnostic use may not be far off. In 
addition, neuropsychologists have overcome some of the limits of traditional test 
batteries by the development of materials to assess executive behaviour within a 
more ecologically valid context. The Six Elements Test (Evans et al. 1993) 
purports to assess ‘everyday’ planning and strategy forming behaviour using an
‘open ended' format requiring the patient to maximise their performance on tests 
of object naming, arithmetic and autobiographical recall, each split into two parts 
i.e. the ‘Six Elements', to be completed within ten minutes. Again, this tool, 
previously a research measure, has potential clinical benefits in terms of 
assessing and monitoring planning of everyday activities.
Memory deficits were considered no more than epiphenomena of schizophrenic 
illness until very recently (see Cutting, 1990). McKenna et al. (1990) showed that 
a group of heterogeneous schizophrenic patients showed test performances 
similar to that of a heterogeneous sample of brain injured patients, particularly on 
the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (Wilson et al. 1985), of a pattern akin 
to Classic Amnesic Syndrome i.e. intact general cognitive functioning and short 
term memory but disproportionate deficits in long term episodic memory. This 
pattern was supported by Tamlyn et al. (1992) who also showed a 
disproportionate deficit in semantic memory functioning. Semantic memory 
deficits were also highlighted by Duffy and O’Carroll (1994) over episodic 
memory deficits in a comparison with Korsakoff’s psychosis patients. The degree 
of difficulty has been a moot issue in interpreting the component tasks of 
composite memory measures. Calev et al. (1984) using matched tasks 
demonstrated that recall deficits were implicated in general memory dysfunction 
over recognition deficits with schizophrenic patients. As stated above, although it 
has been suggested that medications with powerful anticholinergic properties
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e.g. procyclidine (for extrapyramidal side-effects) and the atypical neuroleptic 
Clozapine, can affect memory functioning despite illness, it is of note that 
disproportionately poor memory performance has been observed compared to 
general intellectual and executive performance with groups of unmedicated 
schizophrenic patients (Saykin et al. 1991). Memory deficits in terms of poor 
episodic memory functioning have also been shown to be the most robust 
neuropsychological predictors of outcome providing a pre-emptive intervention 
role for neuropsychological treatment and rehabilitation strategies (Lawrie et al. 
1996). The relationship between memory deficits and symptoms is unclear at 
present, although McKenna (1994) suggested that poor semantic performance 
resulted from the inability to ‘reality check’ new information for storage and 
appropriate recall and that the laying down and use of ‘false knowledge’ may 
give rise to delusion formation.
Psychomotor poverty has already been mentioned above in terms of a putative 
subsyndrome of schizophrenic illness, defined by empirically related deficit 
symptoms but associated with poor executive or ‘frontal’ performance. Cognitive 
slowing or ‘bradyphrenia’ has also been considered a characteristic 
neuropsychological deficit related to the chronic deficit state of schizophrenic 
illness (Pantelis et al. 1991). The establishment of poor cognitive speed has 
implications for the interpretation of any time limited neuropsychological measure 
used with deficit state schizophrenic patients. In line with Pantelis et al. (1992)
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and Crow (1980) such observations are consistent with a subcortical pathology, 
possibly with frontal connections, in patients with type 2 schizophrenia (defined 
by deficit symptoms, poor outcome and possibly of structural aetiology). Rogers 
(1986) suggested that bradyphrenia was the fundamental phenomenological 
feature of the subcortical dementias.
It has been suggested that the cognitive dysfunction associated with memory 
dysfunction, at least, implicates bilateral impairment in schizophrenia (Calev et 
al., 1991). However, this has only sought to exaggerate the ambiguity 
surrounding the question whether the pathophysiology responsible for 
schizophrenic symptoms is hemisphere specific (Cororan and Frith, 1993). Left 
hemispheric dysfunction has been popularly presented as characterising a 
relative hemispheric imbalance in functioning in schizophrenia (Gur, 1978). Left 
turning bias or circling behaviour associated with right hemispatial neglect (i.e. 
left hemispheric dysfunction) has been widely reported in groups of 
schizophrenic patients in recent years (Bracha, 1987; Lyon and Satz, 1991) with 
unmedicated and medicated subjects respectively. Schizophrenic patients have 
also been observed demonstrating deficits in attention reflective of patients with 
unilateral lesions of the left hemisphere (Posner et al, 1988).
Tomer and Flor-Henry (1989) found attention asymmetry clearly related to the 
medication status of the patient. Unmedicated schizophrenic patients would
show inattention to the right visual field (right hemispatial neglect expressed by 
left turning bias behaviour) which changed to more prominent left sided 
inattention after medication. This 'shift' was associated with longer duration or 
higher daily dose of medication. All in all, this appears suggestive that 
medication helps normalise left hemisphere performance whilst deterioration of 
right side performance occurs, as the ‘shift’ did not herald a difference in the 
level of functioning only the nature. Therefore, evidence of lateralization of 
dysfunction appears to be affected by medication, which should be considered in 
future studies. This may also help determine dopaminergic innervation of arousal 
in each hemisphere responsible for the emerging pattern of neuropsychological 
functioning associated with schizophrenic symptoms.
In terms of symptom expression, positive thought disorder has been associated 
with speech and language dysfunction in the left hemisphere, but negative 
thought disorder has been attributed to more bilateral damage (Silverstein et al.,
1991). However, Cutting (1994) suggested that right parietal damage has been 
associated with experiencing one’s voice as alien. Thus contemporary evidence 
for a specific hemispherical dysfunction in schizophrenia is far from conclusive. 
Future studies ought to clarify the association of hemispheric differences in 
terms of specific symptoms. Also, care ought to be taken in attributing 
hemispherical dysfunction to certain patterns of neuropsychological performance
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as many tests involve multiple processes and thus more interactive, including 
interhemispheric, brain systems.
The development of neuropsychological models of schizophrenia
The above examples of the contribution of clinical neuropsychological practice to 
the assessment of groups or single cases of schizophrenic illness by functional 
domain help to decipher the ‘dementia’ of ‘dementia praecox’ more specifically. 
However, such traditional neuropsychological technique i.e. using measures 
derived from known brain lesion studies are limited in explaining the 
phenomenology of the psychotic symptoms grouped as ‘schizophrenia’ (David,
1993). Such evidence does, however, serve as a basis to inform contemporary 
cognitive neuropsychological models of psychotic aetiology which, in turn, ought 
to generate related and novel test materials to the benefit of research and 
clinical practice. The literature concerning executive functioning deficits has 
helped inform, at least, part of Frith’s (1992) cognitive neuropsychological model 
of schizophrenia. Behavioural signs including negative deficit symptoms and 
stereotyped thinking/perseveration are conceptualised as a failure to generate 
willed action. In this regard Frith encompassed Shallice’s (1988) 
conceptualisation of the cognitive mechanisms that comprise executive 
functioning. The ‘Supervisory Attention System (SAS)' is an executive 
mechanism that, through a series of ‘contention scheduling’ of competing motor
programmes, selects the most appropriate to carry out desired non-stimulus 
driven goals. A breakdown in this process results in either solely stimulus-driven 
behaviour (deficit symptoms) or in the selection of the same motor programmés 
whatever the environmental or personal demands i.e. perseveration. Positive 
symptoms i.e. hallucinations and delusions arise from alternative information 
processing deficits. Delusions of control, third person auditory hallucinations or 
‘passivity phenomena’ result from an inability to monitor one’s own mental and/or 
physical actions. Frith (1987) suggested that poor WCST performance could be 
attributed to this failure in self-monitoring. Paranoia, delusions of reference and 
certain second person auditory hallucinations are seen as an inability to 
mentalise the intentions of others or lacking a ‘theory of mind’. These three 
paths to psychotic symptom expression, although mainly theoretical at present, 
have obtained some recent support as testable hypotheses (Corcoran et al,
1995; Frith and Corcoran, 1996). Although Frith’s theory appears to be a 
tripartheid conceptualisation, he suggested that all can be subsumed under a 
general deficit in ‘metarepresentation’ or the ability to ‘know that one knows’ i.e. 
a fundamental deficit in consciousness, This generalised deficit may have some 
relation to executive deficits as stated above but also may highlight the poor 
episodic memory demonstrated by schizophrenic patients in terms of an inability 
to access autobiographical information for appropriate functioning i.e. a failure in 
social cognition (Perner, 1991). This extension of the theory is still in its infancy 
and needs to be developed for subsequent testing.
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The recent focus on specific memory deficits exhibited by schizophrenic patients 
has also been integrated into another recent major neuropsychological model of 
mainly positive schizophrenic symptomatology. Gray et al. (1991) suggested that 
positive symptoms arise through ‘ a failure in acute schizophrenia to integrate 
stored memories of past regularities of perceptual input with ongoing motor 
programmes in the control of current perception (p.1).\ Although the model 
integrates some of Frith (1992) ideas concerning the failure to monitor self­
generated behaviour in the formation of auditory hallucinations, it is ostensibly a 
model based on animal experimentation i.e. that certain behaviours such as 
Latent Inhibition- an example of a process of inhibiting previously stored 
memories in the control of current perception and action- can be abolished by 
dopamine agonists and the resultant state reversed with the administration of 
neuroleptics in rat populations (Crider et al. 1982). The generalisation of such 
effects to humans has been widely criticised (Claridge and Beech, 1991; Frith,
1992) and has not been supported experimentally with human subjects (O’Carroll 
et al. 1993). The model also provides no explanation concerning the aetiology of 
the negative behavioural signs of schizophrenia. However, the model has 
provided a lead in understanding the putative mechanism of memory deficits and 
related putative brain systems whose dysfunction may give rise to certain 
positive psychotic symptoms.
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The clarification of the ‘dementia of dementia praecox’ has been the theme of 
this essay. The general flattening of intellectual functioning of ‘schizophrenic’ 
patients must be of central consideration in the construction of tailored 
rehabilitation programmes for the amelioration of specific functional deficits.
Such programmes will be additionally informed by clarification of the relationship 
between neuropsychological deficits and social/occupational functioning.
Cognitive rehabilitation in pursuit of decreasing functional deficits associated 
with schizophrenic illness has concentrated mainly on either specific task deficits 
(e.g. Kern et al. 1996) or the provision of general cognitive training programmes 
(e.g. Benedict et al. 1994). In the former case, Young and Freyslinger (1995) 
demonstrated schizophrenic patients improved performance on the WCST by 
providing support on individual dimensions of the task the patient was prone to 
make errors on, termed ‘scaffolding’, rather than using a didactic approach. 
Although the authors found that the effects were generalisable to similar tasks of 
problem solving, Bellack et al. (1990) reported no generalisation of learning from 
training on the WCST to other problem solving tasks. However, cognitive support 
would appear to be intuitively more effective than providing solely an explanation 
of the rules (Rossell and David, 1997). Improvements in performance on tests of 
verbal fluency have been obtained through cueing i.e. ‘jungle’ for ‘animals’,
(Joyce et al. 1996). Scaffolding and cueing demonstrate the potential plasticity of 
neurocognitive functioning and may facilitate patients, suffering schizophrenic
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symptoms, overcome outstanding cognitive difficulties. The clearer the 
understanding of the relationship between symptoms and cognitive deficits, 
derived from modern cognitive neuropsychological modelling, the greater the 
possible benefits from such cognitive rehabilitation strategies.
Summary
This essay has attempted to provide an overview of the contribution clinical 
neuropsychology has made to the assessment, modelling and rehabilitation of 
patients suffering psychotic symptoms subsumed under a schizophrenic 
diagnosis. The main focus has been to explain the neuropsychological functional 
deficits exhibited by such patients and show the development from 
understanding deficits associated with heterogeneous groups of patients to 
those that can be predicted through testable cognitive neuropsychological 
models concerned with the exact relationship between deficits and specific 
psychotic symptoms. Associations with brain functioning have been discussed 
briefly, a more detailed account being outside the scope of this essay. However, 
the various functional deficits emerging as characteristic of certain psychotic 
symptoms will serve to inform and clarify putative neurophysiological and 
neuroanatomical explanations as well as social functioning deficits associated 
with ‘schizophrenia’ and the relationships between each level of explanation.
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SECTION 2: CLINICAL
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DETAILS OF SIX CLINICAL PLACEMENTS (see Appendices for contracts)
1. Adult Mental Health (Core Placement)
Location: Queen Mary’s University Hospital, Roehampton.
Supervisors: Ewa Rula, Dr. Sandra Canter.
Dates: 15.10.94-5.5.95.
2. People with Learning Disabilities (Core Placement)
Location: St. Ebbas’ Hospital, Epsom, Surrey.
Supervisors: Zillah Webb, Liz Marlow, Karen Dodd.
Dates: 18.5.95-17.11.95.
3. Child and Adolescent (Core Placement)
Location: Sutton Hospital, Sutton, Surrey.
Supervisor: Dr. Linda Dowdney.
Dates: 1.12.95-11.4.96.
4. Older Adults (Core Placement)
Location: Southlands Hospital, Shoreham-by-Sea, Sussex.
Supervisor: Corrie Meesters.
Dates: 25.4.96-4.10.96.
5. Forensic (Specialist Placement)
Location: Horton Hospital, Epsom, Surrey.
Supervisor: Richard Millington.
Dates: 16.10.96-26.9.97.
132
6. Psychotherapy (Specialist Placement)
Location: Kingston Hospital, Surrey.
Supervisor: Frank Milton.
Dates: 17.10.96-18.9.97.
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CLINICAL CASE SUMMARIES fall names have been changed)
1. A Group for Down’s Syndrome Clients Re: Ageing
As the average life expectancy for people with Down’s syndrome is increasing so 
too is the prevalence of Alzheimer’s disease in this population. Issues 
concerning functional deterioration will affect this type of clients and service 
providers directly. Summerfield, a staffed home for people with learning 
disabilities contained six residents, five of which had Down’s syndrome. They 
had lived together for 20 years and had experience of a previous resident having 
to be moved from their home due to her deteriorated state. Presently, another 
female resident was showing gross signs of physical and cognitive deterioration. 
In this context an opportunity was seen to set up a group for the residents to 
address some of the issues surrounding ageing. The group was to be an 
educational forum as well as a place to discuss and share opinions about 
matters connected to growing old.
The group had as its focus the construction of a visual document called, The 
Journey of Life’. Over six sessions the document represented the week’s subject 
matter which pertained to different stages of life, childhood, old age etc. Although 
the residents were initially weary of the novel format of the group, their 
engagement was obtained. The importance of visual material was of the utmost
importance in keeping their attention and facilitating understanding. In the final 
review session the clients were able to discuss their feelings about seeing their 
fellow resident ‘needing more help' than they did and they were also able to 
relate the present situation to when the previous lady had to be removed to 
hospital for her better care. The group was fun and lively overall but it was 
difficult to assess whether the information imparted had been retained or had 
added to the residents' baseline knowledge. It, at least, provided a contained 
environment to air their worries about deterioration in old age.
2. Clinical Psychology Report (Child and Adolescent Placement)
Kevin Green was a thirteen year old school boy who presented with problems 
surrounding intrusive thoughts about death, dying and contracting fatal illnesses. 
He had also shown compulsive behaviour by needing to wash his hands three 
times an hour. He was suffering guilty feelings believing himself responsible for 
the stressful period experienced in the family home when his father had become 
clinically depressed. It was initially formulated that Kevin’s perceived guilt, during 
a time of family crisis, had been catastrophised into believing he would be 
punished, for not resolving the crisis, by his family abandoning him. The 
resultant loneliness, in concert with a triggering event when he heard a story 
about a small who died, was catastrophised into thoughts about death and dying.
A cognitive-behavioural approach was used in his therapy. Over the nine hourly 
sessions of his therapy we were able to reframe his thoughts through 
normalisation that he was not going ‘mad’ and that the prospect of family break 
up would be anxiety provoking for any 13 year old. An examination was made of 
his catastrophic thinking through the production of the cognitive model of panic. 
His catastrophic thinking was challenged through him producing six alternative 
endings for a story. His initial attempt demonstrated a death or illness theme in 
five of the six endings. In collaboration we were able to repeat the exercise by 
generating six diverse themes for the endings e.g. happy, boring. When a 
realistic appraisal was made of the endings, it was concluded that the ‘boring’ 
ending was most likely to occur. Kevin’s preoccupations with tragedy were 
successfully challenged, particularly in the context of harbouring his fears for 
many years and not having contracted any life threatening illnesses. Kevin’s guilt 
was challenged through using the metaphor of the Good Samaritan story to 
differentiate helplessness and causing something bad to happen. To have 
believed the family crisis could have been averted by his efforts alone was seen 
as an unrealistic expectation of a boy of twelve (at the time).
At termination the frequency of Kevin’s catastrophic thoughts had decreased 
significantly. His guilty feelings had also been successfully challenged. His hand 
washing had not been addressed directly but he was able to see a connection 
between such a behaviour and his other anxieties. The support of his mother and
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sister had helped throughout therapy and would be important for post therapy 
maintenance.
3. Neuropsychological Case Report (Older Adults Placement)
Mrs. Alice Martin, 72, presented with agitation, indecisiveness and possible 
depression. A neuropsychological assessment was requested to clarify any 
organic basis to her deterioration of functioning. Mrs. Martin was an extremely 
anxious and reserved lady at interview. She said little and most of her 
background and present behaviour was proffered by her daughter on whom she 
was totally dependent presently. Of note, from her background, was a nervous 
break down 45 years ago and an abusive relationship with her ex-husband, who 
presently still harassed her. She had recently told her daughter that she believed 
familiar people and objects had been replaced by doubles.
Mrs. Martin could or would not complete a Beck Depression Inventory as an 
index of her mood. She did, however, co-operate with testing. Although there 
was no evidence of a deteriorating process, Mrs. Martin showed a significant 
discrepancy between verbal and performance functioning. This result might be 
indicative of organic involvement but it was also shown that when certain poorly 
performed performance measures were completed she was at her most agitated. 
Mrs. Martin’s overall memory functioning was normal for her age. She did show a
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specific impairment in inhibiting previous learning from her learning new 
information.
It was concluded that Mrs. Martin was not suffering neuropsychological 
dysfunction, according to the measures used. Her functioning was characterised 
by extreme withdrawal and weariness to engage at any level with anyone other 
than her daughter. In the context of her background, it was concluded that Mrs. 
Martin might have being showing an early paranoid process. Her beliefs 
concerning the replacement of familiar objects resembled that seen in Capgras 
syndrome.
Mrs. Martin’s difficulties seemed to stem from her present mood state rather than 
from any organic disorder. It was recommended that she would require tailored 
intervention on both psychological and psychiatric fronts. Engagement would be 
very difficult with Mrs. Martin, therefore, any psychological intervention would 
have to focus on trust, perhaps for a protracted time. As Capgras syndrome is 
characterised by a paranoid process, it was also recommended that Mrs. Martin 
might benefit greater from antipsychotic medication than the antidepressants she 
was presently taking without much effect. Recommendations were also made for 
the provision of respite care as her daughter was her sole carer and found 
coping with her mother’s difficulties (and a family of her own) very stressful.
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4. Clinical Psychology Report (Older Adults Placement)
Mr. Gibson (aged 72) was referred by the Community Health Team following a 
serious suicide attempt in May 1996. A married man, he was arrested for ‘gross 
indecency’ earlier that month when discovered by the police in a wood receiving 
oral sex from another man. The incident was reported in the local press. His guilt 
led him to attempt the suicide. He wished to see a psychologist to treat his 
homosexual impulses which he believed were an ‘obsession’.
Since the incident, Mr. Gibson had been barred from the family home by his wife. 
He had much to lose if he couldn’t show his wife he was able to control his 
impulses or not act upon them. It was made explicit at the beginning of our 
sessions that he could not be ‘cured’ of any homosexual feelings. We attempted, 
therefore, to increase his control over his thoughts precipitating him finding male 
partners and to analyse and reinforce his primary desire to stay married and live 
out his life with his wife. The latter was based on the premise that another 
incident, of the type preceding his last suicide attempt, might have fatal 
consequences next time. Companionship and security were most important to 
him and this formed the basis of his motivation to control his arousal concerning 
male sexual encounters.
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Mr. Gibson became increasingly confident in his ability to control his arousal 
through basic thought stopping and relaxation exercises. He constructed a 
‘motivation document' as a permanent source of reference to remind him of his 
feelings of guilt and remorse surrounding his behaviour. We discussed issues 
surrounding trust a great deal and that it could only be reconstituted, between 
Mr. Gibson and his wife, by him controlling his behaviour and informing his wife 
more about his whereabouts, worries etc. to reassure her. He would have to 
earn her ‘risk' but could only do this to a certain degree. Termination of the 
therapy was seen as a new beginning. Mr. Gibson had improved relations with 
his wife by termination and was staying over most of the week. He had also 
made efforts to reconstruct his social life by joining yoga and bridge clubs.
Mr. Gibson had been successful in creating adaptive strategies to enhance the 
reconciliation with his wife. He was determined to maintain progress. However, it 
was clear to him that any relapse in the future would undermine his present 
desires and would probably result in a tragic outcome.
5. Clinical Psychology Case Report (Forensic Placement)
Mrs. Clarke (aged 47) had been transferred to a forensic facility from prison 
where she was on remand having been charged with ‘arson with intent to
endanger life'. An assessment was required concerning her mental state at the 
time of the offence, her risk of re-offending and possible intervention strategies. 
Mrs. Clarke had a long history of substance misuse and had been diagnosed as 
having a ‘borderline personality disorder’. She had been involved in many 
abusive relationships in her life and had been sexually abused as a child of four. 
She had never known her father and her mother, a prostitute, seldom showed 
any affection for her.
Mrs. Clarke had developed a subjugating personality to compensate for her fear 
of abandonment. Her acquiescence in relationships resulted in her being 
physically abused. Her feelings of worthlessness would increase and she would 
compensate for these intolerable feelings by ingesting drugs and alcohol. At the 
time of her offence she had felt extremely isolated after a move south. It seems 
that her impulsive coping, usually in the form of substance misuse, was extended 
to an unplanned suicide attempt by setting her curtains alight. It was concluded 
that the risk of her reoffending in a similar way was low as this was her first act of 
arson, in the context of a suicide attempt, and that she had come to the attention 
of forensic services who might address some of her emotional problems. After 
consideration of both cognitive-behavioural and psychodynamic approaches, the 
latter was recommended to initially address Mrs. Clarke’s substance misuse as a 
focus due to her ‘borderline’ traits of subjugation and boundary breaking.
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APPENDICES
Placement Contracts
1. Adult Mental Health Core Placement
2. People with Learning Disabilities Core Placement
3. Child and Adolescent Core Placement
4. Older Adults Core Placement
5. Forensic Specialist Placement
6. Psychotherapy Specialist Placement
CLIENT/OTHER PROFESSIONALS CONTACTS/ SETTINGS:
1. To attend Day Hospital Ward round♦
2. To experience joint work and observe work of other
professionals such as CPN, Psychiatric Nurse, Psyhiatrist, 
Social Worker, Occupational Therapist,
3. To visit in-patient unit and attend Psychiatric Ward round.
4. To observe psychiatric intervention in the out-patient
5. To visit Community Drop-In and Day Centre.
6. latter 3~ munbhs— Lu wGZ V T t session in a GP Practice.
TEACHING:
1. To do a case presentation at the Clinical Seminar.
As appropriate, to provide seminars for junior doctors.
ANIZATIONAL/MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES:
1. District Psychology Department Meetings (Last Wednesday of
2. Specialty Meetings a) Business: 3rd Friday of month
b) Clinical Seminar: 1st Friday of 
month»
3. CMHT/Day Hospital Meetings.
4. Quality Assurance Group for Mental Health - attend with 
Head of Department, 20th January, 2.00pm, Board Room and 
3rd February. 10.00am, PGMC.
WEEKLY SUPERVISION:
1. 2 hours a week with major supervisor: Ewa Rula/Annabel
clinic.
month).
Poate.
2. 1 hour a month with coordinator: Sandra Canter.
3. Supervision of Primary Care session to be agreed.
C:\amhs
CONTRACT FOR PLACEMENT FOR EXPERIENCE WITH PEOPLE WITH 
LEARNING DISABILITIES FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF SURREY 
DOCTORATE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY.
LENGTH OF PLACEMENT: 18.5.95 - 16.11.95
NAME OF TRAINEE: ANDREW ROGERS.
NAMES OF CO-SUPERVISORS: ZILLAH WEBB AND LIZ MARLOW.
ADDRESS: SURREY HEARTLANDS NHS TRUST, CAVELL HOUSE, ST EBBA’S,
HOOK ROAD, EPSOM, SURREY KT 19 8QJ
(S  01372 - 722212 EXT 4063)
AIMS OF PLACEMENT:
1. To achieve at least an acceptable standard in the core competencies as applied to clients with 
a learning disability as specified in the Clinical Placement Handbook.
2. To introduce the trainee to this client group and give experience with a full range of 
disabilities in both community and hospital settings.
3. To develop awareness of their needs.
4. To have experience of the range of possible psychological assessments, therapeutic 
interventions and theoretical models, including systematic and psychodynamic.
5. To gain experience or knowledge of alternative therapies e.g. multi-sensoiy environment, 
aroma-therapy, music and drama therapy.
6. To gain awareness of broader systematic and service issues.
7. To identify areas of special interest and provide sample experience on those areas.
OBJECTIVES:
To select, use and interpret norm referenced and criterion reference tests.
2. To enable the trainee to communicate effectively with learning disabled clients using 
modified language and non-verbal methods, including attending a basic Makaton Workshop.
3. To plan and undertake at least part of therapeutic interventions, one behavioural and one 
other orientation.
4. To plan, run and evaluate a group.
5. To communicate the formulation method and outcome of an intervention in writing.
6. To present a psychological assessment and/or intervention to a multidisciplinary group.
2METHODS:
To attend meetings of the Psychology Department held on 
alternate weeks.
To attend meetings of the CTLD held once a month
To attend CTLDS team training day
To attend a SIG (PLD) meeting. (July 5th) Cognition in 
Autism.
To present a case report to a multidisciplinary group.
To give a seminar to the department.
To observe the work of another psychologist in assessment 
and therapy sessions including one case from initial 
assessment to formulation.
To work a shift on a home as part of a specific assessment 
of a client using an observation schedule.
To apply a WAIS-R, Leiter and BPVS.
To cany out a “Theory of Mind” assessment with a person 
with Learning Disabilities and Autism.
To apply the HALO and another criterian referenced 
assessment.
To design and evaluate a behavioural programme including 
a functional analysis.
To work directly 1 :1  with a minimum of 2 clients with 
involvement in at least 10 others and to provide a detailed 
formulation and report on two of these clients.
To participate in focused group work with another 
psychologist or undertake similar joint work.
To communicate results of psychological assessments with 
staff carers in a residential setting.
To do the same with parent carers in a community setting.
To observe the work of other professionals in NHS, Social 
Services and educational settings, including speech 
therapy.
To attend a meeting in which service development or 
organisational change issues are discussed.
To endeavour to cover the following areas - sexuality, 
bereavement/loss, skills teaching, social skills, challenging 
behaviour and cross specialism, ethnic issues.
ACHIEVED.
3PARAMETERS OF THE PLACEMENT
Supervision minimum for VA hours per week, both supervisors to be present together 
with trainee whenever possible plus at least lA hour informal supervision.
Informal lunch break with both supervisors and trainee once a month.
Annual leave arrangements to be negotiated in the early stage of the placement within 
the limits set by the course requirements.
AGENDA FOR SUPERVISION.
1. Ongoing case work.
2. General issues arising, process issues, policy.
3. Contract : Objectives. Still to cover, goal setting.
4. Placement issues : Log book, placement visit, evaluation.
Personal development - learning styles, theoretical orientation.
Making links to other client groups.
STATEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS.
DRESS : to reflect activities for each day as timetabled “smart casual” should be
appropriate for most occasions, but for some activities more informal clothes will be 
more practical - if in doubt - ask.
SECURITY : observing the departmental procedures meticulously is extremely
important due to the high number of break-ins. We shall be reminding each other of 
these and possibly revising them at intervals throughout the placement.
ZILLAH WEBB LIZ MARLOW
Chartered Clinical Psychologist Chartered Clinical Psychologist
ANDREW ROGERS
Clinical Psychologist in Training. May 1995.
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Placement Contract for Andrew Rogers (6.12.95)
Child and Adolescent Placement, St. Heller Trust
This is Andrew's first Child Placement. His goals for this placement are as follows:
1. To gain some understanding o f children by observing them working, playing 
and interacting in other settings - eg playgroup.
experience of assessing children and families with a range of 
presenting difficulties across the age range o f pre-school to adolescence.
3. To gain experience o f psychometric assessment, which will include 
selecting and using appropriate tests, interpreting the results, writing 
up this assessment, and communicating results to the family and other 
relevant professionals.
experience in formulating hypotheses to guide intervention based 
on initial assessment.
5. To gain experience in planning and undertaking interventions based on 
assessment and formulation.
6. Whilst working primarily within a cognitive behavioural model, to gain 
experience of seeing other therapeutic models being practised. ’
As Andrew's supervisor, I will undertake to try to provide Andrew with placement
experiences f —" -  n  -
Signed
Signed
CL. INI CAL_ F-SYCHOL-OGY 
w ± iz hi cd 1 d e  r- a  d u  I t s
F-L-ACEMENT CONTRACT
A p r i l  -  O c to b e r  1996
Worthing Priority Care NHS Trust, Directorate of Clinical Psychology
Int r o d u c t i o n
In this placement we aim to give an introduction to working 
with older adults with mental health problems as a clinical 
p E-yc ho legist.
I his contract is drawn up between 
Dr, Andrew Rogers,
trainee clinical psychologist <= the trainee)
and
u r s = i_ -  = r  =  u" =  lieest e r s,
ed clinical psychologist (= the supervisor):hartp--j
The placement is from 2d -4  to 4-10-1996
A i m s  o f  p l a c e m e n t
The main aim of the placement is to offer the trainee the 
opportunity to gain experience in all aspects of clinical 
psychology, applied to an EMI settings direct and indirect 
work with clients, clinical and educational work with carers 
and relatives, structural and supportive- work with staff 
members and — if desired — involvement in ongoing clinical 
research.
We also hope to introduce the trainee to the challenge of 
working in this specialism and the implications of multidisci­
plinary work.
O p e r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n
.SS-t.ti ng
Worthing Priority Care NHS Trust has a service for elderly 
people with mental health problems. The service emphasises 
that it aims to serve elderly people with both ?functional? 
mental health problems and with problems against the back­
ground of organic brain damage. The service has a strong
commitment to multidisciplinary approach to client care and 
treatment, and this commitment is visible in all parts of the 
service:
four community teams
two in-patient units
a day hospital
a respite facility for people with dementia
The in-patient units specialise in short term assessment of 
the client's problems resulting in extensive care plans. One 
unit is specialised in assessment and short term treatment 
with emphasis on clients with ’functional' problems, the other
giving more attention to clients with problems based on orga­
nic brain damage.
placement content
The trainee will be based in a shared office with the supervi­
sor and from that position be- introduced to the community
teams, the assessment units and the day hospital.
All settings will provide opportunities for familiarisation 
with specialist assessment methods, treatment and research. 
Seeing the time limitations of the placement the trainee will 
be expected to concentrate on direct client work in the asses­
sment units and the community. In addition there is space for
short term projects of structural work, either client—related
or staff—related in any setting.
Techniques
The trainee will gain experience in:
performing and interpreting specialist assessments (neu­
ropsychological 5 functional analysis, structural inter— 
v iews >
applying and evaluating a range of treatment methods 
(client—centred therapy, cognitive techniques, memory 
training, behavioural programmes)
contributing to multidisciplinary client reviews and 
treatment planning
felQcjki  ng , arrangements
The trainee will be introduced to the service through an 
induction period, in which he will meet the most relevant 
workers in the service components. After this induction p e r i o d  
he will be expected to bear increasing responsibility for the 
organisation and time management of his workload, in close 
consultation with the supervisor.
Two hours per week have been set aside f o r  formal supervision 
in a fixed arrangement. In addition the trainee will know at 
all times where and how to reach the supervisor for emergen­
cies or informal supervision.
The psychology directorate in the Trust has a monthly business- 
meeting, followed by a clinical presentation, to which the 
trainee is very welcome. These professional meetings will 
serve as an opportunity to compare EMI work with work aimed at 
other client groups and as a means to meet other psycholo­
gists.
O u t c o m e  e x p e c t a t i o n s
The trainee is expected to gain understanding of all aspects 
of o1 der aduIt psychology as a specialism from this piacernent = 
Growing insight and expertise i n  technical aspects of the 
placement should become apparent in his progress through 
reports and professional correspondence; growing understanding 
of the specialist role of the clinical psychologist in an EMI 
setting is expected to be demonstrated via feedback on diverse 
exposu re experiences.
Finally the p1acernent shou1d be a chalienging and positive 
experience, encouraging and guiding the trainee towards con­
scious choices for his future career development.
Worthing, 25 Apri 1 1 w 6
Dr. Andrew Kogers
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
Drs. C.A.J, Meesters 
Ch. Clin, Psycho1.
ANDY ROGERS
PLACEMENT CONTRACT : FORENSIC 
RIVERSIDE FORENSIC SERVICES 
SUPERVISOR : RICHARD MILLINGTON
Start Date : \C)
End Date : S o  . <1. ^
Mid-Placement Review :
essential supervision 
aims
1) observation of others work
To observe Richard with patients at assessment and treatment stages
2) frequency of supervision
weekly, arranged in advance ( one and a half hours ) ;
Richard to be available for phone consultation at other times.
3) guidelines on supervision
Andy and Richard are familiar with the BPS guidelines on supervision 
Essential knowledge 
aims
familiarity with literature on :
psychological intervention methods for psychosis, personality disorder and trauma 
risk assessment and dangerousness
personal safety and the prevention and management of violence 
services for offender patients at national and local level 
interface between the criminal justice system and the NHS 
supervision register 
CPA
Mental health Act
Essential client work 
aims
1) assessment and investigation
assessment of offender patients with multiple problems e.g. with chronic mental illness, 
organic problems, effects of trauma
assessment for reporting to court on the contribution of the persons mental health problems 
to their offending
assessment for psychological intervention 
assessment for rehabilitation 
assessment of dangerousness
2) intervention methods 
cognitive-behavioural methods
3) individual care planning
familiarity with different methods for planning individual care such as CPA and ICPs.
4) client ability levels and age range
from borderline to superior levels of intelligence; from age 18-60.
5) settings
a) with in-patients at the Henry Rollin Unit
b) with out-patients in Trust settings and at the Askew Road Probation Office 
Essential indirect work
AIMS
work with nursing staff to assess patient mood and behaviour
work with nursing staff to set up and evaluate programmes of behavioural management
education for nursing staff on the implications of particular syndromes for daily care
Work within the organisation 
Aims
familiarity with nursing and multidisciplinary teams at the henry rollin unit and decision-making 
processes in these teams
familiarity with decision-making processes at the level of the Specialist Services Unit and the 
Trust
familiarity with the purchaser/provider culture 
familiarity with the Court Liaison Team
Richard Millington
Frank Milton 
Chartered Clinical Psychologist 
Kingston Hospital
SPECIALIST PLACEMENT - PSYCHOTHERAPY 
October 1996 - September 1997
CONTRACT FOR ANDY ROGERS
AIMS
1. To gain an understanding of the theory of psychotherapy, and to integrate
theory and practice.
2. To develop skills in this therapeutic approach with 2 patients seen until
September 1997.
OBJECTIVES
1. To spend one clinical day per week on placement between October 1996 and
September 1997.
2. To undertake individual therapeutic work with 2 patients throughout this
period.
3. To have 1 hours supervision (shared with another trainee) each day on
placement.
FRANK MILTON ANDY ROGERS
Chartered Clinical Psychologist Clinical Psychologist in training
SECTION 3. RESEARCH
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LITERATURE REVIEW
THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF PARANOIA
Original formulation
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The psychodynamic literature concerning the understanding and development of 
paranoia was precipitated by Freud’s (1911) ‘Psychoanalytic Notes Upon an 
Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’.
Freud’s analysis was based on the personal accounts of Daniel Paul Schreber, a 
presiding judge at the Dresden Appeals Court. Schreber was born in Leipzig, 
Germany in 1842. He suffered two episodes of psychiatric illness in 1884 and 
1893. The second of these episodes led to prolonged hospitalisations from which 
Schreber obtained discharge in 1902 through legal action although he remained 
delusional. Freud asserted that Schreber’s (1903) personal account of his 
experiences ‘Memoirs of My Nervous Illness’ offered legitimate basis for theory. 
Freud and Schreber never met (Zuk and Zuk, 1995).
Freud formulated that Schreber’s psychosis, in the form of paranoid ideation, 
was caused by ‘unresolved homosexuality’ where one of Schreber’s psychiatrists 
was the immediate focus attraction but was also the tranferential representation 
of Schreber’s father and possibly his older brother. Schreber’s delusions 
involved fantasies of himself as a woman being sought after by men for their 
sexual pleasure. He also believed he had a special relationship with God.
Freud proposed that Schreber’s case illustrated a mechanism of general 
applicability to a wide range of delusional formation highlighting denial, 
contradiction and projection of the presumed homosexual impulses from the 
unconscious. His basic proposition went thus; ‘I (a man) love him (a man)’. 
Through a combination of unconscious (motivation elements) and forms of 
logical transformation (reasoning elements) the basic proposition could be 
transformed into a new more acceptable proposition. In essence, a positive 
attraction is converted to a negative one under stress because the positive is 
deemed dangerous. Love for a person of the same sex is reacted to with anxiety 
and fear. This emotional reaction triggers projection (the process of converting 
thoughts to their opposites). Projection then alters the perception of the loved 
one so they are deemed unworthy, rejecting or persecutory. Competing thoughts 
can occur towards the loved one and confusion can result. Finally the negative 
thoughts prevail as they compose a ‘solution’ that reduces the individual’s 
anxieties. The ‘solution’ might, however, compose of thoughts an outsider deems 
bizarre or delusional. The resulting paranoid proposition, therefore, develops 
from the transformation, ‘I (a man) hate him (a man)’ and is projected into, ‘He (a 
man) hates (persecutes) me (a man)’. Freud also believed his theory applied to 
both sexes.
Freud’s theory has elicited an immense amount of criticism. Despite this his 
formulation is still considered of great historical significance in the
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psychopathological literature (Zuk and Zuk, 1995). This apparent paradox has 
been summed up by Meissener (1980) who stated that Freud’s analysis of the 
Schreber case, despite its questionable conclusions, was his first 
pronouncement on the causes of psychosis in which he had attempted to link his 
theories of neurotic behaviour to the field of psychopathology.
Freud’s theory was not immediately dismissed and derived support from such 
notable psychoanalytic theorists as Jung (1915) and Ferenczi(1922) up until the 
1950s (Katan, 1950; 1953). Later psychoanalysts challenged Freud’s view in 
terms of homosexuality being the cause and not the effect of paranoid ideation 
(Klein, 1946) or the product of a punitive and dysfunctional family (Niederland, 
1974; Schatazman, 1973). His view has also been challenged as a 
misinterpretation of the German society of his time, particularly Schreber’s place 
in the judicial system (Lathane, 1992). The author suggested that what might 
appear as paranoid ideation might rather have been a code employed by 
Schreber to mask his thoughts and intentions in a ruthless profession. In 
addition, his symptoms appeared to resemble an affective illness rather than 
paranoia.
Freud’s theory has also been criticised as not dealing with the distinction 
between the form and content of delusions (Manschrek, 1995). Although he 
proposed an inferential process to account for the particular delusion, he did not
147
explain why a delusion is formed and not another (perhaps persecutory) 
symptom such as an hallucination.
Although Freud elicits criticism on a theoretical level, the verification of his 
hypotheses depends on clinical and/or empirical evidence linking paranoid 
delusions with indications of homosexuality or ‘homosexual tendencies’. Many 
studies have been carried out assess exactly this and a representative sample 
will be presented here. However, such studies have been criticised on 
theoretical, methodological and interpretational grounds. These issues will also 
be discussed.
Empirical studies of Freud's formulation
From a clinical perspective the question as to whether paranoid patients possess 
greater homosexual tendencies than non-paranoid patients has been assessed 
using intensive interviews and interpretations of case note material. Therefore, 
these studies are largely unstandardised. One of the first studies to link 
homosexuality with paranoid patient status was conducted by Gardener (1931). 
The author found that ‘unconscious homosexual drives’ were possessed by 45% 
of a sample of paranoid patients and were more prevalent in males than females. 
No control group data was provided. Also, the subjective analysis of what 
constituted ‘unconscious homosexual tendencies’ probably reflected
experimenter bias. Other clinicians have not provided supportive data as to a link 
between covert or overt homosexual concerns and paranoia (see Miller, 1941; 
Klein and Horwitz, 1949; Modlin, 1963). However, these studies also lacked non- 
paranoid control groups and standardised measures. Friberg (1965) was able to 
compare paranoid patients with non-paranoid patients and found no relationship 
between paranoid state and various variables including homosexual 
preoccupations and experiences and sex of persecutor. Again, only subjective 
ratings were used. In conclusion, this type of clinical research has ubiquitous 
methodological problems including a lack of objective criteria and measures, 
experimenter bias and a lack of/inappropriate control groups.
Another area of research into the paranoia-homosexuality association has been 
using an amended Rorschach Test based on Wheeler’s (1949) 20 content 
responses of signs of homosexuality. Construct validity of the cards has been 
demonstrated (Goldfried, 1966). The best known of this type of study was 
conducted by Aronson (1952). He found that 23% of the Rorschach responses of 
paranoid deluded patients were ‘Wheeler signs’ compared to only 9% of non­
deluded patients. This difference was significant. This difference was supported 
by Musiker (1952) comparing samples of paranoid schizophrenic patients with 
non-paranoid schizophrenic patients. These studies would appear to provide 
some support for a link between paranoia and homosexuality. However, 
correlation does not prove causality and the role of homosexuality in
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precipitating the defensive process leading to paranoid thinking cannot be 
confirmed or denied from such studies.
Visual behaviour studies have also provided inconclusive support for Freud’s 
theory of paranoid ideation. Daston (1956) showed paranoid schizophrenic 
patients to have lower recognition thresholds or ‘perceptual sensitisation’ than 
non-paranoid schizophrenic patients to the presentation of words ‘indicative of 
homosexuality’. While Eriksen (1951) demonstrated paranoid patients as 
evidencing greater ‘perceptual defense’ i.e. higher recognition thresholds than 
non-paranoid controls. These results are difficult to interpret as both can be 
considered supportive of the Freudian theory; the former as an example of 
homosexual sensitivities the later a defence against.
The fact that negative results can still be interpreted as supportive of Freud’s 
stance is a major problem of conducting research in this area. For instance, 
although Gittleson and Levine (1966) only found 2/31 male paranoid patients to 
have concerns over their possible homosexuality, it was suggested that this may 
have been due to their defensiveness in discussing matters of a (homo)sexual 
nature. Other areas assessing the paranoid-homosexuality link have shown, on 
face value, supportive evidence in terms of marriage rates (Lucas et al., 1962) 
and even ‘constipation rates’ i.e. corresponding to anal erotic gratification 
(Alexander and Menninger, 1936) have been proffered but these type of studies
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do not bear serious contemplation due to their almost bizarre measures of 
‘covert’ homosexuality.
Studies concerning ‘sex of persecutor’
A more serious area of research ought to be that pertaining to the sex of the 
persecutor since ‘...the person who is now hated and feared as a persecutor was 
at one time loved and honoured.’ (p. 424 Freud, 1911/1933). Although high rates 
of male persecutors have been found for male paranoid patients which might 
support Freud’s theory, similar rates have been found for female paranoid 
patients (see Klein and Horwitz, 1949; Klaf and Davis, 1960 and Rettersal,
1966). An obvious conclusion from this is that men still have the most power and 
characterise authority in society (especially when these studies were carried out) 
thus the sex of the persecutor reflects the patient’s relation to society rather than 
any underlying defence against unacceptable sexuality. Sletten and Ballou 
(1967) suggested that childhood learning experiences were most influential on 
the paranoid patient’s current delusional content. In a group of 12 male and 16 
female paranoid patients there was almost total agreement between the sex of 
the ‘most feared parent’ and the sex of the primary current persecutor. Other 
theories of the psychodynamics of paranoia have emphasised the role of 
childhood learning experiences over repressed sexuality and will be discussed 
later.
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Major criticisms of Freud’s theory of paranoia
The Freudian theory of paranoia has been considered as having 'serious 
conceptual difficulties’ (Chalus, 1978) so much as to be largely ignored by the 
current mental health community, even by those therapists with a 
psychoanalytical background (Zuk and Zuk, 1995). The major criticisms, apart 
from the research ones cited above, centred particularly on Freud’s conception 
that it is latent homosexuality that precipitates the defence mechanism that leads 
to the projection of fear and anxiety that forms paranoid ideation. McCawley 
(1971) noted that latent homosexuality had been implicated by psychoanalysts to 
account for various behavioural problems including alcoholism and drug 
addiction. Schwartz (1963) believed that through ‘depth analysis’ one could 
reveal homosexual fantasies in all analysands and thus could consider such 
fantasies as universal. However, what might distinguish the paranoid patient 
from the ‘normal’ individual is not the intensity of homosexual feelings but the 
primitive and atypical defence against them. Another major problem is that in 
consideration of paranoid patients experiencing schizophrenic breakdown 
(Grauer, 1955). If underlying homosexuality is universal in paranoid patients then 
during schizophrenic breakdown ego defences, especially repression, should 
disintegrate and thus homosexual behaviour or consciously expressed 
homosexual desires should be seen more widely than they are in actual practice.
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In conclusion, in order for the Freudian theory of paranoia to be proven 
conclusively it should be shown that homosexual conflicts initiate a process 
directly giving rise to paranoid thinking. The above research shows that it has 
been extremely difficult to reliably and objectively assess unconscious 
psychological mechanisms and thus any research findings, one way or the other, 
cannot be seen other than inconclusive.
Development of Freud's formulation
At the risk of throwing the baby out with the bath water, the Freudian formulation 
has not been totally dismissed. It is in essence a two step process of a reaction 
to heightened unacceptable arousal caused by homosexual impulses and then a 
projection of the transformed feelings. Chalus (1978) suggested that on the basis 
of the data to date there may still be some validity in the second part of the 
Freudian formulation i.e. that paranoia constitutes a continuous and unconscious 
projection of an individual’s intense and unacceptable hostility onto significant 
others. The individual’s hostility might arise through modelling of parental 
defensive behaviours and thus may be triggered, in the adult, by intolerable 
stress levels e.g. due to occupational failure, relationship breakdown or 
real/imagined mistreatment at the hands of others etc. The reason for the 
projection rather than the direct expression of hostility again may be due to
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learned child hood behaviour. If the child has defensive, perhaps sadistic, 
parents any expression of hostility would incur punishment. Therefore, the child 
becomes afraid of its own (learned) hostility and projection provides the outlet to 
reduce the resulting tension. Of course, if this tension reducing process works as 
a coping mechanism, in adulthood, reinforcement will occur.
The significance of childhood experiences on the development of paranoid 
ideation has been expanded by Zuk and Zuk (1995) based on the authors' 
experience of family therapy. Again the central mechanism of projection has 
been employed in their model in the guise of ‘learning to be possessed'.
Learning to be possessed is a form of pathogenic relating in families where an 
individual (usually a child) behaves in a manner unacceptable to the family. The 
individual is disciplined by the family but is excused from accountability by the 
judgement of a key family member. A general consensus is reached that the 
individual was not behaving ‘normally’ and was under the influence of 
indeterminate (extraneous) forces e.g. school, other children or even ‘the devil’). 
The individual learns that (perhaps severe) punishment may be avoided by 
acknowledging one’s ignorance of one’s own behaviour or that one was not in 
control of oneself and was under the control of external forces. The individual 
learns not to accept personal responsibility for his/her actions.
Zuk and Zuk’s (1995) formulation shares with Freud the core concept of an 
inversion of meaning; in essence, in learning to be possessed the individual 
changes meaning (of an action) by accepting advice from others that they (the 
child) did not mean the behaviour and, therefore, are not responsible. Delusional 
thinking is a consequence of the individual's freedom from personal 
responsibility for odd, unusual or bizarre thoughts or acts, especially as the 
individual might not be aware of the motive to be free from personal 
responsibility i.e. a unconscious mechanism is at work.
Zuk and Zuk (1995) believed their formulation of learning to be possessed as a 
process leading to paranoid thinking, shared similarities with the earlier 
formulation of Harry Stack Sullivan’s theory of ‘paranoid transformation’
(Sullivan, 1953). In essence, Sullivan’s ‘paranoid transformation’ closely 
resembled Freud’s concept of projection. Sullivan thought that unacceptable 
impulses may be dissociated from the self i.e. the ‘not-me’ but are still held within 
the self, a type of repression. However, if that which is held as the ‘not-me’ 
becomes intolerable the ‘not-me’ is transformed and personified as others. The 
‘not-me’ refers to that part of the self which is separated and denied.
‘Dissociation’ is the process whereby separation and denial occur. ‘Personify’ 
refers to a process where material from the ‘not-me’ is attached to another as a 
kind of scapegoat. This three step process is comparable to projection where an 
inversion or conversion of meaning occurs often polar in degree. The difference
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between learning to be possessed and paranoid transformation is that the former 
an outside agent determines what an individual may or may not be accountable 
for whereas in the later the individual themselves determines what gets assigned 
to the ‘not-me’. In conclusion, however, both formulations retain similar 
processes akin to Freud’s conception of projection in which the responsibility for 
the consequences of one’s own actions is attributed to external agents to reduce 
intolerable anxiety and threat.
Paranoia and life events
The role of an intolerable stress state in the development of paranoid ideation 
has been suggested above and may be related to life event stressors such as 
occupational and interpersonal failures. However, developmental stressors or 
‘existential crises’ have also been implicated in the formation of paranoid 
ideation. Chrenka et al. (1985) provided a case-study account of the 
development of paranoid ideation in later life due to distinct psychodynamic or 
existential factors in the absence of organic disease. The expression of paranoid 
ideation was attributed to a defensive adaptation to the narcissistic assaults of 
ageing. The elderly lady who constituted the case-study complained to the police 
of being burgled regularly, neighbours keeping her awake deliberately and men 
commenting on her body and making unwanted sexual advances. Her adulthood 
was characterised by a counterdependent life-style emphasising self-reliance.
She had a good work record and had been sexually active although had no long 
term intimate relationships with men. She was diagnosed as possessing a 
‘narcissistic personality...with a conspicuous absence of depressive affect.’ 
Gutman (1980) suggested that delusions appear to be adaptive protesting 
against the painful depressive affect and fragmentation of self a narcissistic 
woman expects with ageing. Here, the patient no longer able to rely on the 
narcissistic benefits of work or sexual contacts experiences panic at the physical 
and cognitive changes experienced with ageing. Rather than internalising these 
narcissistic assaults and experience them as insults she externalises the agency 
of her perceived decline. For example, her sexual delusions serve a restitutive 
purpose as harassment never leaves her feeling abandoned or undesired. The 
patient develops the belief in a hostile external force which allows them to take 
an active stance in mastering her dilemma. Thereafter her behaviour is 
characterised by scanning the environment for the activities of this force which 
she can react to for her self-preservation. The authors highlighted this process 
as an alternative to depression. The involvement of others e.g. police, doctors in 
her ideation signifies both the pathological nature of her beliefs but can also lead 
to further isolation and ostracism.
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Development of paranoia in a social context
The ‘chicken and the egg’ problem of the development of paranoid ideation i.e. 
whether alienation is a cause or product of paranoid psychosis or is difficult to 
clarify. Aronson (1977) attempted to explain the development of paranoia as a 
behaviour of alienation and provided an explanation of paranoid psychosis within 
a societal framework. In a society characterised by the disappearance of 
extended families, increasing divorce rates and the break up of the nuclear 
family paranoia is seen as an extreme behavioural expression of an underlying 
process of alienation. If an individual’s feelings of alienation develop without 
being checked the end result could be paranoid behaviour. Therefore, the 
development of paranoid ideation is seen as interactive with an individual’s 
increasing ‘separateness’ from the goals and means to achievement his/her 
society counts as valuable and self-enhancing. The background of Aronson’s 
position is found within the sociological framework of ‘anomie’ expounded by 
Durkheim (1893, 1964). Merton (1958) viewed society as possessing cultural 
goals achieved through cultural norms and institutionalised means. Anomie 
results as a disparity between the two. This disparity can be resolved singularly 
or in combination through conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism or 
rebellion. The Merton model and concept of anomie can be compared to the 
development of paranoid ideation in an individual: the individual retreats into a
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paranoid delusional system which s/he creates (innovation), holds onto it in an 
obsessional (ritualistic) way which justifies not only the ability to conform 
(retreatism) but also aggressive (rebellious) impulses.
Seeman (1959) suggested five dimensions of alienation; powerlessness, 
meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation and self-estrangement. He then 
clarified how paranoid ideation might develop out of his alienation model by 
examining the opposites to his dimensions i.e. mastery and autonomy 
(powerlessness), insight and understanding (meaninglessness), order and trust 
(normlessness), consensus and commitment (isolation) and integrity and 
involvement (self-estrangement). These opposites were considered a profile of 
what the paranoid lacks but strives after. Thus the paranoid individual attempts 
to avoid alienation, although paranoid ideation is the ultimate expression of 
powerlessness, the individual is constantly trying to gain mastery through the 
delusional system i.e. involving the police and legal structures to claims ‘rights’ 
while remaining the victim.
The psychodynamic view of alienation substantiates that paranoia is rather the 
result than the cause of alienation. Tietz and Woods (1970) suggested that 
through the paranoid system order can be restored and understanding and 
meaning are given to events over which the individual feels no control.
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Criticism of paranoia as a result of alienation
McClosky and Schaar (1965) highlighted the neglect of cognitive and personality 
factors as psychological dimensions of anomie. Along with the societal and 
cultural failings the paranoid individual’s world is not structured realistically and 
the inability to relate to others leads to a failure to learn the beliefs and values of 
others and society in general. These psychological factors were suggested as 
inflexibility, anxiety, low ego strength and generalised aggression. The factors of 
anxiety and aggression appear to share similarities with the more intra personal 
models of paranoia, as the authors agreed that the fundamental mechanism, 
even though alienation might trigger paranoid development, is the projection of 
anxiety and hostility in the paranoid’s characteristic perception of a hostile and 
malevolent environment.
The alienation model of paranoia has to be verified through research. However, 
a central question must be whether paranoia has increased with social change 
and the supposed increase in family and social breakdown and the fluidity of the 
modern industrial market.
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Paranoia and ‘social forces’
The role of society in the formation of paranoid ideation had been explicated in 
the classic paper ‘Paranoia and the Dynamics of Exclusion’ (Lemert, 1962). 
Since the work of Durkheim, sociologists had attempted to provide a sociological 
account of mental illness. Lemert presented a ‘labelling theory’ of mental illness, 
particularly paranoia, suggesting that the paranoid patient’s (or ‘deviant’s’) 
perspective should be taken seriously. Interviewing those people in familial and 
work environments ‘responsible’ for the paranoid’s hospitalisation, Lemert 
attempted, systematically, to explain those behaviours, psychiatrists believed 
symptomatic of a disorder, in sociological terms.
Lemert’s position was developed in response to the psychiatric formulation of 
paranoia by Cameron (1959). Cameron argued that the paranoid creates a 
‘pseudo-community’ of people who conspire against him/her on a personal level. 
Lemert believed that although the paranoid acts differently towards his/her 
immediate community so does the group to that individual. Therefore, as 
opposed to Cameron, Lemert suggested there was nothing ‘pseudo’ about the 
community of conspirators but their reaction to the paranoid’s behaviour can 
proliferate an atmosphere of perpetual exclusion and thus, to a certain degree, 
validate the paranoid’s beliefs. It is notable that Lemert highlighted that the
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paranoia occurs when the individual feels threat to his/her status which becomes 
unendurable. Hostility and aggression can results which affect the dynamics 
within a group setting first and leads to the individual’s structured exclusion by 
the group as the individual’s behaviour is seen as threatening to the group as a 
whole. Thus the dynamics of the paranoia, although beginning with the 
individual’s hostility, are generated by the exclusion or conspiracy to exclude by 
the group i.e. family, colleagues, professional etc. Lidz (1978) criticised Lemert’s 
formulation as it took the perspective of the paranoid patient too seriously. No 
clear cut grounds exist to determine whether a series of events can be 
considered a conspiracy. It is also unsurprising that when one takes the 
perspective of the paranoid individual one sees what the paranoid does i.e. a 
conspiracy. Although, Lemert’s sociological formulation implicates society as 
reacting in a defensive way to the hostile behaviour of the paranoid individual 
and thus engendering the paranoid feelings of that individual, the individual is 
seen much in the same way as the psychodynamic theories which begin with 
personalised hostility as the precursor to paranoia.
Summary
We have seen in this brief overview of the literature of the psychodynamics of 
paranoia a development from the Freudian formulation of paranoia as the 
resolution of unacceptable unconscious homosexual desires to a consensus of
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theories highlighting the projection of any kind of unacceptable hostile feelings. 
The role of family ‘conspiracy’ has also been suggested as influential in the 
abrogation of responsibility characteristic of paranoid behaviour. As paranoia is 
a belief based on a perspective of one’s social interactions theorists have also 
attempted to decipher whether it is the paranoid’s behaviour that is a self- 
fulfilling prophesy or that society must take a greater responsibility in its 
contribution to the alienation which may precipitate delusional thinking.
The understanding of paranoid ideation and behaviour has taken up much room 
in the literature from biological to sociological theories . This paper attempted to 
review the relatively small area of the psychodynamics of paranoia. This area of 
research may have had its hay-day as there are many empirical difficulties 
surrounding evaluating its theory, as is the case with many analytic explanations. 
However, the ideas expounded by such theorists have been the catalysts for 
contemporary explanations of paranoia, highlighting developmental and social 
interaction processes, along attributional and personal construct lines, are being 
researched presently (see Bentall et al., 1994).
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RESEARCH ON PLACEMENT
HOSPITAL CLOSURE AND OCCUPATIONAL STRESS IN FORENSIC
NURSING STAFF
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ABSTRACT
The present study attempted to assess the levels of occupational stress of 
forensic nurses (n=3) on both objective (the Occupational Stress Indicator: OSI: 
Cooper et al., 1988) and subjective (semistructured interview) measures in the 
context of hospital closure. Particular attention was paid to how any present 
elevated levels of stress might affect motivation and co-operation in terms of 
inter-disciplinary work practice that may have implications for clinical 
psychologists working in the same setting.
Only one of the nurses reported significant disruption to nursing practice due to 
general job dissatisfaction with regard to the uncertainties of closure. All three 
nurses voiced dissatisfaction with the degree of personal influence they felt in 
terms of management decisions about their future job status. Occupational stress 
in the present context appeared to be dependent on previous experience of 
closure, personal flexibility, general attitude to the post in terms of rigidity of 
personal association with the post and general approach to change. It was 
concluded that such specific factors need to be accommodated by management 
during the often protracted process of hospital closure to decrease the likelihood 
of personal staff distress and, indirectly, the quality of patient care.
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INTRODUCTION
Health promotion in the work place has been proposed as a priority in the Health 
of the Nation (Secretary of State for Health, 1992; Prosser et al., 1996). The 
welfare of mental health staff maybe of particular importance as the increased 
likelihood of encountering threats of suicide or violence in mental health settings 
are potential sources of stress (Prosser et al., 1996). This might be even more 
pertinent to forensic settings not only because many patients are characterised 
by violent behaviour (to self or others) but also because forensic staff have the 
additional conflict of being carers and custodians simultaneously (Kinsella and 
Challenor, 1995); the ‘dilemma of therapeutic custody’ (Burrow, 1991).
Research to date on stress encountered by psychiatric nurses indicates two 
broad categories; in relation to patient contact and administrative/organisational 
factors (Jones, 1987). It is unclear whether these two domains of stress have any 
mutual relationship. If the Health of the Nation objectives are to be reached then 
interventions to improve mental health and ‘burn out' of such staff will need to 
concentrate on particular sources of stress.
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Background
X hospital is a low-medium secure forensic facility in Surrey. It comprises two 
wards providing 19 and 23 beds respectively to both male and female patients 
who have been detained, in the main, under Sections 3, 37/41 or 41 of the 1983 
Mental Health Act. There are approximately 7 nurses per day shift and 5 at night 
to care for the patients.
The wards once comprised part of a large psychiatric hospital which has been 
gradually closing down since 1994. Apart from the two forensic wards only two 
long-stay wards for severe treatment resistant schizophrenia remain. The Trust 
to which the hospital belongs is based in central/west London where the majority 
of the patients on the forensic unit come from. Management confirmed in January 
1997 that the forensic wards would relocate possibly early 1998 (although the 
specific date hasn’t been confirmed) to a west London hospital under the 
jurisdiction of another Trust. The new site is approximately one hour away from 
the present site by car and one and a half hours by public transport. Presently, 
nursing staff have been told that their jobs are safe if they wish to relocate with 
the unit. At the time of writing, however, no relocation or redundancy packages 
had been offered to the staff.
Since the knowledge concerning the relocation of the unit had been suspected 
and then confirmed (January 1997) turnover rates of staff have changed 
dramatically, although it is impossible to accurately assess a connection. In the 
first quarter of 1996 the turnover rate was 4.48% compared to 7.30% in the first 
quarter of 1997(from the hospital personnel dept.). It maybe, therefore, that 
factors surrounding the relocation of the forensic unit have resulted in nursing 
staff seeking alternative, ‘more secure’, employment elsewhere. This is perhaps 
speculative but may provide the basis for a more exploratory study of how 
hospital closure affects the general stress levels of the nursing staff. Of course, 
all change does not precipitate stress. However, of particular interest in the 
present study, is how any increased occupational stress, due to the changes, 
may affect intra and interdisciplinary work practice through decreased 
motivation.
Aim
To assess the general levels of occupational stress of forensic nursing staff, both 
objectively and subjectively, within the context of hospital closure, with particular 
reference to intra/interdisciplinary work practice (including that with Clinical 
Psychologists). This was an exploratory study.
METHOD
Three ‘E’ grade forensic nurses (qualified at least two years) took part in the 
study: AB a 38 year old male qualified for 2 years, his present job his first after 
qualification; he is married; CD, a 40 year old female qualified for 11 years, 9 
years in her present job; she is married; EF, a 24 year old single female qualified 
for 2 years all spent in her present job. All live in the locality of their present 
employment. None had any firm career plans within the present context of 
closure/possible relocation.
The above nurses were chosen, along with the methodology outlined below, due 
to the increased staff turnover. Many of the nurses approached had been in post 
for less than six months and did not have the same experience of the gradual 
changing environment as the nurses chosen who had been in post for at least 
two years. Nurses of the same grade were chosen for comparison. It is evident, 
however, that any responses obtained could only be related to that particular 
grade and it can’t be assumed that other more or less experienced nurses would 
have the same perceptions.
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Materials
As an objective measure, the nurses completed the (167 item) Occupational 
Stress Indicator (OSI; Cooper et al., 1988-see Appendix 1). The OSI is a 
standardised measure of occupational stress covering six domains; job 
satisfaction, mental and physical health, type A personality (general attitude to 
living), control (organisational forces and personal influence), job pressure and 
coping with stress.
The responses on the OSI were compared to those elicited from a 
semistructured questionnaire constructed by the investigator. Although the 
questions/prompts attempted to reflect the domains comprising the OSI particular 
attention was paid to the relation of experienced stress and the nurses work 
practice/relationships within their own discipline and between disciplines 
including clinical psychology.
Procedure
The nurses completed the OSI first which took approximately 20 minutes. A 
semistructured interview followed (see Appendix 2 for questions) which lasted 
approximately half an hour.
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Analysis
Due to the small number of nurses in the analysis, an intensive methodology was 
used incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The responses 
obtained on the OSI were compared to normative data. Themes were then 
elicited from the individual’s subjective accounts and compared to their OSI 
responses. A between subject comparison was then carried out to obtain any 
common themes of the nurses experience of stress, their coping styles and how 
their present levels of stress, if at all, have affected their general work practice.
RESULTS
Table
Scores and norms for responses oh the Occupational Stress Indicator 
(means and standard deviations)
Nurse Norms
AB___________ CD  EF_______ (means&sds)
Job
Satisfaction
Achievement 6 19 18 21.7(5.5)
Job itself 9 30 21 16.0(3.2)
Organisational 7 28 13 17.1(3.8)
structure
Organisational 3 15 12 15.5(3.7)
processes
Personal 9 15 13 11.8(2.4)
relationships 
Mental Health 43 52 48 53.0(13.8)
Physical 20 13 17 30.6(10.0)
Health
Tvoe A 
Behaviour
Attitude to 20 20 20 21.2(3.60)
living 
Style of 8 13 15 17.8(3.7)
behaviour
Ambition 10 12 7 11.1(7.4)
Control
Organisational 13 14 13 18.2(3.0)
forces
Management 19 18 18 13.5(2.1)
processes
Individual 15 17 15 10.1(2.1)
influence
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table (cont.)
Job Pressure
Intrinsic to the 35 22 23 29.3(6.4)
job
Managerial role 10 7 9 34.0(8.2)
Relationships 38 17 25 29.8(7.4)
Career and 26 14 20 28.9(7.7)
achievement
Organisational 38 9 27 37.5(8.9)
structure
Home/work
interface
9 12 14 30.5(9.9)
Cooina
Social support 9 6 9 15.5(3.0)
Task strategies 36 31 33 25.7(3.6)
Logic 21 16 15 12.3(2.1)
Home/work 24 20 22 15.6(3.4)
relationships
Time 13 10 15 14.3(2.2)
Involvement 14 12 9 23.1(3.3)
Summaries of OSI scores
1. AB
Job satisfaction
AB was not satisfied with achievement in his job, the job itself, the organisational 
structure/processes within which he had to work. He was satisfied with personal 
relationships at work.
181
Mental and physical health
AB’s mental health was well within the norm, his physical health very good. 
Type A behaviour
AB’s general attitude to life or ambition was not related to elevated stress. His 
style of behaviour was well below the norm.
Control
AB had not found organisational forces stressful presently. He found 
management processes and his individual influence current sources of elevated 
stress.
Job pressure
AB did not find factors intrinsic to the job, his managerial role, career and 
achievement, organisational structure or the home/work interface sources of 
elevated stress presently. There was an indication that relationships at work 
were affected in terms of increased tension.
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Coping
AB used task strategies, logic, home and work relationships often to aid coping 
with stress. Time management was also used but to a lesser degree. AB had not 
experienced a need for greater social support or to involve himself more in his 
job to counter any increased occupational stress.
2. CD
Job satisfaction
CD was currently satisfied with her achievement at work, was very satisfied with 
the job itself and with the organisational structure. She was also satisfied with 
the organisational processes she encountered and was very satisfied with 
personal relationships at work.
Mental and physical health
CD’s mental and physical health was very good at present.
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Type A behaviour
CD’s attitude to living and ambition were well within normal limits. Currently, she 
was experiencing a very good quality of life.
Control
CD was experiencing high levels of stress in relation to management processes 
and her individual influence in her work. Organisational forces were not related 
to elevated stress.
Job pressure
CD did not appear to experience elevated levels of stress with regard to any 
aspect of potential job pressure at the moment.
Coping
CD tended to use task strategies, logic and home/work relationships to cope with 
any occupational stress presently. She seldom used increased social support, 
time management or increased involvement in her work to cope.
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3. EF
Job satisfaction
EF was very satisfied with the job itself presently and generally satisfied with her 
achievement, the organisational structure/processes and personal relationships 
at work.
Mental and physical health
EF experienced no significant problems with her mental or physical health 
presently.
Type A behaviour
EF reported a general attitude to living, style of behaviour well within the norm.
In fact her ambition-stress relationship was well below the norm.
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Control
EF experienced low levels of stress with regard to organisational forces but 
increased stress with regard to management processes and her individual 
influence at work.
Job pressure
EF did not experience elevated levels of stress in terms of job pressure. She 
experienced very low stress with regard to any managerial role and the 
home/work interface.
Coping
EF tended to use task strategies, logic and home/work relationships to cope with 
any stress often and time management, to a lesser degree. She appeared to 
require little in the way of increased social support or greater involvement in her 
job.
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Themes derived from the semistructured interview (see Appendix 3 for full 
transcription)
1. AB
Job satisfaction
AB did not have the ‘same zeal' for the job presently compared to a year ago. 
Issues concerning the possible relocation of his family were a source of stress 
and meant that he ‘can’t give himself 100% to the [care] of the patient'. He was 
unhappy with the level of support from the management in terms of a lack of 
consultation about his and other nurses future status’. The relationships between 
the nursing staff were supportive as they tended to ‘reflect about matters 
together and share their discouragement...[being] in the same boat.’
Mental and physical health
AB felt his anxiety at work has increased as closure became imminent. He felt 
that because this was his first post and had worked in it for two years he was 
now ‘institutionalised’ which increased his anxiety about moving. However, the
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anxiety was controllable as he knew he would have to change jobs rather than 
lose his post.
Type A behaviour
AB expressed some regret at choosing to work in a hospital that was closing 
down and felt that he could do without such a ‘burden’ at this time of his life. He 
thought that he should stay to ‘the end’ as the job was his ‘possession’; however, 
the closure had also precipitated him thinking about future alternatives such as 
travelling.
Control
AB felt that the system was ‘very disruptive’ at the moment, which constituted a 
general source of stress. He felt ‘very little [personal] influence in organisational 
issues due to the lack of consultation.’
Job pressure
AB felt that ‘it is very difficult to progress in work...in the present circumstances.’ 
Despite this, the nurses ‘try not to let the patients suffer.’ AB did feel he was able 
to separate work and home life despite the difficulties at work.
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Coping
AB coped by talking to others, especially his wife and father. His wife is a 
psychiatric nurse so as well as being supportive she could understand the 
organisational difficulties AB was currently experiencing. He was also able to 
relax by listening to music and involve himself in domestic improvements. AB 
found that praying and reading the Bible sometimes helped calm him.
Work practice with other professionals
AB had noticed the increased turnover of staff, especially consultants, recently 
which he described as ‘catastrophic’ as it affected nursing practice in terms of 
having to compensate for the temporary relationships between doctors and the 
patients. AB was adamant that the present circumstances affected work co­
operation e.g. ‘why bother with a person who will leave..you can’t develop trust..’ 
General motivation and co-operation was affected, including that with clinical 
psychologists e.g. ‘motivation to keep information on programmes, implement 
programmes.’ He believed that underpinning the poor motivation was a lack of 
supervision. The present changes ‘cloud everything’.
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2. CD
Job satisfaction
CD felt satisfied with her job, the present situation ‘hasn’t altered the way I think.’ 
She liked the type of patient she works with and the lack of a routine; ‘[she liked] 
the challenge that things on the ward change quickly, often dramatically.’ She 
saw change as keeping her ‘alive’ and that, considering the present changes, 
‘anyone who works in an environment like this will develop the guts to work 
anywhere.’ She had also experienced the changes involved in a hospital closure 
previously.
Mental and physical health
The present changes hadn’t affected either her mental or physical health 
significantly, she didn’t feel ‘depressed or more stressed.’ However, she felt the 
need to ‘put on a smiling face during more difficult days.’
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Type A behaviour
CD described herself as Very independent’ who neither planned her life nor 
‘burdens herself with what might happen next week.’ The present changes, 
therefore, did not affect her general attitude to life or any personal ambitions.
Control
CD admitted that the nurses had very little say concerning the closure about their 
future status. She was pragmatic about the fact that ‘plans are always changing, 
[she] can’t do much about it, it happens.’
Job pressure
CD believed work was ‘more challenging than stressful..[she] never feels 
stressed’. However, she noticed that other nurses were ‘not very happy, they’re 
stressed most of the time.’ Whether this was due to the present circumstances or 
in general was not clear. However, she felt they needed to accept that there was 
always change. She liked the people she worked with but wouldn’t miss them as 
they had agreed to meet up monthly. She was optimistic about her future as her 
independence helped her accept work almost anywhere. If no work did 
materialise she would go back to the Philippines; her time in the UK she saw in
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terms of experience rather than constituting a firm career plan. There was no 
evidence that the present changes had affected her home life. She believed that 
her present experiences of organisational processes had informed her more 
about management.
Coping
CD did not need any increased social support in the present circumstances. She 
has an understanding husband whom she felt was supportive. In general, CD 
took a pragmatic coping approach to the present changes and believed her 
present and previous experiences had made her 'tougher', which she saw 
positively. In fact, she described her attitude as ‘always planning for changes.'
Work practice with other professionals
CD had not experienced a decrease in the quality of work practice either with 
regard to herself or others. The acknowledged increased turnover of new staff, 
including consultants, had not constituted an extra burden to her. She said that 
the nurses were used to registrars/locums changing often and the extra turnover 
of new staff was only significant in that they should be helped more as ‘you can’t 
be selfish in life.’
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3. EF
Job satisfaction
EF felt that the present situation hadn't really changed her. She was waiting to 
find out what would happen and deal with what she's offered then. She was 
initially worried that she ‘wouldn’t have a job this time next year.’ She did not 
appear to be stressed about the prospect of relocation and seemed to have 
resigned herself to a move because it’s ‘better then the dole.’ She has previous 
experience of a hospital closure, albeit as a student, and was aware of the 
potential closure of the present unit when she applied for her present post. She 
thought, however, that closure would not happen until 1998. Patient care 
appeared to constitute a ‘bottom line’ with EF; ‘anything shouldn’t affect their 
care.’
Mental and physical health
EF had not experienced any increased levels of poor mental and physical health 
in the present circumstances.
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Type A behaviour
EF had ‘no general less enjoyment of life because of what’s going on here.’ She 
said she would not get worked up until she finally knew what would happen. In 
terms of her ambition, she would not go for jobs in hospitals closing down in the 
future. However, she felt that a move might be beneficial in terms of experience 
working in a ‘newer, bigger environment with more variety of patients and staff.’
Control
EF admitted to having been consulted about the nurses needs by the new 
management but she appeared uncertain to any acknowledgement of such 
views. She hoped that the situation would become clearer with forthcoming 
meetings.
Job pressure
EF had felt elevated pressure in dealing with the increased number of new staff, 
often temporary, brought in due to previously permanent staff leaving to find new 
jobs before closure. She felt that personal pressure on her to ‘sort things out’ 
could increase as she saw more staff leaving. She felt it had been difficult to get
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to know new staff but ‘we’re all here to do a job...if the staff get on it makes life 
easier.’ She didn’t think that the present circumstances had affected her 
relationships outside of work, ‘it wouldn’t even if I was bothered.’
Coping
EF coped with the changes by taking ‘one day at a time.’ It seemed that she was 
prepared to relocate with the unit, when the time came, if necessary.
Work practice with other professionals
EF did not believe that the increased turnover of other professionals e.g. 
consultants, should cause the nurses to ‘scrimp’ on their work practice. She 
hadn’t felt any change in her motivation working with others and, due to the fact 
of knowing of the closure before beginning her post, ‘I wouldn’t have applied if I 
thought it would affect my motivation or co-operàtion with other professionals.’
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Relation between the objective measure (OSI) and subjective accounts
1. AB
AB reported general dissatisfaction with his job presently rather than increased 
job pressure, both objectively and subjectively. His dissatisfaction centred on 
how he perceived management had poorly treated the nursing staff in such an 
uncertain time. He did not objectively experience poorer mental or physical 
health but subjectively felt heightened anxiety at work, but this was manageable. 
His general attitude to living and family life had not changed, objectively and 
subjectively. He found other nursing staff supportive but subjectively found the 
increased turnover of staff especially consultants a source of increased stress. 
He believed subjectively that motivation had decreased and that poor working 
practice between disciplines had increased subsequently, and this included 
nursing co-operation with clinical psychologists.
2. CD
CD both objectively and subjectively reported little stress in terms of job 
satisfaction and pressure in the present circumstances. She expressed concern 
over the lack of control and personal influence she, as a nurse, had over 
managerial decisions. Subjectively, she appeared to revel in challenge and
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change which was reflected in her open-ended attitude to work, ambition and life 
in general. She reported little significant decrease in her co-operation with other 
disciplines in terms of work practice and motivation, although she noticed other 
staff showing signs of stress. She reported no effect of the changes on her life 
outside work.
3. EF
EF experienced little occupational stress from the objective and subjective 
accounts. However, she was uncertain about any personal or professional 
influence in any of the management decisions concerning the closure about the 
future status of the nurses. The present changes had not affected her personal 
life or future ambitions negatively. She believed that the changes might be 
beneficial in terms of increasing her professional experience. Although the extra 
staff turnover had meant getting used to waves of new staff, which was a burden, 
she believed that patient care ought not to be affected. Personally, this was 
reflected in little decrease in her effectiveness concerning her motivation or inter­
disciplinary co-operation. Her coping was characterised by making decisions as 
events dictate.
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Commonalities and contrasts
Only AB of the three nurses reported major negative effects of the hospital 
closure on his job satisfaction. CD and EF seemed to cope by having 
experienced closure before and attempting to take pragmatic viewpoints. AB 
focused his dissatisfaction on how he perceived the nurses had been poorly 
treated by the management and the indifference of the management to the 
nurses welfare had trickled down to poorer work practice in term of 
interdisciplinary co-operation and subsequently poorer quality of patient care. 
Although CD and EF had not experienced decreased motivation, as they held 
the belief that patient care should never be compromised, they both admitted to 
little influence over managerial decisions concerning their future.
An interesting difference between the nurses was their general attitude towards 
their jobs. AB saw his job as a ‘possession’, CD appeared to thrive on change 
and saw her job as an experience to move on from rather than the basis to any 
firm career plan. EF, on the other hand, appeared resigned to relocating 
because ‘it’s better than the dole’, she was also independent as she had no 
family responsibilities (as opposed to AB) which made her more flexible. She 
also had decided that change could be personally and professionally beneficial 
rather than a source of stress. A common factor to all three nurses was that any 
stress experienced at work had not affected their home life either consciously
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(AB) or because the levels of occupational stress were not experienced as 
significant (CD/EF). Although CD/EF’s levels of stress appeared to be tempered 
by their general attitude to work and life, AB, who expressed the greatest 
disruption to his work life because of the closure, found many avenues of 
distraction, including family support, which helped him cope.
DISCUSSION
This was an exploratory study assessing both objective and subjective accounts 
of occupational stress with three nurses who are presently experiencing the 
closure of their hospital at the same time as proffering no firm career alternatives 
after closure. Of particular interest, as a clinical psychologist, was how any 
increased occupational stress might have affected the nurses work practice in 
terms of inter-disciplinary co-operation or motivation.
Only one of the nurses appeared to express any decrease in interdisciplinary co­
operation and poorer general work practice on behalf of the nursing staff. He 
seemed to have a more personal attachment to his present job and felt less 
flexible in terms of relocating due to family responsibilities. He had not 
experienced the concomitant uncertainties of hospital closure previously. The 
other two nurses did not express heightened stress levels or decreased work 
efficiency in the present context due to experiencing hospital closure before,
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showing greater degrees of flexibility in their work aspirations and perceiving 
change as potentially beneficial or, at least, a constant fact of life.
There was a general dissatisfaction with the managerial processes surrounding 
the closure. All three believed they had very little personal influence over 
managerial decisions concerning their future status. There were indications that 
the nurses believed the management were unable to pass on firm plans for the 
future status of the unit and the staff as firm decisions at an executive level were 
slow in their conception and presentation.
The present study was an exploratory study in form of a survey. Even in AB’s 
case no causal inferences could be made about the relationship between 
present occupational stress levels and the hospital closure. No data was 
available to compare occupational stress when no knowledge of hospital closure 
existed. This was also a small, however intensive, study and was limited by the 
questionable representative quality of the three nurses interviewed. Despite this, 
the present methodology was chosen due to the increased numbers of recently 
appointed staff, mainly temporary agency staff, on the wards who had been in 
post less than six months and thus had not experienced the protracted events 
surrounding the closure. Future studies, involving larger numbers of subjects, 
might compare forensic nurses of different grades, and, possible different 
experience. Also, the same nurses might be interviewed repeatedly over a
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protracted time course. Changes in stress due to organisational changes might 
be appraised more accurately. It may also be of interest to compare forensic 
nurses in a changing environment with those in a static environment, and with 
nurses representing other specialities within and without mental health care.
There may have been some methodological problems using the OSI with such 
staff. It was not known whether the normative group had included nurses in its 
standardisation which might call into question its reliability when applied to such 
a population.
The results may have implications for the role of Clinical Psychology in forensic 
facilities during organisational change. The provision of groups to address 
elevated stress at work, co-ordinated by a psychologist, might provide a much 
needed outlet for those members of staff whose personal effectiveness had 
decreased. Problem-solving might also inform such a group.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the results of this small scale study suggest that occupational 
stress surrounding hospital closure may depend on experience of closure, 
personal flexibility, general attitude to the post in terms of rigidity of personal 
association with the post and general approach to change.
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However, such conclusions must be considered with great caution, especially 
with regard to their representative value, due to the extremely small sample used 
in the present study. The size of the sample was limited by the number of 
forensic staff, at the time of assessment, who had been in post for at least two 
years. This was critical in the assessment of the nurses’ experience of the 
process of ongoing change. The methodology used attempted both qualitative 
and quantitative analysis of occupational stress to assess the three nurses’ 
contemporary stress in an intensive manner, although not formally in a ‘case- 
study’ format. Despite this, such small numbers cannot be considered generally 
representative of the various degrees of experience and differing grades of 
nursing staff populating the forensic wards. The study provided anecdotal 
evidence from three individuals of the same grade with regard to their present 
occupational stress concerning hospital closure. There is, therefore, a great 
need to study larger groups of forensic nurses representing the broad range of 
experience and grades, normally found on such wards, using perhaps pre and 
post measures of occupational stress appropriate to the concerns of such a 
group. The present study may be useful in determining what those specific 
concerns may be for further study.
The literature concerning occupational stress in hospital closure is severely 
lacking. The present study might provide a basis for future studies assessing the
effect of organisational upheaval on a mental health facility. In particular, what 
seems important, from the present limited findings, is that nursing staff are 
regularly consulted about their future job status by management and feel that 
their views are being registered. Staff need to be informed of executive decisions 
as early as possible especially with regard to those staff with great external 
responsibilities e.g. families etc. Evidently, in the present situation hospital 
closure can be a long and tedious affair but although work practice may not be 
generally affected there may be a subgroup of staff who experience greater 
levels of stress which affects their work practice and motivation. If hospital 
closure takes years rather than months to complete then the affects of 
demotivation may be present simultaneously and may affect patient care 
indirectly for a significant period of time. The present study may provide some 
indications of the factors that make particular members of staff vulnerable to 
occupational stress, at a time of uncertain change, whose welfare might be 
accommodated by management and occupational health professionals alike 
before personal and/or professional effectiveness suffers.
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APPENDICES
1. The Occupational Stress Indicator (OSI: Cooper et al. 1988)
2. Questionnaire for nurses re: stress and working with other professionals
3. Transcripts
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The Occupational Stress Indicator
Background
These questionnaires are designed to measure both the sources and effects of 
occupational stress ; a topic which has been much researched and for which there 
are many definitions. Generally speaking, occupational stress is regarded as a 
response to situations and circumstances that place special demands on an individual 
with negative results; and this is the definition that has been used in the construction 
of the Indicator. *
The sources of stress are multiple, as are the effects. It is not just a function of 
being ‘under pressure’. The sources may be work-related, but home life will also 
be implicated. The effects in terms of health may not just concern how you feel 
physically but how you react and behave; again both in your job and at home.
The Indicator, which has been designed to gather information on groups of 
individuals, has six questionnaires entitled: H ow  you feel about your job; H ow 
you assess your current state of health; The way you behave generally; How you 
interpret events around you; Sources of pressure in your job; and, H ow you cope 
with stress you experience. There is also a questionnaire to collect significant 
background Biographical data.
As the Ind icator is being completed in a work context, the results will naturally 
be used in a work application. The explicit intention of the Ind icator is to alleviate 
the effects of stress to the mutual benefit of the individuals and organisation 
concerned. Thank you for yoifr cooperation in completing the questionnaires.
What we would like you to do
•  Answer all the questions
•  Give your first and natural answer; be accurate and honest!
•  W ork quickly and efficiently through the questionnaires
•  Base your answers on how you have felt during the last three months
•  If you make a mistake, cross it out and make your new answer
•  Check each questionnaire to ensure that you have answered all the items
•  N ow  please w ait until the A dm inistrator asks you to proceed.
How you feel about your jo b
"his questionnaire is concerned with the extent to which you feel satisfied or 
issatisfied with your job. Try not to be put off by any other reactions you may have 
simply rate the items against the satisfaction/dissatisfaction scale provided.
Please answer by circling the number of your answer on the scale shown: , 7 . . f .
V ery  m u ch  sa tisfa c tio n
M uch  sa tisfaction
S om e sa tisfaction
Som e d issa tisfaction
M uch  d issatisfaction
V ery  m u ch  d issa tisfaction  1
1 Communication and the way information flows around your organisation 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 The relationships you have with other people at work 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 The feeling you have about the way you and your efforts are valued 6 5 4 3 2 1
4 The actual job itself 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 The degree to which you feel ‘motivated’ by your job 6 5 4 3 2 1
6 Current career opportunities 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 The level of job security in your present job 6 5 4 3 2 1
8 The extent to which you may identify with the public image or goals of your 
organisation 6 5 4 3 2 1
9 The style of supervision that your superiors use * 6 5 4 3 2 1
0 The way changes and innovations are implemented 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 The kind of work or tasks that you are required to perform 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 The degree to which you feel that you can personally develop or grow in your job 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 The way in which conflicts are resolved in your company 6 5 4 3 2 1
4 The scope your job provides to help you achieve your aspirations and ambitions 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 The amount of participation which you are given in important decision-making 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 The degree to which your job taps the range of skills which you feel you possess 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 The amount of flexibility and freedom you feel you have in your job 6 5 4 3 2 1
I The psychological ‘feel’ or climate that dominates your organisation 6 5 4 3 2 1
) Your level of salary relative to your experience 6 5 4 3 2 1
) The design or shape of your organisation’s structure 6 5 4 3 2 1
[ The amount of work you are given to do whether too much or too little 6 5 4 3 2 1
I The degree to which you feel extended in your job 6 5 4 3 2 1
tsj
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How you assess yo u r  current state o f health
5
^art A  of this questionnaire focuses on feelings and behaviour and how these are 
ffected by the pressure you perceive in your job. Part B is concerned more 
pecifically with the frequency of occurrence of manifestly physical problems.
The questions assume that you can assess your health with a fair degree of accuracy 
nd al<o that you will be honest in your responses.
k Please answer by circling your position on each answering scale. Consider the 
Questions w ith  reference to how you have fe lt over the last three months.
’art A How you feel or behave
1 Would you say that you tended to be a rather overconscientious person who worries about 
mistakes or actions that you may have taken in the past, such as decisions?
Very tru e
6 5 4 3
Very u n tru e  
2 1
! During an ordinary working day are there times when you feel unsettled and upset though the 
reasons for this m ight not always be clearly obvious?
Frequently
6 5 4 3 2 1
' When you consider your level and quality of job performance recently, do you think that your 
contribution has been significantly useful?
Very useful
6 5 4 3
N o t really 
2 1
As difficult problems occur at work that require your attention, do you find that you can think  
as clearly and as concisely as you used to or do you find your thoughts becoming ‘muddled’?
Definitely th in k  
n o t as clearly
6 5 4
D efinitely  th in k  
as clearly
3 2 1
1 When the pressure starts to mount at work, can you find a sufficient store or reserve of energy 
which you can call upon at times when you need it that spurs you on into action?
Lots of 
energy
6 5 4 3
N o t m uch 
energy
2 1
Are there times at work when you feel so exasperated that you sit back and think to yourself that 
‘life is all really just too much effort’?
O ften
6 5 4 3 2 1
As you do your job have you noticed yourself questioning your own ability and judgment and a 
decrease in the overall confidence you have in yourself?
No noticeable 
decrease
6 5 4 3
N oticeable
decrease
2 1
Generally and at work, do you usually feel relaxed and at ease or do you tend to feel restless, tense 
and find it difficult to ‘settle down’?
Relaxed
6 5 4 3 2
Tense
1
If colleagues and friends behave in an aloof way towards you, do you tend to worry about what 
you may have done to offend them as opposed to just dismissing it?
Definitely
w orry
6 5 4
Definitely do n o t
3 2 ^  7
If the tasks you have implemented, or jobs you are doing, start to go wrong do you sometimes 
feel a lack of confidence, and panicky, as though events were getting out of control?
O ften
6 5 4 3 2
N ever
1
Do you feel confident that you have properly identified and efficiently tackled your work or 
domestic problems recently?
H a v e ‘faced up 
properly
6 5 4
H ave n o t ‘faced u p ’ 
properly
3 2 1
Concerning work and life in general, would you describe yourself as someone who is bothered by 
their troubles or a ‘worrier’? . .
Definitely
yes
6 5 4 3
D efinitely 
2 1
When trying to work do you find yourself disproportionately irritated by relatively minor 
distractions such as answering the telephone or being interrupted?
Very irrita ted
6 5 4 3
N o t irr ita ted  
a t  all 
2 1
As time goes by, do you find yourself experiencing fairly long periods in which you feel rather 
miserable or melancholy for reasons that you simply cannot ‘put your finger on ’?
O ften
6 5 4 3 2 1
Would you say you had a positive frame of mind in which you feel capable of overcoming your 
present or any future difficulties and problems you might face such as resolving dilemmas or 
making difficult decisions?
Definitely
yes
6 5 4 3
D efinitely  
2 1
When you think about your past events do you feel regretful about what has happened, the way 
you have acted, decisions you have taken, etc?
N o regrets
6 5 4 3
Lots of 
reg rets  
2 1
Would you describe yourself as being a rather ‘moody’ sort of person who can become 
unreasonable and bad tempered quickly?
Definitely
yes
6 5 4 3
Definitely 
2 1
Are there times at work when the things you have got to deal with simply become too much and 
you feel so overtaxed that you think you are ‘cracking-up’?
Definitely
yes
6 5 4 3
D efinitely  
2 1
<#
art B Your physical health
xamine the list below and indicate the frequency of occurrence of these ailments 
/er the last three months.
Please answer by circling your answer on the scale shown.
Very frequently 6
Frequently 5
Sometimes 4
Infrequently 3
Very infrequently 2
Never 1
Inability to get to sleep or stay asleep 6 5 4 3 2 1
! Headaches and pains in your head 6 5 4 3 2 1
Indigestion or sickness 6 5 4 3 2 1
Feeling unaccountably tired or exhausted 6 5 4 3 2 1
Tendency to eat, drink or smoke more than usual 6 5 4 3 2 1
Decrease in sexual interest 6 5 4 3 2 1
Shortness of breath or feeling dizzy 6 5 4 3 2 1
Decrease in appetite 6 5 4 3 2 1
Muscles trembling (e.g. eye twitch) 6 5 4 3 2 1
Pricking sensations or twinges in parts of your body 6 5 4 3 2 1
Feeling as though you do not want to get up in the morning 6 5 4 3 2 1
Tendency to sweat or a feeling of your heart beating hard 6 5 4 3 2 1
There is no scoring key for this scale
fhe w ay you behave generally
)uite apart from feelings and reactions, the way you approach things and your 
verall style of behaviour are important. In this questionnaire you are required to 
-cord the extent to which you agree or disagree with statements about yourself and 
our behaviour.
Please answer by circling the number which indicates the extent of your agreement/ Very strongly agree Strongly agree
6
5
isagreement. Agree 4
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 2
Very strongly disagree 1
I Because I am satisfied with life I am not an especially ambitious person who has a need
to succeed or progress in their career 6 5 4 3 2 1
’ My impatience with slowness means for example that when talking with other people 
my mind tends to race ahead and I anticipate what the person is going to say 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 I am a fairly confident and forceful individual who has no qualms about expressing 
feelings or opinions in an authoritative and assertive manner 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 I am not an especially achievement-oriented person who continually behaves in a 
competitive way or who has a need to win or excel in whatever I do 6 5 4 3 2 1
i When I am doing something, I concentrate on only one activity at a time and am fully 
committed in giving it 100% of my effort 6 5 4 3 2 1
> I would describe the manner of my behaviour as being quite challenging and vigorous 6 5 4 3 2 1
When I compare myself with others I know, I would say that I was more responsible, 
serious, conscientious and competitive than they are 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 I am usually quite concerned to learn about other people’s opinions of me particularly 
recognition others give me 6 5 4 3 2 1
Even though I take my job seriously, I could not be described as being completely and 
absolutely dedicated to it 6 5 4 3 2 1
I have a heightened pace of living in that I do things quickly such as eating, talking, 
walking and so on 6 5 4 3 2 1
When I am establishing priorities, work does not always come first because although it 
is important, I have other outside interests which I also regard as important 6 5 4 3 2 1
I am a fairly easy going individual, who takes life as it comes and who is not especially 
‘action oriented’ 6 5 4 3 2 1
I am a very impatient sort of person who finds waiting around difficult especially for 
other people 6 5 4 3 2 1
I am time conscious and lead my life on a ‘time is money and can’t be wasted’ principle 6 5 4 3 2 1
-low  you in terpret events around you
he object of this questionnaire is to record how much you feel you can or cannot 
ifluence the things that go on around you. You are asked to indicate your level of 
greement to the following statements.
Please answer by circling the number which best represents your answer on the 
Dllowing scale.
1 The trouble with workers nowadays is that they are subject to too many constraints 
and punishments.________ . _____________________
Very strongly agree 6
Strongly agree 5
Agree 4
Disagree 3
Strongly disagree 2
Very strongly disagree 1"
#
6 5 4 3 2
2 Assessments of performance do not reflect the way and how hard individuals work. 6 5 4
3 With enough effort it is possible for employees generally, to have some influence over 
top management and the way they behave.___________________________________ 6 5 4 3 2
4 It is not possible to draw up plans too far ahead because so many things can occur that 
make the plans unworkable._______________________________________________ 6 5 4 3 2
5 Socialising is an excellent way to develop oneself and an emphasis on such things in 
organisations is important.____________________________________________ 6 5 4 3 2
6 Even though some people try to control company events by taking part in social
affairs or office politics, most of us are subject to influences we can neither comprehend 
nor control. 6 5 4 3 2
7 Being successful and getting to be ‘boss’ depends on ability -  being in the right place at 
the right time or luck have little to do with it._______________ 6 5 4 3 2
8 Management can be unfair when appraising subordinates since their performance is 
often influenced by accidental events.________________________ 6 5 4 3 2
9 Being an effective leader is more often a function of personal skills than it is of taking 
advantage of every available opportunity.________________________ 6 5 4 3 2
D It is upper management rather that ordinary employees who are responsible for poor 
company performance at an overall level. ______ 6 5 4 3 2
1 The things that happen to people are more under their control than a function of luck 
or chance. 6 5 4 3 2
2 In organisations that are run by a few people who hold the power, the average 
individual can have little influence over organisational decisions.___________ 6 5 4 3 2
Sources of pressure in your jo b
9
Almost anything can be a source of pressure (to someone) at a given time, and 
ndividuals perceive potential sources of pressure differently. The person who says 
hey are ‘under a tremendous amount of pressure at work at the mom ent’ usually 
neans that they have too much work to do. But that is only half the picture.
The items below are all potential sources of pressure. You are required to rate 
hem in terms of the degree of pressure you perceive each may place on you.
» Please answer by circling the number of your answer against the scale shown.
Very definitely is a 
source 6
Definitely is a source 5 
Generally is a source 4 
Generally is not a source 3 
Definitely is not a source 2 
Very definitely is not a 
source 1
1 Having far too much work to do 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 Lack of power and influence 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 Overpromotion -  being promoted beyond my level of ability 6 5 4 3 2 1
4 Not having enough work to do 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 Managing or supervising the work of other people 6 5 4 3 2 1
6 Coping with office politics 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 Taking my work home 6 5 4 3 2 1
8 Rate of pay (including perks and fringe benefits) 6 5 4 3 2 1
9 Personal beliefs conflicting with those of the organisation 6 5 4 3 2 1
0 Underpromotion -  working at a level below my level of ability 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 Inadequate guidance and back up from superiors 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 Lack of consultation and communication 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 Not being able to ‘switch off’ at home 6 5 4 3 2 1
4 Keeping up with new techniques, ideas, technology or innovations or new challenges 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 Ambiguity in the nature of job role 6 5 4 3 2 1
6 Inadequate or poor quality of training/management development 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 Attending meetings 6 5 4 3 2 1
8 Lack of social support by people at work 6 5 4 3 2 1
9 My spouse’s attitude towards my job and career 6 5 4 3 2 1
D Having to work very long hours 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 Conflicting job tasks and demands in the role I play 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 Covert discrimination and favouritism 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 Mundane administrative tasks or ‘paperwork’ 6 5 4 3 2 1
4 Inability to delegate 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 Threat of impending redundancy or early retirement 6 5 4 3 2 1
S Feeling isolated 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 A lack of encouragement from superiors 6 5 4 3 2 1
s Staff shortages and unsettling turnover rates 6 5 4 3 2 1
? Demands my work makes on my relationship with my spouse/children 6 5 4 3 2 1
) Being undervalued 6 5 4 3 2 1
Continued on next page ►
I u
Sources o f pressure in your jo b  (continued)
Very definitely is a 
source 6
Definitely is a source 5 
Generally is a source 4 
Generally is not a source 3 
Definitely is not a source 2 
Very definitely is not a 
source 1 s
1 Having to take risks 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 Changing jobs to progress with career 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 Too much or too little variety in work 6 5 4 3 2 1
4 Working with those of the opposite sex 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 Inadequate feedback about my own performance 6 5 4 3 2 1
6 Business travel and having to live in hotels 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 Misuse of time by other people 6 5 4 3 2 1
8 Simply being seen as a ‘boss’ 6 5 4 3 2 1
9 Unclear promotion prospects 6 5 4 3 2 1
0 The accumulative effects of minor tasks 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 Absence of emotional support from others outside work 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 Insufficient finance or resources to work with 6 5 4 3 2 1
3 Demands that work makes on my private/social life 6 5 4 3 2 1
4 Changes in the way you are asked to do your job 6 5 4 3 2 1
5 Simply being ‘visible’ or ‘available’ 6 5 4 3 2 1
6 Lack of practical support from others outside work 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 Factors not under your direct control 6 5 4 3 2 1
S Sharing of work and responsibility evenly 6 5 4 3 2 1
) Home life with a partner who is also pursuing a career 6 5 4 3 2 1
D Dealing with ambiguous or ‘delicate’ situations 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 Having to adopt a negative role (such as sacking someone) 6 5 4 3 2 1
> An absence of any potential career advancement 6 5 4 3 2 1
> Morale and organisational climate 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 Attaining your own personal levels of performance 6 5 4 3 2 1
> Making important decisions 6 5 4 3 2 1
j ‘Personality’ clashes with others 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 Implications of mistakes you make 6 5 4 3 2 1
I Opportunities for personal development 6 5 4 3 2 1
> Absence of stability or dependability in home life 6 5 4 3 2 1
) Pursuing a career at the expense of home life 6 5 4 3 2 1
Characteristics of the organisation’s structure and design 6 5 4 3 2 1
lo w  you cope w ith  stress you experience
rhilst there are variations in the ways individuals react to sources of pressure and 
e effects of stress, generally speaking we all make some attempt at coping with 
ese difficulties — consciously or subconsciously.
This final questionnaire lists a number of potential coping strategies which you 
e required to rate in terms of the extent to which you actually use them as ways 
coping with stress.
Please answer by circling the number of your answer on the scale shown.
Very extensively used by 
me 6
Extensively used by me 5 
On balance used by me 4 
On balance not used by 
me 3
Seldom used by me 2 
Never used by me 1
@
Deal with the problems immediately as they occur 6 5 4 3 2 1
Try to recognise my own limitations 6 5 4 3 2 1
‘Buy time’ and stall the issue 6 5 4 3 2 1
Look for ways to make the work more interesting 6 5 4 3 2 1
Reorganise my work 6 5 4 3 2 1
Seek support and advice from my superiors 6 5 4 3 2 1
Resort to hobbies and pastimes 6 5 4 3 2 1
Try to deal with the situation objectively in an unemotional way 6 5 4 3 2 1
Effective time management 6 5 4 3 2 1
Suppress emotions and try not to let the stress show 6 5 4 3 2 1
Having a home that is a ‘refuge’ 6 5 4 3 2 1
Talk to understanding friends 6 5 4 3 2 1
Deliberately separate ‘home’ and ‘work’ 6 5 4 3 2 1
‘Stay busy’ 6 5 4 3 2 1
Plan ahead 6 5 4 3 2 1
Not ‘bottling things up’ and being able to release energy 6 5 4 3 2 1
Expand interests and activities outside work 6 5 4 3 2 1
Have stable relationships 6 5 4 3 2 1
Use selective attention (concentrating on specific problems) 6 5 4 3 2 1
Use distractions (to take your mind off things) 6 5 4 3 2 1
Set priorities and deal with problems accordingly 6 5 4 3 ' 2 1
Try to ‘stand aside’ and think through the situation 6 5 4 3 2 1
Resort to rules and regulations 6 5 4 3 2 1
Delegation 6 5 4 3 2 1
Force one’s behaviour and lifestyle to slow down 6 5 4 3 2 1
Accept the situation and learn to live with it 6 5 4 3 2 1
Try to avoid the situation 6 5 4 3 2 1
Seek as much social support as possible 6 5 4 3 2 1
APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NURSES RE: STRESS AND WORKING 
WITH OTHER PROFESSIONALS
1. As you know the hospital is closing down very soon. Can you tell me how, if at 
all this has affected your levels of stress at work?
- prompt: motivation? job satisfaction? physical/mental health? Influence 
in organisational decisions? Pressure of work?
2. How do you think the hospital closing down with many staff leaving to find 
other employment has affected your relationships at work?
- prompt: in what ways have your professional/personal relationships 
changed, within your own profession and between different professions?
- how, if at all, has the increasing turnover of staff affected your motivation 
at work re: personal and teamwork?
3. How, if at all, have the events at work over the past year affected your 
relationships outside of the work place?
- prompt: relationships, personal mental/physical health? general attitude 
and enjoyment of life?
4. How have you coped with your present levels of stress at work?
prompt: re: intra/interdisciplines?
5. How do you see the state of your future career, how has this affected your 
working practice presently, particularly with reference to motivation within 
teamwork?
APPENDIX 3: TRANSCRIPTS FOR RESEARCH ON PLACEMENT
1. AB (aged 38) male nurse grade E. Two years qualified, two years in present 
job on a low-medium secure forensic ward in Surrey; low-medium security 
forensic ward. Presently has no firm plans concerning occupational future.
Responses to semistructured questions (see sheet)
I) ‘ I don’t have the same zeal I had a year ago knowing that the soil is not stable 
underneath my feet. The change has come about knowing there is no solid 
support for our [nurses] position form the management-they don't know where 
they are so why should we.’
Prompt: How has this affected your motivation and satisfaction for your work?
‘ Thinking about moving house, relocating the family...the distances 
involved...means I can’t give myself 100% to the patient...there’s a lot on my 
mind day to day. I don’t know where I’ll be in six months time...the stress affects 
the job. It’s mainly because I don’t feel reassured enough by the management, 
even in terms of redundancy if I don’t move.’
Prompt: How has your present level of stress surrounding closing affected your 
mental and physical health?
‘ I have felt increasingly anxious about each next day at work...I’ve not felt 
depressed. I mean there were indications at the beginning of my time here that 
the hospital would be closing but it has been more real lately as things seem to 
be moving quickly. As this is my first job and I’ve been here for two years, I feel 
‘institutionalised’ which makes me feel more anxious about having to move on. 
My anxiety can be controlled because I know the present events don’t mean that 
I have to necessarily lose my job. Saying that, there has been a lot of false 
information given to us about the relocation, for instance, they said we would be 
consulted about the future but there has been no consultation from the 
management.’
Prompt: How do you feel you have been able to influence organisational 
decisions in this period of change?
‘ I feel very little influence in organisational decisions due to the lack of 
consultation..they treat us as if we’re stupid...they feel they’re keeping us happy 
with false promises but we can see through it.’
ii) ‘ I haven’t noticed a big difference in the relationships between nurses 
compared with a year ago. The nurses tend to reflect about matters together and 
share their discouragement..we’re all in the same boat. It is quite obvious that 
the lack of support we all feel [from the management] results in an attitude of 
“why should I put myself out”. Despite this, we try not to let the patient suffer. It’s 
very difficult to progress in work practices in the present circumstances.’
Prompt: How, if at all, have relationships between professions been affected by 
the changes?
‘ It is catastrophic to have an increasing turnover of consultants, it’s disruptive to 
the utmost. The continuity of care is constantly being disrupted...which affects 
nursing practice a lot. It takes time to get to know patients but the temporary 
consultants can’t so more of the burden of care is left to the nurses. It is a 
disruptive and fragmented system at the moment. When the doctors were here 
for 8 months to a year relationships were much better.’
Prompt: How does the increase in turnover of other professional staff affect your 
work practice and motivation?
‘ It definitely affects work co-operation with the consultants. Why bother with a 
person who will leave .you can’t develop trust with a person who will soon leave.’
Prompt: How about other professional groups, such as psychologists?
' It affects all of the system including psychology.’
Prompt: What aspects of work practice between nurses and psychologists would 
be affected?
‘ Probably co-operation and motivation to keep information on programmes, 
implement programmes. I feel a great sense of loss presently, we’re only human, 
of course morale is down. Nothing is working, for instance supervision-these 
changes cloud everything.’
iii) ' Talking to the wife helps but when I compare myself to friends working in 
more stable environments I think I should have chosen another hospital. At this 
stage of my life I should have less of a burden for myself. Other nurses give 
support, we are all quite sad. I think things could have turned out better for 
myself. The present situation hasn’t affected my relationship with my wife, she’s 
a psychiatric nurse and understands about these things-she’s been supportive 
and gives me advice which I value.’
iv) ‘ In the future I've thought about travelling, using any compensation we might 
get. I suppose it’s forced me into thinking about alternatives so the job situation 
is not 100% bad. It is still pretty bad though, when I got the job I thought it was 
the job for me..like a possession, but now someone’s taking it away or, at least, 
swapping it. It won’ change my life but it’s on my mind. This place should have 
been improved not run down.
I’m frustrated because I sometimes wonder if I’m being properly rewarded for the 
job I’m doing. We don’t get paid a forensic lead. If I went to Tooting I would be 
paid better and there’s probably less danger. Even so I feel the need to stay here 
to the end as I still think the job’s my ‘possession’.
v) ‘I don’t drink or smoke so I don’t cope by using perhaps the usual things. I 
tend to relate my worries to others, I talk to all the members of my family and 
friends. I have a good father who helps. I read to relax, listen to music, do the 
garden, make improvements to the new house and I like to cook.
I can separate work and family life. Family is number 1 in my life. I pray and read 
the Bible sometimes which also helps.’
2. CD is an E grade female nurse, 40 years old, who has been qualified for 11 
years (has been in her present job for 9 years). She is married and arrived in the 
UK from the Philippines 13 years ago. She has no firm plans about her future job 
status.
I) ‘ I feel the same. The present situation doesn’t alter the way I think. I don’t feel 
depressed or more stressed. Life goes on. You see I don’t plan my life, I take 
one day at a time, I don’t burden myself with what might happen next week. I’m 
not scared of change. I came here from another hospital and have experience of 
moving. I see change as a good thing, keeps you alive. Anyone who works in an 
environment like this will develop the guts to work anywhere.
I feel satisfied with the job, I like nursing this type of patient. There’s little routine 
to the work which is a positive thing. I like the challenge that things on the ward 
change quickly, often dramatically.
I feel the same degree of motivation for my job as I always have had. If I felt less 
motivated I wouldn’t come to work. I don’t feel different mentally or physically 
from a year ago. I put on a smiling face during more difficult days.
Prompt: How much influence do you feel you’ve had in terms of the future of the 
unit and your own job status.
'We’ve had meetings about the closure. The management said “here it is, we’ve 
decided”-the nurses didn’t have any say. Plans are always changing, can’t do 
much about it, it happens.’
ii). ‘No, people come and go..more people are leaving at the moment but it’s my 
choice to stay. Some new people adapt well, I’ve no personal experience of poor 
work practice from new staff. However, I don’t think people around me are very 
happy, they’re stressed most of the time.
I don’t think the consultant turnover has affected my personal work practice-you 
help the new one’s, you can’t be selfish in life. I’m not sure if it’s a waste of time 
we’re used to registrars/locums changing all the time.’
iii). I haven’t been talking to friends about the situation here, nor have I really 
talked about my future plans.’
iv). Work is more challenging than stressful-1 never feel stressed. If I felt 
stressed I would look for another kind of job. I like the people I work with here but 
I won’t miss them because we’ve agreed to meet up once a month despite what 
happens. We all need to accept that there’s always change. My personal 
experiences of moving have been useful. I moved form the Philippines to 
Glasgow and then to here so I’ve been around a bit. Such experience makes you 
tougher. I do make sure I keep in touch with the people I’ve left, I make sure I go 
home every year. My experience has helped me to be very independent.’
v). ‘I’m optimistic about my future, I feel I will get another job, if not I could always 
go back home. I feel there’s always a job for me somewhere in this country, the 
only problem is if you don’t want to work.
I do eventually want to go back to the Philippines, being in the UK has been 
more of an experience than being a far reaching plan about a career or anything,
I have always planned for things changing.
One positive thing is that I’ve learnt a lot more about management in the past 
year.
(Coping: being married helps with any problems as I’ve a very understanding 
husband.’
3. EF is an E grade female nurse, 24 years old. She has been qualified for two 
years and has spent all her professional working life in her present job. She is 
single and has no firm plans about her future job status.
I) ‘ The present situation has really changed me. I’m waiting to find out what’s 
going to happen and will deal with the future then. When I was a student I had 
experience of another hospital closing down and I wasn't really bothered then.
I was initially worried that I wouldn’t have a job this item next year but, as I 
understand, the people from the new trust said we would have jobs over in west 
London. But you hear so many stories. I will go to the new hospital if I have to- 
there’s nothing really around here in Epsom. I’ll go because it's better than the 
dole.
I haven’t really felt a change in my motivation working with others, I just continue 
to do the job we’re here for to care for the patients. Anything shouldn’t affect their 
care. I kind of knew they were thinking of closing the place down when I applied 
for the job, I wouldn’t have applied if I thought it would affect my motivation or co­
operation with other professionals. I did think, though, that the closure wouldn’t 
happen till 1998.
I have not noticed any change in my mental or physical health say with a year 
ago or even when I started the job.
We have had meetings with the management from the new trust, we were asked 
about our situations and about our needs. I hope our views will be taken into 
account. The next meeting’s at the beginning of next month and I guess we 
should know a little more.
I’ve felt a little bit more pressure with the increasing staff changes. I’m worried 
that the more permanent staff will move on together closer to the end- that would 
increase the pressure on me to sort things out. At the moment it’s OK.
ii) The present situation has not really affected relations between the 
professionals, between the nurses or other disciplines. It is hard to get to know 
increasing numbers of new temporary staff, perhaps I’m just unfriendly. We’re all 
here to do a job and if the staff do get on it makes life easier.
I think the staff accommodate new consultants etc., readily. Just because the 
hospital’s closing why should we scrimped on our work-we may be here for at 
least 4/5 months maybe longer.’
iii) ‘Hasn’t really affected any relationships outside of work, it wouldn’t even if I 
was bothered. I have no general less enjoyment of life because of what’s going 
on here. I won’t get worked up until I know what’s finally happening.’
iv) ‘I’ve coped with the changes by taking one day at a time. I do want to know if 
we relocate if the travel deal will suit me. If not then I’ll start to worry.’
v) ‘In the future I wouldn't go for any jobs in hospitals closing down. The future is 
difficult to gauge. It might be beneficial for my general experience working in a 
newer bigger environment with more variety of patients and staff.’
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SMALL SCALE RESEARCH PROJECT
A COMPARISON OF PARANOID AND DEPRESSED PATIENTS’ 
ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLES: A REPLICATION STUDY OF LYON ET AL. f19941 
TO ASSESS THE UTILITY OF OVERT AND COVERT ATTRIBUTION
MEASURES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH INTO PSYCHOSIS.
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ABSTRACT 
Rationale
The present study attempted to assess the utility of both overt and covert 
measures of attributions with patients expressing paranoid psychotic symptoms, 
for use in further research into psychosis, by replicating the only previous study, 
Lyon et al. (1994), with this type of patient.
Design
The design followed Lyon et al. (1994) using the Attributional Style 
Questionnaire (ASQ: Peterson et al. 1982) and the Pragmatic Inference Test 
(PIT: Winters and Neale, 1985 ) as overt and covert measures of attributional 
styles respectively. The measures were administered to groups of six paranoid 
(5 male, 1 female) and four depressed (all female) patients. Responses were 
compared using Mann-Whitney U tests.
Hypotheses
The initial hypotheses were the same as the Lyon et al. (1994) study, that 
paranoid patients should show a self-serving protective bias, compared to
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depressed patients, on the ASQ but on the PIT both groups should show similar 
depressive attributional styles. Successful replication would imply that the 
measures might be confidently used as appropriate measures of putative 
paranoid attributions in future research.
Results
No self-serving bias group differences were recorded on the ASQ. However, as 
predicted, on the PIT, both groups showed similar attributions.
Summary/Conclusions
The PIT was considered suitable as an appropriate measure of covert 
attributions of paranoid patients to be used in further research, while the overt 
measure, the ASQ, was not. The study was criticised for the small sample used. 
Possible questions over the ASQ's reliability and/or validity were discussed with 
great caution as the study was not a formal assessment of either. However, 
research subsequent to the completion of the study has attested particularly to 
the unreliability of the ASQ (Kinderman and Bentall, 1996), necessitating a 
modified version: the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions 
Questionnaire (IPSAQ: Kinderman and Bentall, 1996), which may inform the 
present results.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Bleuler (1911/1950) psychopathologists have attempted to explain 
psychotic phenomena such as delusions and hallucinations within ‘disease 
entity’ paradigms such as schizophrenia. However, due to recent criticism of 
concepts such as schizophrenia demonstrating little scientific validity, 
researchers have subsequently criticised results derived from heterogeneous 
group studies (Bentall et al. 1988). Therefore, an analysis of subsyndromes of 
‘illness’ i.e. associations between empirically related symptoms (Liddle, 1987, 
Liddle and Barnes, 1990) and the single symptom approach (Bentall, 1992) have 
arisen as more valid approaches to the study of psychotic symptoms. This study 
will adopt the single symptom approach with respect to an analysis of paranoid 
delusions, in particular the psychological mechanisms that underpin the 
expression and maintenance of such beliefs.
Relatively little of the vast amount of knowledge concerning the ‘normal’ 
acquisition and maintenance of attitudes and beliefs has been applied to the field 
of psychopathology. This has been due, in the main, to the historical consensus 
that delusions represent qualitatively different processes from those involved in 
normal belief acquisition (Bentall et al, 1994). Jaspers (1963) differentiated 
delusional or overvalued ideas arising from mood or circumstances and more 
primary delusional states arising from fundamental changes particularly in the
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perception of meaning. Such delusions were considered beliefs held with extra­
ordinary conviction, resistant to counterarguement
and ‘ununderstandable’ i.e. without meaningful content. Such a view has been 
supported in extremis in that delusions are not beliefs at all but empty speech 
acts symbolic of nothing (Berrios, 1991).
As the above views dismissed meaningfulness or ‘intentionality’ in the formation 
of psychotic delusions, delusions were assumed to represent cognitive deficits of 
probable organic origin. However, despite the assertion that neurobiological 
accounts of behaviour are justified when intentional accounts fail (Dennet, 1971), 
such assertions are dependent on the ability to determine when intentional 
accounts are no longer adequate (Bentall, 1994). In contrast to those disposed 
to concentrate on biological accounts of psychopathological behaviour, psychotic 
delusions have been conceived as lying on the extreme end of a continuum of 
beliefs running from the ‘normal’ to pathological (Strauss, 1969). Such a 
continuum would also hold other non-empirical subjective belief systems i.e. 
religious or political and provides a perspective of the rise of such beliefs within 
particular environments.
The role of environmental factors in the formation of delusions has been 
suggested in terms of controlling and inflexible family systems characterised by 
irrational beliefs and distrust (Kaffman, 1983). In a wider social context paranoia
has been associated with an individual’s social position characterised by 
powerlessness and threat of victimisation (Mirowsky and Ross, 1983). Maher 
(1974) suggested that delusional beliefs are the product of normal reasoning 
processes attempting to make sense of abnormal experiences. However, this 
assertion was based on the results of syllogistic reasoning tasks which are 
probably poor indicators of cognitive functioning (Gilhooly, 1983). Despite this, a 
growing body of research has begun to stress the psychiatric patient’s personal 
history and their relationship to the social environment as well as brain 
physiology in the understanding of the deluded patients mind (Bentall, 1994). 
Such research, therefore, has changed the emphasis of understanding 
delusional behaviour from processing deficits to processing biases.
Deluded patients have been shown to demonstrate attentional biases compared 
to depressed and normal controls on an emotional Stroop task (Bentall and 
Kaney, 1989). The deluded patients were slower to colour-name threatening 
words than the other two groups. Due to the majority of the deluded patients 
being paranoid this result may be unsurprising. Also, it was difficult to determine 
whether the bias was responsible for or a product of the paranoid state.
As the content of many presenting delusions reflects perceived social 
relationships, whether paranoid or grandiose, the reasoning of deluded patients 
has been examined with regard to attribution theory. This paradigm has been
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used previously to explain the processing biases of depressed patients i.e. 
internal, stable and global attributions for negative events (Abramson et al., 
1978). An analysis of the attributional styles of patients with persecutory 
delusions was carried out by Kaney and Bentall (1989) using the Attributional 
Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982). The ASQ requires patients to 
generate likely causes for hypothetical positive and negative events. The events 
are then rated along scales of internality (the degree to which the events are 
attributed to themselves or other people/circumstances), stability (the degree to 
which the causes will be present in the future) and globality (the degree to which 
the causes influence a wide range of situations in addition to the one generated 
by the patient). Patients with persecutory delusions made excessively external, 
stable and global attributions for negative events and excessively internal, stable 
and global attributions for positive events compared to depressed and normal 
controls. In essence, patients with persecutory delusions credited the cause of 
negative events to other agents/situations and the cause of positive events to 
themselves on a generalised and consistent basis. It was suggested that 
persecutory and grandiose delusions may well be different emphases of the 
same attributional bias. This self-serving bias was also seen in a study using a 
video game task of pre-programmed outcome where deluded patients claimed 
significantly greater control on a win condition and less control on a lose 
condition than a group of depressed patients who claimed little control in either 
condition but were seen as ‘sadder but wiser’ (Kaney and Bentall, 1992). It is of
interest to note that a group of normal controls showed a similar self-serving bias 
to that of the deluded patients but to a lesser degree. The results were 
interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that paranoia is a form of camouflaged 
depression (Zigler and Glick, 1988). In conclusion, therefore, in contrast to the 
attributional bias of depressed patients, patients holding persecutory delusions 
were suggested as demonstrating a self-serving protective bias against such 
depressive feelings. There is, however, presently a lack of evidence that the 
above attributional account of depression is causal in depression per se (Bentall, 
1994). However, there is growing evidence that depression characterised by low 
self-esteem is indeed associated with this type of reasoning (Brewin, 1988).
The above research suggests, therefore, that paranoid thinking results from 
protective cognitive biasing against threat related stimuli and thus chronic 
feelings depression characterised by low self esteem (see also p.214 ‘Paranoia 
and the maintenance of self-esteem’). This type of hypothesis indicates that the, 
often bizarre, beliefs of deluded patients reflect attempts at sense-making of a 
perceived threatening environment rather than products of cognitive deficits. In 
turn, the behaviour of paranoid patients may provoke persecutory acts (or acts of 
control) in their immediate environment reinforcing such beliefs. Along the 
continuum of belief expression referred to above, such biases may be 
considered exaggerated forms of cognitive biasing displayed by the non- 
psychotic population when coping with threat-related situations in order to
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preserve self esteem. The formation and maintenance of such exaggerated 
biasing does not necessarily exclude the role of underlying neuropsychological 
deficits in terms of problem solving or lowered intellectual functioning that may 
magnify the impact of stressors depriving the individual of essential coping 
abilities (Bentall, 1994). The connection between self-serving cognitive biasing 
and neuropsychological deficits, however, requires further research.
Paranoia and the maintenance of self-esteem
It has been widely suggested that schizophrenia in general and paranoia in 
particular are disorders of the self (see Bleuler, 1950). Although psychotic 
patients show higher levels of self esteem than depressed patients (Silverstone 
et al., 1991) more comparable with normal controls (Kaplan, 1975) the nature of 
their self-concept appears to be more complex. Schizophrenic patients 
demonstrate poor elaboration and often contradictory self-concepts (Robey et 
al., 1989), thus while showing uniform self-esteem levels comparable to healthy 
normals they also show domain-specific deficits (Bentall et al., 1994).
Utilising the single symptom approach, here focusing on delusions, Bentall et al. 
(1994) proposed a model of persecutory delusions following Higgins (1987) 
model of the self that addresses the interactions between different dimensions of 
the self. For instance, Higgins (1987) observed that depression reflects a
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significant discrepancy between the perception of one’s actual and ideal selves. 
Bentall et al. (1994) believed that persecutory delusions result from an attempt to 
reduce this discrepancy to a minimum. The relationship between attributional 
biases and paranoid self-discrepancies is seen as self-perpetuating and 
dynamic. Higgins (1987) model also takes into account the view of the actual-self 
and ideal-self comparison, in the formation of certain psychopathological states, 
not only as a perception of one’s-self but also as that perceived by others. 
Therefore, in persecutory ideation, the small discrepancies from the view point of 
the self, maintained by attributional biases, lead inevitably to large discrepancies 
between the self-perceptions and the way paranoid patients feel others perceive 
them. The deluded individual’s perception of self-other differences leads, 
therefore, to the external attributional explanations involving others empirically 
supported by Kaney and Bentall (1989).
The purpose of reducing actual and ideal self discrepancies at the expense of 
large self-others perceptions is an extreme self-serving bias intended to maintain 
cognitive (and emotional) organisation (Bentall et al., 1994). In an attempt to 
investigate the proposed defensive function of paranoid delusions Lyon et al. 
(1994) used an opaque attributional style questionnaire, the Pragmatic Inference 
Test (Winters and Neale, 1985) to reduce the likelihood of activating the self­
ideal discrepancies cited above. Subjects were required to answer questions 
derived from short vignettes requiring them to imagine themselves as agents in
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situations of either successful or unsuccessful outcome. Questions eliciting 
attributional style were ambiguously worded i.e. was a successful party due to 
one being able to throw good parties or that everyone was in need of such a 
party anyway?. Patients holding persecutory delusions were compared with 
depressed patients and normal controls. All subjects were administered the more 
obvious or transparent ASQ in a modified version. The results from the ASQ 
replicated Kaney and Bentall’s (1989) observations of a significant self-serving 
bias on the part of the deluded subjects. However, on the PIT, the same 
subjects, along with the depressed patients, made more internal attributions for 
negative events than for positive events than the normal control group. It 
appears, therefore, that there is a difference between paranoid patients implicit 
judgements of causal attributions and their explicit judgements. This discrepancy 
was explained in part by a re-analysis of Kaney and Bentall’s (1989) ASQ data 
using independent judges who disagreed with the degree of internal self-ratings 
of the deluded subjects but not the normal controls. The deluded subjects rated 
as external many of the statements the independent judges rated as internal.
The location of attribution, therefore, appears to be a result of the deluded 
person’s awareness of judging self blame for negative outcomes (i.e. 
necessitating protective self-serving biases) and how their self-ideal 
discrepancies are explicitly activated (Bentall et al. 1994).
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Reliability and validity of attribution measures
To date, the Lyon et al. (1994) study comprises the sole use of the ASQ and the 
PIT as measures assessing overt and covert attributions of psychotic patients 
exhibiting predominantly paranoid symptoms. There has been no formal analysis 
of the reliability and/or validity of these scales with this type of patient. In the 
limited literature using the scales with depressed patients, the ASQ has been 
criticised on the grounds of poor reliability, especially regarding the internality- 
externality subscale (Rehm, 1988; Tennen and Herzenberger, 1985). No such 
literature exists for the utility of the PIT with either depressed or psychotic 
patients. However, at the conception of the present study the ASQ and PIT were 
the only available measures of overt and covert attributions from the literature for 
use with either depressed or psychotic patient groups.
Aims of the present study
The present study attempted to assess the utility of the Attributional Style 
Questionnaire and the Pragmatic Inference Test as measures of overt and covert 
attributional styles respectively for subsequent research with paranoid patients. 
The questionnaires had only been used once before comparatively with such a 
clinical group i.e. Lyon et al. (1994). Therefore, the study attempted to replicate
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the findings that the overt measure would discriminate between paranoid and 
depressed patients by triggering a self-serving bias of the former group, while 
the covert measure would show similar attributions in both groups attesting to the 
protective nature of paranoid thinking as a defence against depressive 
thoughts/feelings. Thus selection of appropriate attribution measures was sought 
for subsequent research through replication. The design, therefore, was limited 
to assessing the utility of the measures but could not sustain conclusions about 
their reliability and/or validity as the study was not a formal assessment of either.
Although not a specific aim, the present study also allowed the analysis of 
attributional styles with respect to current intellectual functioning levels using the 
Quick IQ Test (Ammons and Ammons, 1962) as well as pre morbid intellectual 
levels using the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982). This 
analysis was carried out due to questions surrounding the use of the NART as a 
valid measure of pre morbid intelligence with groups of schizophrenic in patients. 
The NART comprised the only measure of intellectual functioning in the Lyon et 
al. (1994) study. Crawford et al. (1992) showed that long term hospitalised 
schizophrenic patients had significantly compromised NART scores compared to 
community based schizophrenic patients indicating a putative disease effect with 
more treatment resistant patients, some of which comprised the paranoid patient 
group in the present study. Assessment of intellectual functioning was deemed 
important due to the abstract conceptualising required to complete the
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questionnaires. The assessment of current intellectual functioning had not been 
carried out in the Lyon et al. (1994) study.
Hypotheses
1. On an overt measure of attributional style (the ASQ) paranoid patients should 
show significantly more internal, stable and global attributions for positive events 
and external, stable and global attributions for negative events compared to 
depressed patients. This effect constitutes the paranoid patients exhibiting a 
self-serving bias activated by threatening stimuli as a protection against feelings 
of depression characterised by low self-esteem.
2. On a covert measure of attributional style (the PIT) both paranoid and 
depressed patients should show equivalent internal attributions to negative 
events and external attributions for positive events as the paranoid protective 
self-serving bias ought not to have been activated.
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METHOD 
Demographics
Ten subjects in total were recruited for the present study, six in the paranoid 
group (5 male, 1 female) and four (all female) in the depressed patient group. 
The groups were matched for age and intellectual functioning (pre-morbid and 
current), but not for sex. The subjects comprised in and out patients at Queen 
Mary’s University Hospital in Roehampton. The members of the paranoid patient 
group met the DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for 
paranoid schizophrenia and were being treated for such at the time of interview. 
The members of the depressed patient group met the DSM-IV criteria for major 
depressive disorder at the time of interview. Both groups were assessed by a 
Consultant Psychiatrist to confirm that the patients were suffering active 
symptomatology, paranoia and depression respectively, at time of interview. The 
patients were additionally screened for any history of head injury or substance 
misuse.
No significant differences were found between the groups for age (t= -1.33, df=
8, P= .222). However, the groups differed significantly on sex distribution 
(Likelihood Ratio= 8.46, df=1 , P< .005).
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The mean age of the paranoid patient group was 37.8 years (s.d. 15.3). Their 
mean pre morbid intelligence level was 102.50 (s.d. 14.57) (MART- WAIS 
equivalent; Nelson, 1982). The WAIS equivalent was used for comparative 
purposes as the current intelligence measure, the Quick IQ (Ammons and 
Ammons, 1962), had only been validated against the WAIS with schizophrenic 
patients (see Frith et al. 1991). Their mean current intelligence level was 93.83 
(s.d. 14.92). There was no evidence of deterioration of intellectual functioning 
between pre morbid and current states (t= 1.75, df= 5, P= .140)
The mean age of the depressed patient group was 49.5 years (s.d. 10.3). There 
was no significant difference between mean pre morbid intelligence level, 104.50 
(7.94) (NART-WAIS equivalent; Nelson, 1982) and mean current intelligence 
level, 100.50 (2.52) (Quick IQ; Ammons and Ammons, 1962), (t= 1.20, df= 3, 
P=.317).
Materials
Pre morbid intellectual functioning was assessed using the National Adult 
Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982), current intellectual functioning was 
assessed using the Quick IQ Test (Ammons and Ammons, 1962).
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The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ, parallel form; Lyon et al. 1994)
The ASQ used in the present study was derived from the version used by 
Peterson et al. (1982) amended by Lyon et al. (1994). The questionnaire was 
used to access the patients overt attributional styles. The patients were 
presented with six positive and six negative hypothetical scenarios. They were 
asked to imagine the particular event happening to them and to generate 
putative causes for the outcome of that event. They were also asked to rate their 
causes on a seven point scale along three different dimensions; internality- 
externality, stability-instability and globality-specificity. A specific example (of a 
negative hypothetical scenario) was, ‘You have been looking for a job
unsuccessfully for some time, write down one major cause (see appendices
for complete questionnaire).
The Pragmatic Inference Test (PIT; Winters and Neale, 1985)
The PIT was used to assess the patients covert attributional styles. The test also 
comprised a set of hypothetical scenarios for the patients to imagine themselves 
as the major agent about which they were required to answer questions. Once 
again six positive and six negative scenarios were presented. The scenarios 
presented in this test differed from the ASQ by being in the form of a short story
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rather than a single statement. The stories were verbally presented by the 
examiner. Each scenario was followed by four questions and two possible 
answers per question of which the patient had to select one. The four questions 
consisted of two requiring factual recall, one requiring inference and a target 
question requiring a causal attribution to be made concerning the outcome of the 
scenario. A specific example from a story about (the patient) throwing a 
successful party (positive scenario) was, Why was the party a success...a) Your 
colleagues were in the mood to unwind (external cause) or b) You know how to 
throw a good party (internal cause)-see appendices for full PIT questionnaire. 
The target questions were designed to access internal and external attributions 
for both positive and negative events. The ‘camouflaging’ of the target questions 
was designed to minimise the patients’ activation of any self-serving or defensive 
biases putatively activated by the more overt ASQ.
The questionnaires were administered at either the outpatient day centre or on 
the inpatient psychiatric wards at Queen Mary’s University Hospital, Roehampton 
after ethical clearance. The questionnaires took approximately 45 minutes to 
complete, often taking several sessions according to the wishes of the individual 
patient i.e. due to fatigue or distress.
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Scoring and analysis
a) ASQ
Between group comparisons were made of the composite scores for positive and 
negative events along the three dimensions of internality-externality, stability- 
instability and globality-specificity. A self-serving bias index was calculated by 
subtracting the causal ratings for positive events from negative events again 
along the three dimensions of causality.
b) PIT
A self-serving bias index was calculated by subtracting the number of internal 
attributions for negative events from the internal attributions for positive events. 
Scoring for both questionnaires followed Lyon et al. (1994).
Statistical analysis
Intellectual functioning was analysed by independent t-tests as the data was 
assumed to be normally distributed. The questionnaire data was not normally 
distributed and was analysed using non-parametric statistics (e.g. Mann-Whitney
U tests). All statistics were performed on a PC using SPSS version 6.0 by the 
author.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the mean subscale scores for the three dimensions of the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire and the internality-externality subscale of the 
Pragmatic Inference Test for the paranoid patient group versus the depressed 
patient group. Of particular interest is the comparison of scores for the 
internality-externality subscale of the ASQ and the PIT subscale presented.
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Table 1
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) and Pragmatic Inference Test (PIT) 
scores (means and standard deviations) for paranoid patient versus 
depressed patient groups for positive and negative events
GROUP 
PARANOID DEPRESSED U P
ASQ
INTERNALITY-
EXTERNALITY
POSITIVE 34.50(2.81) 28.00(4.32) 2.0 .038
NEGATIVE 26.50(8.09) 27.75(6.40) 11.0 .914
STABILITY-
INSTABILITY
POSITIVE 34.50(4.97) 26.25(5.80) 3.0 .067
NEGATIVE 26.67(9.50) 28.25(6.02) 10.0 .762
GLOBALITY-
SPECIFICITY
POSITIVE 34.33(7.12) 28.25(8.54) 5.5 .171
NEGATIVE 32.83(8.68) 29.50(4.93) 7.0 .352
PIT
INTERNALITY-
EXTERNALITY
POSITIVE 3.33(1.75) 2.50(1.00) 8.0 .476
NEGATIVE 1.50(1.22) 3.75(1.50) 3.0 .067
*P<.05
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The Attributional Style Questionnaire(ASQ)
Inspection of the ASQ scores shows that the paranoid patient group made 
significantly more internal attributions for positive events than the depressed 
patients, as hypothesised. However, the groups appeared to show similar levels 
of attributions for negative events. Perhaps due to this similarity of attributional 
style for negative events, the paranoid patients did not show an overall self- 
serving bias of attributional style compared to the depressed patients (U= 7.0, 
P=.352).
Scores on the stability-instability dimension showed that the paranoid group 
showed a trend towards making more attributions for positive events than the 
depressed group, although not at a level of significance. Again no significant 
group difference was observed considering attributional style for negative 
events. Although further analysis showed no overall self-serving bias of the 
paranoid patients over the depressed patients, a trend towards significance was 
observed (U= 3.5, P=.067).
No significant differences were observed on the globality-specificity dimension of 
the ASQ whether considering attributional styles for positive or negative events 
or overall self-serving bias (U= 9.5, P=.610).
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In conclusion, following Lyon et al. (1994), a predicted difference was observed 
on the transparent ASQ showing paranoid patients making significantly more 
internal attributions for positive events. However, this pattern was not repeated 
for the stability or globality of such attributions. Also, despite the internality 
difference for positive events the similar attributional style for negative events 
along the internality-externality dimension showed no overall self-serving bias in 
favour of the paranoid group. Similarly no individual or overall attributional 
biases were observed for negative events along all three dimensions. 
Subsequently no overall self-serving biases emerged along the stability- 
instability or the globality-specificity dimensions. These results, therefore, have 
not replicated those presented by Lyons et al. (1994).
The Pragmatic Inference Test (PIT)
Table 1 shows that both the paranoid group and the depressed group showed 
equivalent attributions for positive and negative events along the internality- 
externality dimension of the opaque PIT. Consequently, no significant between 
group differences were observed on a comparison of self-serving bias indices 
(U= 3.0, P= .067), although this result did indicate a trend towards a greater self- 
serving bias with respect to the paranoid patients. Overall, therefore, the results 
replicate those reported by Lyon et al. (1994) showing paranoid and depressed
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patients having similar self-serving biases on a covert measure of attributional 
style.
DISCUSSION
The present study constituted a pilot study for a larger research project 
comparing attributional styles with alternative measures of cognition and 
neuropsychology with respect to psychotic symptoms (see large scale research). 
As a replication of Lyon et al. (1994), the study compared groups of patients 
suffering paranoid symptoms and those with depressive symptomatology on 
overt and covert measures of attributional style to assess the utility of the 
measures as appropriate recording instruments (for paranoid patients' 
attributions) suitable for use in further research.
The first part of the study did not replicate the Lyon et al. (1994) results. Indices 
of self-serving biases could not discriminate between groups of paranoid and 
depressed patients on the overt attributional scale (the ASQ) along dimensions 
of internality, stability or globality. However, as hypothesised, paranoid patients 
made significantly greater internal attributions for positive events on this scale. A 
trend was observed of the paranoid patients displaying discriminating self- 
serving bias on the ‘stability’ dimension of the overt measure (but not at a 
significant level). Results on the covert attributional scale (PIT), however, did
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support the study’s hypotheses. Both groups demonstrated similar attributional 
styles, possibly due to the inactivation of the paranoid patients’ protective self- 
serving bias. An unexpected trend was observed indicating a discriminating self- 
serving bias of the paranoid patients on the covert measure, however not to 
significance. A control group was absent in the present study due to time and 
logistic considerations but would have been necessary to assess the degree, if 
any, of the samples’ ‘depressive’ responding. Such a group would comprise of 
healthy normal individuals , matched for gender, age, pre morbid and current IQ 
and possibly education, for normative comparison. It is of note that there were 
gender and age differences between the clinical groups in the present study 
which may have influenced the results. Future studies ought to involve clinical 
groups matched on such demographic variables as should the comparative 
healthy controls.
The failure to replicate the Lyon et al. (1994) study with particular respect to the 
present ASQ (overt) results may be due to one or a combination of factors. Of 
particular interest were the small experimental samples used and possible 
questions surrounding the reliability and/or validity of the ASQ.
It is evident that the above results were obtained from extremely small 
experimental samples. The resultant six paranoid patients and four depressed 
patients represented recruitment difficulties restricted to one day a week for six
months. Therefore, time limits and also the personal distress of many patients 
both involved in the study i.e. requiring multiple sessions for completion, and 
those who were approached and refused attests to the real life difficulties of 
research involving patients with severe psychological problems. Despite this, it is 
very unlikely that given the small numbers in each group one can be confident of 
the meaningfulness of the comparisons due to their low statistical power. From 
an analysis of the groups’ means the present study showed an overall effect size 
of .45. Using the Gpower computer programme (Paul and Erdfelder, 1992) this 
effect size would necessitate a combined sample of 156 (NB: as nonparametric 
statistics were used it is noteworthy that such comparisons possess 90% of the 
power of a parametric analysis). This is an extremely large number of recruits 
and by comparison would leave very little confidence in the power of the present 
comparisons. However, the attribution measures used have not been 
standardised thus it is unclear what effect size would constitute a meaningful 
clinical difference between the groups. This is a pivotal problem in the analysis 
of such novel measures. It is of interest to note that in the Lyon et al. (1994) 
study, although three times the present sample size, the results were based on 
only 14 patients per psychiatric group again indicative of low statistical power 
according to formal power analysis. However, normative comparison was 
completed in the Lyon et al. (1994) study which was lacking in the present study. 
Ideally, therefore, in the present study much larger groups would be needed to 
be confident of the few statistical differences observed being Valid’. [It is
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noteworthy that statistical differences and trends to significance were observed 
with such a small data set attesting to large response differences between the 
groups, however low in power.] In general, further research, needs to be 
qualified by normative comparisons in the form of matched healthy controls or 
comparison with standardised data.
Despite this major caveat, the results may also be explained in light of emerging 
research. The use of the overt ASQ, as a reliable measure of attributional style, 
has been criticised on theoretical grounds (Kinderman and Bentall, 1996). The 
reliability of the three subscales has been deemed to be poor (Rehm, 1988) 
especially with regard to the internality-externality subscale which has shown 
poorer reliability scores than the other dimensions (Tennen and Herzenberger, 
1985). The problem appears to centre on the dichotomous nature of the
internality-externality subscale i.e. (causes) due to me due to other people or
circumstances. It is this latter polarity that appears to be unreliable as it 
represents two potentially independent attributional loci. The theoretical 
importance of the putative tripartite structure of this scale has been shown in the 
detection of important differences between those who make personal as 
opposed to situational external attributions for negative events. Evidence is 
emerging that although subjects may make external attributions for negative 
events, those who made external-personal attributions showed a tendency to 
believe others thought ill of them whilst this was not the case for those who made
external-situational attributions (Kinderman and Bentall, 1996) i.e. signifying 
different underlying mechanisms responsible for their paranoia. The same 
authors subsequently developed the Internal, Personal and Situational 
Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ) with the ability to differentiate between the 
three attributional loci along the internality-externality dimension of attributional 
style. Preliminary use of the IPSAQ has shown encouraging results with regard 
to its reliability and validity (Kinderman and Bentall, 1996). To date, however, the 
IPSAQ has not been administered to groups of psychotic patients in 
investigations of cognitive biasing underlying delusional thinking. In addition, 
there has been no formal analysis of the validity of the ASQ or the IPSAQ, in the 
literature. There is, therefore, a need to assess that both the ASQ and IPSAQ 
measure what they are theoretically supposed to i.e. attributional data reflective 
of self-serving biasing in groups of paranoid patients. For instance, in the future 
researchers could compare similar psychological variables derived from 
interview with the responses from the measures or construct alternative 
measures to assess similar cognitive biasing for comparison. Of course, if such 
questionnaires do not reflect the putative protective biasing of paranoid patients, 
despite questions over their validity, the theory on which such research is based 
may also require reappraisal.
The present study used a single symptom approach in an analysis of paranoia. 
Although the paranoid group was deemed as experiencing active symptoms at
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the time of interview, one cannot be certain that all experienced similar forms of 
paranoia i.e. ‘persecutory’ or ‘punishing’, to the same degree of chronicity or 
stability. Additional assessment tools such as the Paranoid Scale (PS;
Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992) could be used to increase the degree of 
homogeneity of the paranoid group. Otherwise more detailed single case-study 
analyses might be carried out to augment group studies. A similar case may be 
made for the composition and analysis of the depressed symptom group.
The use of the single symptom approach has been justified elsewhere (see 
Introduction). Although it overcomes some of the problems encountered in 
studies involving heterogeneous samples defined by invalid diagnoses, it does 
not accommodate a theoretical viewpoint proposing common underlying 
cognitive mechanisms for related groups of symptoms (see Frith, 1992 pp. HS­
US). Empirical associations have been observed between psychotic symptoms 
(Liddle, 1987; Liddle and Barnes, 1990), the resultant groups of symptoms or 
‘factors’ relating to particular patterns of neuropsychological performance (Liddle 
and Morris, 1991). Future studies of the attributional styles of psychotic patients 
may need to account for the empirical associations between symptoms rather 
than concentration on just single symptoms as related symptoms may indeed 
have common psychological underpinnings. As the present study was concerned 
with cognitive biasing rather than deficits, the aim of the study was to assess the 
utility of ‘biasing’ or attributional scales for further use in an analysis of cognitive
style with empirically related symptoms. Therefore, on the basis of the present 
results, acknowledging the methodological issues cited above, along with 
findings from the recent literature, the ASQ was rejected and the PIT selected as 
an appropriate attributional measure for future cognitive research with psychotic 
patients expressing paranoia. Recent literature indicates that the IPSAQ may be 
a more reliable measure of overt attributions and is, therefore, the best available 
measure for future research presently. The present study provided a basis for 
future research using the IPSAQ and the PIT as appropriate measures, presently 
available, for assessing overt and covert attributions of patients expressing 
paranoid and other related psychotic symptoms. There is, however, a need to 
formally address the reliability and validity of such measures not addressed 
presently.
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1. The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ: Peterson et al., 1982).
2. The Pragmatic Inference Test (PIT: Winters and Neale, 1985).
Directions
Vividly imagine yourself in each of the situations that follow. If such a situation happened 
to you, what would you feel would have caused it? While events may have many causes, we 
want you to pick only one, the major cause if this event happened to you. Please write this 
cause in the blank provided after each event. Next we want you to answer three questions 
about the cause. To summarize, we want you to:
1. Read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to you.
2. Decide what you believe would be the major cause of the situation if it happened to
you.
3. Write this cause in the blank provided.
4. Answer three questions about the cause.
5. Go on to the next situation.
. You meet a  friend who compliments you on your appearance 
Write down the one major cause____________
Is the cause of your friend's compliment due to something about you or something 
about the other person or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due to
the other person or Totally due
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  to me
In the future when you are with your friends, will this cause again be present? (Circle 
one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  be present
Is the cause something that just affects interacting with friends or does it also influence 
other areas of your life?
You have been looking for a job unsuccessfully for some time.
Write down the one major cause____________
Is the cause of your unsuccessful job search due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due
to other people Totally due
or circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  to me
In the future when looking for a job, will this cause again be present? (Circle one 
number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  be present
Is the cause something that just influences looking for a job or does it also influence 
other areas of your life? (Circle one number).
Influences just 
this particular 
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Influences 
all situations 
in my life
Influences just
this particular
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Influences 
all situations 
in my life
3. You become very rich
Write down the one major cause
Is the cause of you becoming rich due to something about you or something about 
other people or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due to
other people or Totally due
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  to me
In your financial future, will this cause again be present? (Circle one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 be present
In the cause something that just affects obtaining money or does it also influence other 
areas of your life? (Circle one number).
Influences just Influences
this particular all situations
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  in my life
4. A friend comes to you with a problem and you don't try to help them.
Write down the one major cause___________________
Is the cause o f you not helping your friend due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due
to other people Totally due
or circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  to me
In the further when a friend comes to you with a problem, will this cause again be 
present? (Circle one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  be present
Is the cause something that just affects what happens when a friend comes to you with 
a problem or does it also influences other areas of your life? (Circle one number).
Influence just Influences
this particular all situations
situation 12 3 4 5 6 7 in my life
You give an important talk in front of a group and the audience reacts negatively.
Write down the one major cau se___________________
Is the cause of the audience reacting negatively due to something about you or 
something about other people or circumstances. (Circle one number).
Totally due to
other people or Totally due
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to me
In the future when giving talks, will this cause again be present? (Circle one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  be present
Is the cause something that just influences giving talks or does it also influence other 
areas of your life? Circle one number).
Influences just Influences
this particular all situations
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 in my life
You do a project which is highly praised.
Write down the one major cause___________________
Is the cause of being praised due to something about you or something about other 
people or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due
to other people Totally due
or circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to me
In the future when doing a project, will this cause again be present? (Circle one 
number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 be present
Is the cause something that just affects doing projects or does it also influence other 
areas of your life? (Circle one number).
Influences just Influences
this particular all situations
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 in my life
7. You meet a friend who acts bostilely towards you.
Write down the one major cause___________
Is the cause of your friend action hostile due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due to
other people or Totally due
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to me
In the future when interacting with friends, will this cause again be present? (Circle 
one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 be present
Is the cause something that just influences interacting with friends or does it also
influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number).
Influences just Influences
this particular all situations
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 in my life
8. You can't get all the work done that others expect of you.
Write down the one major cause______________ ____
Is the cause of you not getting the work done due to something about you or 
something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due to
other people or Totally due
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to me
In the future when doing the work that others expect, will this cause again be present? 
(Circle one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 be present
Is the cause something that just affects doing work that others expect of you or does 
it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number).
Influences just Influence
this particular all situations
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  in my life
9. Your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) has been treating you more lovingly.
Write down the one major cause_________________ _
Is the cause of your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) treating you more lovingly due to 
something about you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one 
number).
Totally due to
other people or Totally due
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to me
In the future interactions with your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend), will this cause again 
be present? (Circle one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 be present
Is this cause something that just affects how your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend), treats 
you or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number).
Influences j ust Influences
this particular all situations
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 in my life
10. You apply for a position that you want very badly (e.g. important Joe, graduate 
school admission, etc) and you get it.
Write down the one major cause________________ ___
Is the cause of you getting the position due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due to
other people or Totally due
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  to me
In the future when applying for a position, will this cause again be present? (Circle 
one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 be present
In this cause something that just influences applying for a position or does it also 
influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number).
Influences just Influences
this particular all situations
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  in my life
11. You go out on a date and it goes badly.
Write down the one major cau se___
Is the cause of the date going badly due to something about you or something about 
other people or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due to
other people or Totally due
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  to me
In the future when dating, will this cause again be present? (Circle one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 be present
In the cause something that just influences dating or does it also influence other areas 
of your life? (Circle one number).
Influences just Influences
this particular all situations
situation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to me
12. You get a raise
Write down the one major case
If the cause o f you getting a raise due to something about you or something about 
other people or circumstances? (Circle one number).
Totally due to
other people or Totally due
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  to me
In the future on your job, will this cause again be present? (Circle one number).
Will never again Will always
be present 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  be present
Is this cause something that just affects getting a raise or does it also influence other 
areas of your life? (Circle one number).
Influences just Influences
this particular all situations
situations 12 3 4 5 6 7 in my life
ANGLICIZED VERSION OF THE PRAGMATIC INFERENCE TEST
A. You decide t8 %jgP®2s y°ur own dry cleaning shop in a small but growing 
town near ti*£ bo£#i?*5u Yc>ur shop will be the only one of its kind for miles 
around. In the first year of business, the towns population doubles and 
your business prospers. Your advertising campaign is a big success and 
reactions from your customers indicate that the cleaning is of good 
quality. Your gross sales exceed expectations. You wonder whether it would 
be to your advantage to open a chain of shops, so you go to the bank and 
apply for a loan. As you had hoped, the bank approves the loan.
B. You have been looking unsuccessfully for a job as a factory worker. The 
unemployment rate has risen lately, and jobs are especially tight in your 
field. Sales have been hurt because of foreign competition. You decide to 
talk to a i r i end about the situation. He reminds you that you've had 
difficulties with management in the past because of tardiness and a poor 
performance record. Your search for a job is frustrating and you go for six 
weeks without finding a job.
C. You pride yourself on your appearence. You recently spent some money on 
new clothes ana a new hair style. The next day you receive a number of 
compliments at work, especially from one colleague. However, this person 
angers you later on in the day, by asking you for a lift home. This is a 
great inconvenience because this person lives quite a distance froi.i your 
destination.
D. A neighbour mentions to you that their teenager has a drinking problem. 
You wonder if the neighbour is going to ask you for advice. This neighbour 
is an independent and headstrong person who rarely seeks advice from 
others. You are uncomfortable because you do not have any children of your 
own and you are not very good at counselling people. The neighbour leaves 
without asking for your advice.
E. You and a colleague decide to go out one night for a bite to eat. You 
wonder whether you will have a good time since your colleague is a moody 
person. The night starts out badly when you forget to call a taxi for both
of you and you also fail to make dinner reservations. You and the colleague
wait for an hour at the resturant and there is still no table. You both
decide to go elsewhere for a meal. The food and service are unsatisfying at 
the other place, especially for the colleague. On the trip home the
:olleague asks you a lot of questions about how you were able to receive a 
recent promotion from the boss, and mentions that no one else in the office 
las received a promotion in over two years. The questioning indicates a 
losti1e tone.
F.
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A i .  What k . ' .d  of shop do you open?
A. H a r d v ^ r ? .
B. Dry c l e a n i n g .
A 2. In what part of the country is the town located?
A. Birmingham.
B. Carlisle.
A 3. Where is the loan obtained?
A. A Finance company.
B. Bank
*A 4. What is the reason for the success of your business?
A. Ycv 'ttre a clever businessman.
B. Ycv Lad no competition.
you 5 1 1uati on w i th a f ri end
A. Need a d v i c e .
D Your friend is recruiting staff.
B 2. How long do you go for without finding work?
A. Six weeks.
3. Six months.
*B 3. Why do you have trouble finding work?
A. Poor job record.
B. Poor job market.
B 4. What kind of job interests you?
A. A big company.
B. A small company.
; t. Why do you receive a compliant from your colleague?
A. Your appearence is genuinely perceived as worthy of
B. This person needs a favour from you.
c 2. Why do you spend money on your appearance?
A. Self pride.
B. You enjoy compliments.
c 3. Who gives you the most compliments at work?
A. Same sexed people.
B. Opposite sexed people.
a compliment.
c 4. On what do you spend your money?
A. Shoes.
B. Hair style.
Who comes to you for advice?
A . Coileague.
E. Neighbour.
D 2. What is the nature of the problem?
A. Stealing.
B. Drinking.
D 3. What gender is the person with the problem'3
A. Male.
B. Female.
$D 4. Why doesn't the neighbour ask you for advice?
A. This person is the type not to ask for advice.
B. You are inexperienced in this area.
c o
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Where,  do you a nd  Uve c o l l e a g u e  g o?
A T o  a Pi  1m.
?.. To a r e s t a u r a n t .
At what time of day does the activity take place?
A. Afternoon.
B. Evening.
, Why does the colleague act host i iely towards you?
A. The person is jealous of you.
B. The person is angry that you forgot to call a taxi and make dinner
reservations.
4. Who initiates the activity?
A. You.
B. The colleague.
m m
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F 1. With whom do yoo have a date :
A. A c  lose frienc.
B. A new a c q u a i n t a n c e .
F 2. Where do you go on the date?
A. To a film.
B. For dinner.
*F 3. Why does the date go badiy?
A. Your date was a boring person.
B. You were not interesting enough for the person.
F 4. Where did you go after the date?
A. For a drive.
B. Nowhere.
G 1. Who starts the conversation with you?
A. A t o u r i s t .
B. A s t r a n g e r .
*G 2. Why does this person talk with you for so long?
A. You are friendly.
B. This person wants your help.
G 3. What are you doing when you are approached by this individual?
A. Reading a newspaper.
B. Reading a book.
G 4. Why is this person down on their luck?
A. Illness.
B. Deserted by family.
*H 1 . Why i s  t h e  p a r t y  a s u c c e s s ?
A. Your  c o l l e a g u e s  a r e  i n  t h e  mood t o  unw;n. :
B. You know how t o  t h r o w  a gc oo  c a r - ; . .
H 2 . What  i 5> p o p u l a r  a t  t h e  par ty.*'
A. The o r  i n k .
B. The t " c o g .
3 . At wh a t  t i m e  of  y e a r  i s  t o e  p a r t y
A. C h r i s  ■■mas.
. c-umme:
IS t k e  p a r t y  w e l l  a t b s r x d â d
A. Yes.
• I < cU) ^<sv u^>(L -V.e speech'
4 A p o l i t i c a l  c o n v e n t i o n .
B. A town h a l l  m e e t i n g .
* I 2. Why does the audience react negatively to your speech?
A. You were an ineffective speaker.
B. The second speaker took the less controversial viewpoint.
I 3. How do you learn about the audience's reaction to the second speaker
A. Someone tells you.
B. You witness it.
I 4. What is being discussed at the meeting?
A. Road repair.
B. Rubbish removal.
J i . Wi t h  whom do you t a l k  a b o u t  y o u r  p r o b l e m s  a t  wor k?
A. No one .
B. Your  s p o u s e .
J 2. What kind of skill does this job require?
A. Manual.
B. Technical.
*J 3 . Why does you boss complain about your work performance?
A. You have poor technical skills.
B. The boss wants you to leave to make room for a relative.
J 4. What shift do you work?
A. Day.
B. Night.
K i. What kind of course do you take?
A. English Literature.
B. Writing course.
K 2. Why do you take the course?
A. Compulsory.
B. Pleasure.
*K 3 . Why does the teacher like your paper?
A. You are a good writer.
B. Your viewpoints are similar to the teachers.
K 4. Why do you choose to write about Fowles?
A. He is your favourite author.
B. The teacher tells you to.
i i .  IVC JIA
L i • What  t y p e  of  i n c o me  r a i s e  do  y o u  r e c e i v e ?  
h.  Bonus  p a y m e n t .
B. Wage increase.
L 2. How do you hear about the raise?
A. A memo.
B. Told personally.
*L 3. Why do you get the raise?
A. Company wants to prevent further resignations.
B. You deserve the raise because of good performance.
L 4. Who else gets a raise?
A. No one.
B. Everyone.
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LARGE SCALE RESEARCH PROJECT
ATTR1BUTIONAL STYLE, THEORY OF MIND ABILITY. AND EPISODIC 
MEMORY FUNCTIONING: AN INTEGRATED COGNITIVE
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF PSYCHOTIC SYMPTOMS
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ABSTRACT 
Rationale
The present study attempted to examine the relationship between attributional 
style, ‘theory of mind’ ability and episodic memory functioning as an integrated 
mechanism of psychological abnormalities putatively underpinning a range of 
psychotic phenomena.
Hypotheses
It was hypothesised that there would be a significant relationship between the 
above cognitive functions in a group of patients expressing predominantly 
paranoid type symptoms. It was also predicted that episodic memory dysfunction 
would characterise a group of patients expressing predominantly behavioural 
signs of schizophrenia.
It was also hypothesised that the cognitive functions would be significantly 
related to an empirically generated ‘subsyndrome’ of illness characterised by 
paranoid type symptoms. Episodic memory dysfunction was predicted to be
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highly associated with a subsyndrome of illness characterised by behavioural 
signs.
Design
Clinically homogeneous groups were generated by cluster analysis of a 
heterogeneous group of schizophrenic patients. Attributional style, ‘theory of 
mind’ and episodic functioning measures were administered to the groups. 
Multiple correlations within each group tested the above hypotheses. Secondly, 
symptom ratings of the initial sample were entered into a factor analysis. The 
emergent factors were correlated with the psychological performance data of the 
above measures.
Results
Four patient groups were generated from the clustering procedure for further 
analysis . None of the correlational data provided any support for the 
hypotheses.
Three factors were generated from the factor analysis. ‘Abnormal 
experiences/thinking’ was significantly related to external-personalising biasing, 
while against prediction ‘suspiciousness/persecution’ was not related
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significantly to any performance variable. ‘Negative behavioural signs’ was 
significantly related to episodic memory dysfunction.
Summary/Conclusions
Very little support was recorded for the study’s hypotheses. It was deemed that, 
although the study was overambitious, it was based on valid theoretical grounds 
but needed more long term analyses, perhaps using the same design, 
guaranteeing vastly elevated numbers of patients to test the hypotheses 
confidently.
INTRODUCTION
Neuropsychological investigations informing the putative behavioural-biological 
linkage of psychotic symptoms, in terms of information processing, have been 
characterised by using ‘traditional’ measures derived from studies of known brain 
pathology. Such studies have used largely heterogeneous groups of patients 
with psychiatric diagnoses under the umbrella term of ‘schizophrenia’. This 
methodology has produced disappointing returns in our understanding of the 
psychological underpinnings of psychotic symptoms for two main reasons.
Firstly, the scientific validity and reliability of schizophrenia as a ‘disease entity’
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has been called into question due to the varying clinical presentation(s) and 
outcome of those individuals given the diagnosis (Bentall et al., 1988). The 
continuing use of studies comparing schizophrenic patient groups with controls, 
therefore, is largely meaningless as group means (of neuropsychological 
performance) are likely to relate little to the variance of symptom presentation 
within the group. Secondly, although there have been significant advances in 
determining putative biological substrates associated with schizophrenic patient 
groups (Rossell and David, 1997), in over a hundred years of research no 
specific lesion(s) have been found to account for psychotic behaviour. This 
approach also suffers the methodological shortcomings of heterogeneous group 
studies but also tends to confuse ‘levels of explanation’ (Mortimer and McKenna, 
1994) i.e. to state that auditory hallucinations arise due to an overactive 
dopamine system, ignores the integral ‘link’ between behaviour and biology. 
Psychotic symptoms are psychological phenomena, therefore, ought to be 
explained as such before any putative mapping of associated biological systems 
occurs.
Recently, researchers have attempted to overcome some of the above 
methodological difficulties by adopting a single symptom approach (Bentall, 
1992) or analysing neuropsychological performance with respect to empirically 
related groups of symptoms (factors or ‘sub-syndromes’) (Liddle and Morris, 
1991; Arndt, 1991). Such methods provide greater validity in understanding
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specific psychotic phenomena but disclose little concerning the inter-relation 
between symptoms or ‘sub-syndromes’ as commonly expressed clinically in the 
same psychotic individual. This is of great importance as singular symptoms 
and/or subsyndromes are rarely seen in isolation. A cognitive 
neuropsychological approach attempts to remedy this by providing testable 
models of the information processing anomalies that give rise to psychotic 
symptom expression. Such models attempt to provide general cognitive deficits 
that give rise to specific psychotic phenomena, a major example of this is the 
work of Frith (1992).
Schizophrenia as a disorder of self-awareness: Frith (1992) model
Frith (1992), in an attempt to provide a cognitive neuropsychological explanation 
of the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia, suggested that the underlying 
cognitive abnormality was one of a disorder of self-awareness. Frith proposed 
three principal information processing abnormalities underlying all the major 
signs and symptoms of the illness. Firstly, disorders of willed action or the 
inability to generate spontaneous (willed) action can lead to poverty of action, 
perseveration and inappropriate action. In essence, that behaviour is elicited by 
external stimuli only. Secondly, certain auditory hallucinations and delusions 
including thought insertion and alien control can be attributed to a disorder of 
self monitoring. Finally, core symptoms such as delusions of reference, paranoid
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delusions, third person auditory hallucinations and certain types of incoherence
i.e. characterised by speech patterns lacking the use of previously qualified 
referents, may be caused by a disorder in monitoring the intentions of others or 
‘mentalising’. These three pathways to symptom expression were conceived as 
differing expressions of an abnormality in a single fundamental cognitive process 
necessary for consciousness, that of 'metarepresentation'. The psychotic 
individual has difficulty in mentally representing the world and their own 
thoughts. Self-awareness requires not only experience of the content of what is 
happening mentally or physically, but also requires the knowledge of how that 
experience is being represented itself i.e. events require primary and secondary 
representation or awareness. In the experience ‘I am watching a football match'- 
‘I am watching' is the self-conscious (secondary) representation of the (primary) 
representation ‘a football match’. If something is being attended to one must 
have representational knowledge concerning that attention otherwise the 
experience is not part of consciousness. If this mechanism breaks down then 
one only experiences content not the appropriate knowledge of how that content 
is represented in the world. Such a failure of metarepresentation can lead to a 
lack of awareness of goal directed behaviour or difficulties in correctly 
interpreting personal and interpersonal intentions.
It is important to note that the origins of the above theory lie in the study of 
childhood autism (see Frith, 1989). The characteristic social withdrawal,
stereotyped behaviour and extinct communication ability of childhood autistics 
are synonymous with the behavioural signs of deficit state schizophrenia. It is of 
note that patients with chronic negative schizophrenia show evidence of poor 
childhood social functioning (Forster et al. 1991). Such paucity of functioning 
indicates a total failure to make representations, primary or secondary. However, 
symptoms such as paranoia/delusions of persecution and delusions of reference 
do not represent a total failure of metarepresentation. Such symptoms appear to 
arise by psychotic individuals making wrong inferences about the 
behaviour/intentions of others. Such a deficit has been termed as lacking a 
‘theory of mind' (Leslie, 1987). Possessing a ‘theory of mind’ requires the ability 
to make correct inferences about the knowledge, thoughts and beliefs of others 
(Permack and Woodruff, 1978; Corcoran et al., 1995). This is evidently absent in 
autism/behavioural sign schizophrenia (associated with inability to perform willed 
actions). The difference, between paranoid and autistic individuals, perhaps, is 
that the paranoid patient has lost the ability to infer the intentions of others 
whereas the autistic individual never possessed the ability to ‘mentalise’ in the 
first place-this might be reflected in the age of onset of such disorders (Frith and 
Corcoran, 1996). Delusions of control and other passivity phenomena (including 
second person auditory hallucinations) are thought to arise from a failure to 
centrally monitor the psychotic individual's own intentions (Frith and Done,
1989). Therefore, unlike the deficits associated with the autistic or chronic 
schizophrenic patient ‘first rank’ or ‘positive’ symptoms appear to arise from
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abnormalities in the representation of own and others’ intentions. The advantage 
of conceptualising psychotic phenomena in such cognitive neuropsychological 
terms is that the theory proposes a model of cognitive dysfunction that can 
predict the expression of certain symptoms according to where in the model 
dysfunction occurs.
Although ‘theory of mind’ has been extensively studied in autism (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; 1986; Happe and Frith, 1994), Frith’s (1992) model has received 
less intensive empirical investigation, and thus stands largely theoretical at 
present. However, the ability to ‘mentalise’ or infer the mental states of others in 
relation to paranoid or delusions of reference has been supported (Corcoran et 
al., 1995; Frith and Corcoran, 1996). In both these studies patients, diagnosed 
with DSM-IV (APA, 1994) schizophrenia, were assigned to groups hierarchically 
on the basis of their clinical presentation. It is important to note that the authors 
assigned the patients to groups arbitrarily in terms of ‘predominance’ of symptom 
expression without defining ‘predominance’. However, four groups emerged 
consisting of those patients expressing predominantly behavioural signs (deficit 
signs or stereotyped behaviour/incoherence), paranoia/delusions of reference, 
passivity phenomena and no psychotic symptoms/signs (a remission group) 
respectively. As predicted, the behavioural sign group and the paranoid group 
performed significantly poorer than the other groups on tests assessing the 
ability to a) infer real intentions behind indirect speech utterances (Corcoran et
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al. 1995) and b) recognise both ‘first order’ false belief/deception (stories 
involving characters who have a false belief about the state of the world) and 
‘second order’ false beliefs (stories involving characters who have false beliefs 
about other characters) (Frith and Corcoran, 1996). The results supported the 
hypothesis that behavioural sign patients would do poorly because of gross 
general cognitive dysfunction, but that paranoid patients would perform poorly 
because of their specific inability to infer the intentions/beliefs of others or their 
lack of a ‘theory of mind’. However, there are serious methodological problems 
with the above studies. The groups to which the schizophrenic patients were 
assigned were ‘hierarchical’ meaning that, although an individual may express 
predominantly behavioural signs and be assigned to that group, no account of 
that patient’s other symptomatology was made i.e. feasibly, an individual might 
express paranoid symptoms but be assigned to any another group than the 
paranoid group. Therefore, the methodology did not take into account how 
patients present clinically with a combination of symptoms. No statistical criteria 
or otherwise were stated as to what degree of symptom expression represented 
predominance or not.
Although the theory has received limited empirical support, preliminary biological 
correlates of the model have already been implicated. Frith (1992) proposed that 
as the cognitive mechanism at fault is one of self-awareness then a failure in 
metarepresentation would imply dysfunction in a distributed brain system
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involving structures and systems necessary for goal directed behaviour, action, 
willed intentions and social cognition (e.g. facial recognition etc.). Such a system 
has not been specified to date. The brain systems involved in social cognition, 
however, have been suggested as involving the amygdala (social emotions), the 
superior temporal sulcus (aspects of facial recognition) and the orbitofrontal 
cortex (socially appropriate behaviour) (see Brothers, 1990). This brain system is 
probably only responsible for primary representations, whereas the ability to 
represent mental states may also implicate the prefrontal cortex (Frith, 1992).
Theory of mind deficits and memory dysfunction
Episodic memory dysfunction has been shown as a disproportionate 
neuropsychological deficit to global intellectual functioning with heterogeneous 
groups of schizophrenic patients, both medicated and unmedicated (McKenna et 
al., 1990; Tamlyn et al., 1992; Saykin et al., 1991). How such a deficit underpins 
certain psychotic symptoms is unclear. However, along with this general 
neuropsychological deficit, schizophrenic patients also show significantly poorer 
appreciation of social knowledge i.e. how people tend to act in social situations, 
than manic or depressed patients (Cutting and Murphy, 1990). The authors 
suggested that the results could be explained in either of two ways. The 
schizophrenic patients may have lacked the experience and/or exposure to such 
situations or that poor social judgements are a fundamental feature of, at least, a
subgroup of these patients. Accepting the latter explanation, such paucity of 
social knowledge could reflect more fundamental ‘theory of mind' deficits. Frith 
and Corcoran (1996) attempted to account for the ‘memory load’ in their 
methodology by assessing memory of the stories presented by asking 
supplementary factual questions. Although their results stood after only those 
patients who had answered the factual questions properly were compared, it was 
also evident that the groups who showed poorer mentalising ability also showed 
poorer recall.
It has been suggested that episodic memory depends upon metarepresentation 
as such memories require knowledge of the source of the memory (Perner,
1991). However, it is difficult to detect the direction of causality presently (Frith 
and Corcoran, 1996). For instance, is the inability to infer social behaviour 
correctly due to poor access of socially contextual episodic memories or is a 
poor episodic memory store a product of poor social inference or lack of a ‘theory 
of mind'? A pattern may be emerging implicating fundamental episodic memory 
dysfunction in those patients showing behavioural signs as they may, indeed, 
have poorer social experiences to refer to, especially if their functional deficits 
are neurodevelopmental (see Weinberger, 1987). It has also been suggested 
that paranoid symptoms may reflect intact mentalising processes but that 
retrieval of information, in social interactions, from the episodic memory store is 
negative and self-referential and, therefore, biased (Corcoran et al., 1995).
Attributional style and psychosis
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A detailed account of the theoretical and research literature concerning 
attributional style and psychotic symptoms can be seen in the small scale 
research project, ‘A comparison of paranoid and depressed patients’ attributional 
styles: a replication study of Lyon et al. (1994) to assess the utility of overt and 
covert attribution measures for further research into psychosis’,contained in this 
portfolio. A brief synopsis follows.
Attributional theory has been applied to the psychological modelling of 
persecutory delusions (see Bentall et al., 1994). Utilising a single symptom 
approach, patients expressing persecutory delusions tend to make excessively 
external, stable and global attributions for negative events and internal, stable 
and global attributions for positive events (Kaney and Bentall, 1989). This 
example of cognitive biasing rather than deficits proposes that the intention 
behind such belief acquisition is to maintain self-esteem defensively in the 
context of a perceived threatening environment, an extension of the hypothesis 
that paranoia is camouflaged depression (Zigler and Click, 1988). Bentall et al 
(1994) proposed that persecutory delusions arise from a perceived gross 
inequality between an individual’s actual and ideal selves. The formation of 
persecutory delusions involves reducing this discrepancy to a minimum.
However, Higgins (1987) proposed that the perception of self also involves
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perception by others. If actual-self discrepancies are minimised then, inevitably 
large discrepancies occur in the perception of self-other. This necessitates the 
negative externalising attributional style involving others, expounded above.
Empirical evidence supporting the model has been forthcoming (see Kaney and 
Bentall, 1989; Lyon et al., 1994). The Lyon et al. (1994) study used a measure of 
attributional style called the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ: Peterson et 
al. 1982). This measure used a bipolar dimension of localised attribution i.e. 
internal or external. This dimension has been considered unreliable as the 
tendency to make negative external attributions appears to differ according to 
the cause of an event i.e. situational or personal (Kinderman and Bentall, 1996). 
The unreliability of the ASQ was supported in the small scale research project 
referred to above. Kaney and Bentall (1996) constructed the Internal, Personal 
and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ) to account for the proposed 
tripartite localisation dimension. The authors found that a significantly greater 
proportion of personal as opposed to situational external attributions were 
associated with an analogue measure of paranoia. These results, however, were 
based on the responses of college students. To the present authors knowledge 
the IPSAQ has not been administered to psychotic patients. In addition, although 
the single symptom approach used in the above studies overcomes some of the 
methodological difficulties of heterogeneous studies, psychotic symptoms are 
rarely found in isolation in clinical practice. The single symptom approach does
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not take into account psychotic symptoms with putative common psychological 
origins e.g. persecutory delusions and delusions of reference (see Frith, 1992).
The relationship between ‘Theory of mind' ability and external-personal 
biasing
It has been proposed that paranoid delusions or delusions of reference may 
arise due to an inability to infer the mental states of others in social interactions 
(Frith, 1992-see above). Paranoia, therefore, arises due to making wrong 
inferences. However, this does not explain the negative content of such 
delusions. Bentall et al. (1994) explain this in terms of external-personal biasing 
(see above). It may follow, therefore, that to make external-situational attributions 
that are characteristic of the non-paranoid state one must be able to make 
correct inferences about the intentions and beliefs of others. The tendency to 
make external-personal attributions is possibly underpinned by poor mentalising 
ability or a lack of ‘theory of mind'. Therefore, although external-personal biasing 
may serve a defensive purpose against feelings of low self-esteem and is thus 
intentional, the information processing abnormalities that result in such a coping 
strategy may be linked to poor ‘theory of mind' ability. This connection, to the 
author's awareness, has not been addressed in the literature to date.
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Theory of mind deficits, external-personal biasing and episodic memory 
dysfunction: An hypothesis
The above review indicates that the path to the formation of psychotic behaviour, 
in particular paranoia, is more inclusive of contemporary cognitive 
neuropsychological models of symptom expression than has been considered 
previously. One hypothesis is that the road to the expression of positive 
symptoms, such as paranoid/grandiose delusions, involves reduced cognitive 
capacity in terms of episodic memory dysfunction that, in turn, reduces the ability 
to infer the intentions of others in social situations and thus leads to protective 
external-personal biasing in the face of perceived threatening or negative 
events. An extension of this hypothesis is that the episodic or florid nature of 
certain positive symptoms e.g. paranoid delusions, and the chronic 
neuropsychological deficits and/or social dysfunction associated with 
schizophrenia may constitute differing emphases of the same continuum. That is 
positive symptoms in the acute phase may arise due to an individual’s coping 
with perceived environmental stressors which trigger protective attributional 
biases while more chronic behavioural signs e.g. poor or absent social 
functioning, reflect more gross neuropsychological impairments of episodic 
memory.
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Aims of the study
The present study tested the above hypothesis by examining the relationship 
between episodic memory functioning, ‘theory of mind’ or mentalising ability and 
attributional styles with patients expressing psychotic symptoms and/or 
behavioural signs associated with schizophrenia.
The methodology attempted to account for the criticisms levelled at previous 
studies using arbitrary groups defined by ‘hierarchical’ symptom status (see 
above re:Corcoran et al. 1995 and Frith and Corcoran, 1996) and those using a 
single symptom approach (see Lyon et al., 1994). The study examined the 
functioning of psychotic patients in groups defined by common clinical status 
generated by statistical procedures. As a complementary analysis, the cognitive 
neuropsychological functioning of psychotic patients, in the domains described 
above, was compared to groups of empirically related symptoms or putative 
‘subsyndromes’ of psychotic illness (after Liddle and Morris, 1991) which may 
account for any gross clinical variance within the empirically generated patient 
groups in the first analysis.
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Specific aims and hypotheses
1. Aim: To examine the relationship between performance on measures 
assessing episodic memory, ‘mentalising ability’ or ‘theory of mind’ and 
attributional style of patients with DSM-IV (APA, 1994) diagnoses of 
schizophrenia. Performance was compared between patients grouped by 
statistically related clinical presentations based on clinical ratings of psychotic 
symptoms derived from;
a) The full Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al.,
1987). A comprehensive and inclusive contemporary rating scale used to 
account for a wide range of psychotic symptom expression.
b) Specific symptoms highlighted in Frith’s (1992) cognitive 
neuropsychological model of schizophrenia. This analysis examined 
whether psychotic patients grouped by empirically related clinical 
presentations resembled the hierarchical patient groupings of Corcoran et 
al. (1995) and Frith and Corcoran (1996).
Hypothesis: For this part of the study, the hypothesis predicted that there would 
be a significant association between external-personal biasing, theory of mind 
ability and episodic memory functioning in statistically derived groups of patients 
expressing predominantly paranoid/grandiose delusions and/or delusions of
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reference i.e. representing a common psychological abnormality, after Frith 
(1992).. There could be no prediction of what groups will arise from the purely 
arbitrary statistical procedure of cluster analysis used to generate the 
experimental groups for comparison. There is no contemporary literature, to the 
author’s knowledge, that has carried any similar procedure for comparison and 
prediction. The Corcoran et al. (1995) and Frith and Corcoran (1996) studies 
provided the only comparative literature using patient groups defined by clusters 
of predominant symptoms underpinned by common putative psychological 
deficits. However, these studies did not use statistical techniques of 
classification.
2. Aim: To examine the relationship between performance on the above 
measures and groups of empirically related psychotic symptoms (based on those 
symptoms selected in 1. b). This alternative analysis dccounted for the 
heterogeneity of a schizophrenic diagnosis, in general, and any heterogeneity 
encountered in the clinical groups generated in 1. Therefore, this secondary 
analysis attempted to examine psychological performance in relation to putative 
'subsyndromes’ of psychotic illness not restricted to collective patient profiles, 
which may be more heterogeneous.
Hypothesis: For the second part of the study, the hypothesis predicted that 
factor analysis would generate three groups of empirically related psychotic 
symptoms after Liddle and Barnes (1990) and Liddle and Morris (1991), namely 
‘psychomotor poverty’ (predominantly behavioural signs), ‘disorganisation’ 
(predominantly symptoms associated with thought disorder) and ‘reality 
distortion’ (paranoid/grandiose/reference delusions and hallucinations). It was 
predicted that there would be a highly significant association between external- 
personal biasing/ ‘theory of mind’ deficits and the ‘reality distortion’ factor. In 
addition, there would be a highly significant association between episodic 
memory dysfunction and the ‘psychomotor poverty’ factor.
METHODS
An attempt was made to recruit as many psychotic patients as possible for the 
study due to the statistical procedures of cluster and factor analysis used. In the 
event, twenty four patients with DSM-IV diagnoses of schizophrenia were 
recruited for the study (see Table 1 for demographic details).
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Table 1
Demographics of schizophrenic patients (n=24) (means and standard 
deviations)
* WAIS equivalent was used due to the Quick IQ (Ammons and Ammons, 1962) 
being validated using the WAIS (see Frith et al., 1991).
The patients were recruited from in and outpatient facilities at Queen Mary’s 
University Hospital, Roehampton and Horton Hospital, Epsom. The selection of 
the patients was informed by a Consultant Psychiatrist to be representative of a 
wide range of clinical presentations of schizophrenic illness (including a number
Males: Females 
Age (years)
Illness duration (years) 
Education (years) 
Neuroleptics (%) 
Anticholinergics (%) 
NART IQ (WAIS equivalent*)
________ Quick IQ
19:5
38.0(12.5)
14.3(11.6)
12.3(2.2)
100
33
107.9(9.1)
104(10.4)
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of remitted patients). This part of the selection process was blind to the primary 
investigator.
Apart from the demographics presented in Table 1., all the patients were 
unemployed. There was no indication of gross deterioration of general 
intellectual levels form pre morbid to current states (t(23), P=1.40).
Materials
General intellectual functioning
Pre morbid intellectual functioning was assessed using the National Adult 
Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982), current intellectual functioning was 
assessed using the Quick IQ Test (Ammons and Ammons, 1962).
The Hints task (Corcoran et al., 1995)- see Appendix 1 for a complete set of 
scenarios and scoring criteria.
The Hints task was devised to test the ability to infer the real intentions behind 
indirect speech utterances (Corcoran et al. 1995). The patients in the present 
study were presented ten scenarios, verbally and visually on a card, involving an 
interaction between two characters. Each scenario ended with one of the
characters dropping a very obvious hint. The subject was then required to 
explain what the character had really meant. An appropriate response was given 
a score of two. If the subject failed to give a correct response outright, the 
subject was then prompted by asking what the one character wants of the other. 
A correct answer after prompting was given a score of one. If the subject failed to 
respond correctly after prompting i.e. displaying poor inference skills, then a 
score of zero was given. There was a possible maximum score of twenty on this 
test.
The Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; 
Kinderman and Bentall, 1996)- see Appendix 2 for the complete 
questionnaire
Overt attributional style was assessed using the Internal, Personal and 
Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman and Bentall, 1996). 
The authors had developed the IPSAQ after the Attributional Style Questionnaire 
(ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982), used in previous studies of attributional style and 
psychosis (Lyon et al., 1994) was considered unreliable from the research 
literature (see Introduction and small scale research project in the present 
portfolio). The IPSAQ comprises 32 items which describe 16 positive and 16 
negative social situations i.e. ‘a friend gave you a lift home’ and ‘a friend talked 
about you behind your back.’ The subjects were asked to imagine themselves in
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each of the situations and to provide a likely possible cause for the event 
happening. The respondent was then required to state whether the cause was 
due to something to do with themselves (internal), something to do with the other 
person/people (external-personal) or something to do with circumstances or 
chance (external-situational). Three positive and three negative subscale scores 
were then generated by summing the number of internal attributions, the number 
of personal attributions and the number of situational attributions for both 
positive and negative items. Two indices of cognitive biasing were then 
calculated from the six subscale scores;
a) Externalising bias = Total number of internal attributions for positive events - 
Total number of internal attributions for negative events. A positive index, 
therefore, demonstrates a strong self-serving bias.
b) Personalising bias =
Number of external-personal attributions for negative events________
Total (external) personal + situational attributions for negative events
A personalising bias over 0.5 thus represents a greater tendency to use personal
than situational external attributions for negative events.
The IPSAQ has not been administered to psychotic patients to date but has 
shown sensitivity to personal attribution styles with healthy normals (Kinderman 
and Bentall, 1996). The covert attribution measure the Pragmatic Inference Test
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(PIT; Winters and Neale, 1985-see small scale research project in this portfolio) 
was not administered for two reasons. Firstly, the present study was concerned 
with activating ‘defensive’ attributional styles in the comparison with the other 
tests, therefore, the covert PIT was deemed redundant. Secondly, the individuals 
involved in the study were often severely disturbed at time of testing, therefore it 
was decided that the extra time involved in the administration of the PIT might 
add to their distress and affect co-operation of completing the other measures of 
greater interest.
The Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT; Wilson, Cockburn and 
Baddeley, 1985)
The Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test was constructed to detect impairment 
in 'everyday' (episodic) memory functioning and to assess change following 
treatment for memory difficulties (Wilson et al, 1986). The RBMT sought to 
provide ecologically valid information of memory functioning as opposed to more 
traditional testing using 'experimental' material.
The RBMT and Schizophrenia
Several studies have investigated the level of memory functioning, assessed by 
the RBMT, in groups of heterogeneous schizophrenic patients. Significant 
impaired performance on the task has been reported disproportionate to the 
degree of general intellectual impairment and relative to short term memory
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performance (McKenna et al, 1990; Tamlyn et al, 1992; Duffy and O'Carroll, 
1994). This emergent pattern of impairment has been likened to that of the 
Classic Amnesic Syndrome (CAS) i.e. intact general intellectual functioning and 
short term memory and impaired long term episodic memory (McKenna et al,
1990).
The RBMT was administered in the present study as a standardised episodic 
memory measure, especially useful for normative comparison in the absence of a 
normal control group.
Administration followed that set out in the test manual of Wilson et al. (1985). A 
profile score was calculated (maximum: 24; 0, 1, 2 per item) which is a sensitive 
measure of memory function and provides the basis for the categorisation of 
memory dysfunction developed by Wilson et al. (1986).
Psychiatric ratings 
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al. (1987)- see 
Appendix 3
The PANSS was developed and constructed along the guidelines for test 
construction laid out by the American Psychological Association (1985). The 
result was a thirty point item scale including seven positive symptoms and seven 
negative symptoms of schizophrenia. In the present study only the particular 
symptoms directly relevant to schizophrenia were used in analysis; the remaining 
sixteen symptom ratings refer to general states of psychopathology e.g. anxiety.
The positive symptoms included delusions, conceptual disorganisation, 
hallucinatory behaviour, excitement, grandiosity, suspiciousness/ persecution 
and hostility. The negative or deficit symptoms included blunted affect, emotional 
withdrawal, poor rapport, passive/apathetic social withdrawal, difficulty in 
abstract thinking, lack of spontaneity and flow of conversation and stereotyped 
thinking. Although such symptoms as stereotyped thinking have been considered 
neither positive or negative as traditionally understood, but rather behavioural 
signs (Frith, 1992), the items included in the scale were picked to be broadly 
representative of symptoms from the cognitive, social, emotional and 
communicational realms of clinical pathology expressed by schizophrenic 
patients (Kay, 1990). The PANSS allows the rating of a comprehensive range of 
schizophrenic symptomatology and is also sensitive to the severity of symptoms 
by including a seven point scale of severity from absent through minimal, mild, 
moderate, moderately severe, severe and extreme expressions of the symptom.
In the present study analysis using the full range of clinical ratings was required 
and those particular symptoms highlighted in Frith’s (1992) model. For the former 
analysis the fourteen psychotic symptom categories were used with a 
modification of the ‘delusions’ category being dichotomised into ‘delusions of 
control’ and ‘delusions of reference’. In the ‘Frith’ analysis delusions of control, 
delusions of reference, conceptual disorganisation, hallucinatory behaviour, 
suspiciousness/persecution, blunted affect, passive/apathetic social withdrawal 
and stereotyped thinking were chosen as representative of Frith’s three groups
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of psychotic symptoms of common abnormal cognitive functioning i.e. 
behavioural signs, paranoia and passivity phenomena.
All ratings were made by the investigator, who had previously been trained in the 
use of the PANSS, on the day of psychological testing. However, as a 
modification had been made to the ‘delusions’ category and to afford some 
reliability to the ratings, a subgroup of five patients were individually rated by a 
Community Psychiatric Nurse, to whom the patients were well known, on 
‘delusions of control’ and ‘delusions of reference’. Although the CPN had not 
been trained in using the PANSS, their ratings provided an indication of inter- 
rater reliability. The other symptoms were not additionally rated due to the 
PANSS having shown to display high inter-rater reliability (r=.81 ; Kay et al., 
1987).
All testing and interviews were held on the same day for each patient. The 
battery took approximately 2 hours to complete. Many of the patients required 
regular rests due to their distressing illness states. All interviews and testing 
were carried out by the author.
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Statistical analyses
1. To generate groups defined by common symptom type statistically, all 
symptom ratings were entered into an hierarchical cluster analysis as the 
number of emergent clusters was not known beforehand. A dendrogram was 
generated which gave a diagrammatic representation of how the patients 
were clustered by common clinical status. Multidimensional scaling was also 
performed on the clinical data to provide a schematic representation of the 
patient clusters. The visual representations were then compared to establish 
the number of patient groups used in the subsequent analyses. A Kruskall- 
Wallis one-way analysis of variance was performed symptom by symptom to 
derive 'meaningfulness' of the emergent clusters i.e. the characteristic 
symptom make up of each patient group.
2. Test performance, between the emergent groups, was analysed using 
Kruskall-Wallis one-way analyses of variance. Also, bivariate Spearman’s 
correlations were used to analyse the strength of the relation between each 
test performance per group. Due to the design necessitating multiple 
correlations, the level of significance of the correlations, within each group, 
was amended using a Bonferroni correction, by which the 0.05 ‘standard’ 
level of significance was divided by the number of comparisons to avoid type 
1 errors. The level of significance was, therefore, divided by fifteen. The
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resulting level of significance was, therefore, posited at 0.003 for each 
correlation.
3. The above two procedures were repeated using the eight symptoms 
representative of Frith’s (1992) model.
Non-parametric statistics were used in the above analyses as the emergent 
groups were small in number and no approximation to a normal distribution could 
be made. Different characteristics of the emergent clusters were interpreted by 
inspection of the group mean ratings.
4. To overcome some of the difficulties surrounding heterogeneous patient 
groups, despite clustering, an additional analysis of the test performances was 
carried out by comparison with statistically related groups of symptoms 
generated by factor analysis. The psychiatric ratings of the ‘Frith’ symptoms were 
entered into the factor analysis as they were of the greatest interest and that 
considering the basic requirements of factor analysis i.e. at least three times as 
many cases as variables to get anything like a useable result (West, 1991 ), the 
24 cases and 8 symptoms entered just fulfilled this criterion, on a basic level. 
Initial factors were extracted by the method of principal components. An oblique 
rotation was then performed as there was no a priori evidence that the symptoms 
should be related. Pearson’s correlations (as n=24) were then performed
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between the emergent factors and the test data. The methodology followed that 
of Liddle and Morris (1991) who compared emergent factors of psychotic 
symptoms, not derived from the PANSS, with neuropsychological test 
performance using measures of putative ‘frontal’ functioning. This procedure has 
not been completed with the psychological measures described above, to date, 
to the awareness of the author.
All the statistics were performed on a PC using SPSS 6.0 for Windows by the 
author.
Inter-rater reliability
The inter-rater reliability for the dichotomised ‘delusions’ category was calculated 
using Spearman’s correlations on the five patient sample. Cohen’s Kappa, the 
usual statistic for inter-rater reliability, was not used as the categories for each 
rating (between 1 and 7) were not equal for each rater. The correlation for 
‘delusions of control’ was not significant (r=.69, P=. 140), the relationship 
between the raters was highly significant, though, for ‘delusions of reference’ 
(r=.97, P<01).
RESULTS
The analysis of patient groups generated by cluster analysis of all 15 
symptoms from the PANSS
Figure 1.
Multidimensional scaling plot of psychotic patients fn=24) clustered bv ail 
symptom ratings derived from the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
(Kay et al., 1987). Hypothesised clusters are delineated (see also 
dendrogram Appendix )
2 
2 
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Figure 1. shows a schematic plot of patient cases in relation to each other’s 
clinical status. The Kruskal stress coefficients 126 (RSQ=.921) showing that the 
distance between cases was relatively small. The lines delineate the emergent 
patient clusters, after comparison with the dendrogram generated during cluster 
analysis (see Appendix 4). Five patient clusters emerged of 8, 6, 5, 3 and 2
patients. All the emergent groups were, therefore, very small considering the 
statistical demands of the subsequent analyses. It was decided, however, to 
pursue the study design by selecting the groups comprising 8,6,5 and 3 patients 
to examine their symptomatic characteristics with non-parametric analyses. 
Despite all the groups being very small for any type of analysis, the two patient 
group was rejected at this stage as too small for meaningful analyses even with 
such non-parametric statistics. The decision was, however, arbitrary. In addition, 
only the 8, 6 and 5 patient groups were selected for further correlational analysis 
of their psychological performances. The group of three patients was deemed 
too small for such analyses as the correlational data would be converted into 
ranks and this would vastly increase the likelihood of a type 1 error.
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Table 2
Demographics for four patient clusters (means and standard deviations)
------------------------     df=3
____________________________ GROUP____________ x2 P
1(n=8) 2 (n=6) 3(n=5) 4(n=3)
M:F 6:2 5:1 3:2 3:0 2.44 .485
Age 36.5(14.1) 41.5(12.6) 41.0(14.8) 36.0(7.5) 1.01 .799
(years)
Illness 11.3(8.2) 13.1(16.2) 20.2(14.6) 17.3(4.9) 2.07 .558
duration
(years)
Education 12.3(2.4) 12.8(2.6) 12.0(2.2) 12.7(2.9) 0.13 .988
(years)
Neuro­ 100 100 100 100 .00 1.000
leptics (%)
Anticholin 33 20 67 50 2.57 .463
-ergics
(%)
NART IQ 103.1(9.0) 114.5(7.0) 106.4(6.7) 106.0(12.3) 5.52 .138
Quick IQ 104.1(12.4) 112.7(7.7) 103.8(4.6) 97.7(9.3) 5.78 .123
Table 2. shows the demographics of the emergent four clusters of patients by 
clinical status. The groups were, therefore, matched for sex, age, illness
duration, education (full time years), proportion receiving neuroleptic and 
anticholinergic medication and for pre morbid and current levels of intellectual 
functioning.
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Table 3
Symptom ratings for four patient clusters derived from the Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (means and standard deviations!
SYMPTOM GROUP X2 P.
1 (n=8) 2 (n=6) 3 (n=5) 4 (n=3)
PI 3.6(2.0) 13(0.8) 4.4(2.1) 10(0.0) 9.70 .021
P2 5.3(1.0) 10(0.0) 5.4(0.9) 2.7(2.9) 11.76 .008
P3 3.3(1.2) 12(0.4) 6.4(0.6) 13(0.6) 17.23 .001
P4 4.3(2.3) 10(0.0) 6.2(0.8) 2.0(17) 12.19 .007
P5 3.9(14) 1.8(16) 5.0(12) 10(0.0) 11.04 .012
P6 5.8(13) 3.5(2.1) 5.8(0.8) 10(0.0) 10.66 .014
P7 4.0(2.1) 3.3(2.0) 4.2(18) 3.3(0.6) 0.77 .857
P8 10(0.0) 1.7(12) 3.8(19) 10(0.0) 7.06 .070
N1 14(0.7) 18(0.8) 2.2(13) 5.7(0.6) 8.96 .030
N2 10(0.0) 17(0.8) 3.0(12) 57(0.6) 12.87 .005
N3 11(0.7) 12(0.4) 3.4(17) 5.0(10) 11.45 .010
N4 18(1.1) 12(0.4) 3.4(18) 5.3(0.6) 10.50 .015
N5 2.6(15) 10(0.0) 5.8(0.8) 4.3(2.9) 12.16 .007
N6 14(0.7) 13(0.5) 2.4(0.6) 5.7(0.6) 11.96 .008
N7 2.1(11) 2.0(17) 6.2(0.5) 2.7(2.9) 10.27 .016
Key:
P1 Delusions of control N1 Blunted affect
P2 Delusions of reference N2 Emotional withdrawal
P3 Conceptual disorganisation N3 Poor rapport
P4 Hallucinatory behaviour N4 Passive/apathetic social
P5 Excitement withdrawal
P6 Grandiosity N5 Difficulty in abstract thinking
P7 Suspiciousness/persecution N6 Lack of spontaneity and flow of
conversation
PB Hostility N7 Stereotyped thinking
Table 3. shows the mean symptom ratings for all symptoms entered into the
cluster analysis for each group. There were significant overall group differences
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on all the symptom ratings except those representing the categories 
suspiciousness/persecution and hostility.
Characteristics of the groups
On inspection of the means and standard deviations, the groups’ characteristics 
or symptomatic make up was constructed by looking at those mean symptoms 
that showed a rating of over 4 (moderate) on the PANSS scale.
Group 1 showed elevated ratings for delusions of reference and grandiosity 
(both means over 5-moderately severe).
Group 2 showed no elevated ratings and thus could be considered containing 
remitted patients.
Group 3 showed elevated ratings on delusions of control, delusions of reference, 
conceptual disorganisation, hallucinatory behaviour, excitability, grandiosity, 
difficulty in abstract thinking and stereotyped behaviour (all over 5 except 
delusions of control).
Group 4 was characterised by the behavioural signs of the deficit symptoms; 
blunted affect, emotional withdrawal, poor rapport, passive/apathetic social 
withdrawal, difficulty in abstract thinking, lack of spontaneity and flow of 
conversation (all over 5 except difficulty in abstract thinking).
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Although no significant overall difference was observed on 
suspiciousness/persecution groups 1 and 3 scored over four. However, the other 
two groups scored over three and, considering the standard deviations, it 
appears that this symptom may be experienced by all the patient groups albeit at 
a moderate level. No elevated scores were observed on hostility.
It is of note that both groups 1 and 3 contained both delusions of reference and 
grandiosity, and that groups 3 and 4 contained difficulty in abstract thinking. As 
the selection of such groups from inspection of the dendrogram is basically 
arbitrary, this ‘spread’ of common symptoms might reflect where in the 
dendrogram the selection of the groups ceased. Also, because the initial sample 
was small any groups generated may be less exclusively defined due to the 
restrictions such small numbers have on the extent of the clustering process i.e. 
greater numbers might reveal more exclusively defined groups.
Table 4
Test performance of four patient clustersf means and standard deviations)
TEST GROUP X* P.
1 (n=8) 2 (n=6) 3 (n=5) 4 (n=3)
Externalising bias 0.8(2.4) -1.0(2.5) 2.8(2.6) -2.0(5.6) 4.56 .207
Personalising bias 0.9(0.1) 0.6(0.2) 1.0(0.1) 1.0(0.9) 10.62 .014
Rivermead profile 17.3(4.3) 17.8(2.6) 14.6(3.7) 12.7(5.8) 4.60 .203
Hints task 12.3(5.2) 12.0(4.4) 10.2(5.4) 10.7(0.6) 3.28 .351
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Table 4. shows the test performances of the four patient groups. An overall 
significant difference was observed only on the personalising bias results. It 
appears that groups 1, 3 and 4 show extremely high external-personalising 
biases for negative events. However, the spread of responses in group 4 is very 
high on inspection of the standard deviations. No overall differences were 
observed in externalising biasing although group 3 showed an elevated positive 
index indicating that this group demonstrates self-serving cognitive biasing.
No overall differences were observed on Rivermead performance, although the 
means showed that groups 3 and 4 mean episodic memory functioning 
compared to standardised normative data indicates moderately impaired 
functioning i.e. profile scores 10-16 (see test manual; Wilson et al., 1986).
No overall difference was observed on the test of mentalising ability, although 
when compared to the control data from the Corcoran et al. (1995) sample all 
groups performed greater than two standard deviations below the control mean 
(18.1(1.6)). However, it is not possible to determine that this control group was 
matched for the present data.
Correlations between test performances for patient groups 8. 6 and 5
In the inspection of the relation between tests a Boferroni correction was used to 
account for the multiple correlations. Therefore, the significance level for each
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group was amended for the number of contrasts to reduce the likelihood of type 
1 errors. For each of the 15 correlations the ‘familywise’ 0.05 level of significance 
was amended to .003.
Table 5 (i)
Correlations (Spearmans) between test performances and intellectual 
functioning for patient cluster group 1 (n=8l
NART IQ Quick IQ Externalis­
ing bias
Personalis­
ing bias
Rivermead
profile
NART IQ
Quick IQ .443
Externalis­ -.125 -.063
ing bias
Personali­ .325 .697 .494
sing bias
Rivermead .276 .054 .340 .321
profile
Hints task .449 .964* .089 .822 .231
*P<003
Table 5(i) shows a significant correlations between mentalising ability and Quick 
IQ only. No other correlations were significant for the group defined by delusions 
of reference and grandiosity.
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Table S(\\)
Correlations (Spearmans) between test performances and intellectual 
functioning for patient cluster group 2 fn=61
NART IQ Quick IQ Externalis­
ing bias
Personalis­
ing bias
Rivermead
profile
NART IQ
Quick IQ .537
Externalis­ -.433 -.091
ing bias
Personali­ .145 .000 -.412
sing bias
Rivermead .735 .224 .179 -.203
profile
Hints task -.897 -.537 -.478 -.551 -.529
No correlations were significant at the .003 level for the group of ‘remitted’ 
patients.
Table 5(iii)
Correlations (Spearmans) between test performances and intellectual 
functioning for patient cluster group 3 (n=5l
NART IQ Quick IQ Externalis­
ing bias
Personalis- Rivermead 
ing bias profile
NART IQ 
Quick IQ 
Externalis­
ing bias 
Personali­
1.000*
-.633
.000
-.633
.000 -.775
sing bias 
Rivermead -1.000* -1.000* .632 .000
profile 
Hints task -.344 -.344 .317 .000 .344
*P<003
Perhaps unsurprisingly, pre morbid and current intellectual levels were 
significantly correlated. However, both pre morbid and current intellectual levels 
were also correlated, negatively, with episodic memory functioning to the point of 
unity. The level of significance is surprising and may be due to the small 
numbers in this group as the raw scores were ranked the chance of unity 
correlations is increased with just 5 data sets.
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The analysis of patient groups generated bv cluster analysis of ‘Frith’ (8) 
symptoms from the PANSS
Figure 2.
Multidimensional scaling plot of psychotic patients fn=24) clustered bv 
'Frith' symptom ratings. Hypothesised clusters are delineated (with 
reference to dendrogram see Appendix ).
2.
1.
1.
0.
- 1.
Figure 2. shows the multidimensional scaling plot of patient cases by the eight 
‘Frith’ symptoms (see Methods). The Kruskal stress coefficient was also low for 
this plot (1.63; RSQ=.860). After comparison with the dendrogram (see Appendix 
5) generated by the cluster analysis, two major patient groups were considered 
for further analyses, delineated by lines on the scaling plot. The demographics of 
the two groups are presented in Table 6.
case 16
case 9
es se 24 
case 11 cascase 14
case 18
case 22
case 3 case 17
case
care 13
case 10
Dimension 1
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Table 6
Demographics for two patient clusters derived from ‘Frith’ symptoms 
(means and standard deviations)
df=1
GROUP X2 P.
1 (n=15) 2 (n=9)
M:F 11:4 8:1 .89 .346
Age (years) 37.1(13.5) 39.7(11.0) .29 .592
Illness duration (years) 14.5(11.2) 13.8(12.9) .47 .493
Education (years) 12.0(2.1) 12.7(2.5) .03 .858
Neuroleptics (%) 100 100 .00 1.000
Anticholinergics (%) 33 33 .00 1.000
NART IQ 107.1(8.8) 109.1(9.9) .36 .551
Quick IQ 101.9(9.0) 109.4(11.4) 3.20 .074
The emergent groups were well matched for all demographic information.
Table 7
Symptom ratings for two patient clusters derived from 'Frith' symptoms 
(means and standard deviations)
___________________________  df=1
SYMPTOM GROUP X2 P.
1 (n=15) 2 (n=9)
P1 3.8(1.9) 1.3(0.7) 8.54 .004
P2 4.9(1.5) 1.6(1.7) 9.61 .002
P3 4.1(2.1) 1.3(0.5) 9.80 .002
P4 5.4(1.6) 1.0(0.0) 14.11 .000
P7 4.4(1.9) 3.2(1.6) 2.13 .144
N1 2.3(1.5) 2.7(2.0) 0.17 .676
N4 2.7(1.7) 2.1 (2.0) 0.70 .404
N7 3.3(2.3) 2.2(2.0) 1.80 .180
Key:
P1 Delusions of control N1 Blunted affect
P2 Delusions of reference N4 Passive/apathetic social withdrawal
P3 Conceptual disorganisation N7 Stereotyped thinking
P4 Hallucinatory behaviour 
P7 Suspiciousness/persecution
Table 7. shows that there was a between group difference on the ratings of 
delusions of control, delusions of reference, conceptual disorganisation, and 
hallucinatory behaviour. Of these, group 1 had mean scores of four or over on all 
except delusions of control. Group one did score over four on 
suspiciousness/persecution but this was not significantly different from group 2. 
No differences were observed on analysis of deficit symptoms.
Table 8
Test performance of two patient clusters (means and standard deviations)
TEST GROUP X2 P.
1 (n=15) 2 (n=9)
Externalising bias 0.8(3.5) -0.2(2.5) 1.02 .314
Personalising bias 0.9(0.1) 0.73(0.2) 2.38 .123
Rivermead profile 15.9(4.0) 16.2(4.4) 0.36 .551
Hints task 11.9(5.1) 12.1(3.8) 0.13 .721
No overall group differences were seen between test performances. On 
inspection of the means group 1 showed a trend toward self-serving bias but 
both groups had elevated external-personal attributional styles for negative 
events. Both groups’ episodic memory performances were ‘moderately impaired’ 
after normal comparison but also showed large standard deviations or spread of 
responses. Mentalising ability per group was also very poor.
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Table 9m
Correlations (Spearmans) between test performances and intellectual 
functioning for ‘Frith’ patient cluster group 1 (n=15)
NART IQ Quick IQ Externalis­
ing bias
Personalis- Rivermead 
ing bias profile
NART IQ
Quick IQ .259
Externalis­ -.256 -.387
ing bias
Personali­ .513 .107 .164
sing bias
Rivermead -.265 .020 .254 -.136
profile
Hints task .228 .285 .130 .025 .148
*P<003
No significant correlations were observed between any of the test performances 
in group 1.
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Table 9(in
Correlations (Spearmans) between test performances and intellectual 
functioning for ‘Frith’ patient cluster group 2 (n=91
NART IQ Quick IQ Externalis­
ing bias
Personalis- Rivermead 
ing bias profile
NART IQ
Quick IQ .421
Externalis­ -.504 .056
ing bias
Personali­ -.513 -.060 .277
sing bias
Rivermead .699 .537 .059 -.437
profile
Hints task -.443 -.004 .540 -.276 -.114
*P<003
No significant correlations were observed in group 2 at the .003 level of 
significance.
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The analysis of test performances with groups of empirically related 
psychotic symptoms
Table 10
Factor loadings generated bv factor analysis of ‘Frith’ symptoms
SYMPTOMS FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
Delusions of control .759 -.268 .135
Delusions of reference .742 -.154 .033
Conceptual disorganisation .928 .134 -.112
Hallucinatory behaviour .765 -.006 .388
Suspiciousness/persecution .053 .141 .909
Blunted affect -.212 .846 .074
Passive/apathetic social withdrawal .130 .946 .071
Stereotyped thinking .681 .347 -.331
Eigen value 3.16 1.86 1.07
% variance 39.5 23.3 13.4
Cum. % variance 39.5 62.8 76.2
Table 10. shows the factor loadings for each of the eight ‘Frith’ symptoms. Three
factors were generated. The first factor loaded highly on delusions of control,
delusions of reference, conceptual disorganisation, hallucinatory behaviour and 
stereotyped thinking. This factor accounted for the greater part of the variance in 
the analysis. The second factor represented close statistical relationships 
between blunted affect, passive/apathetic social withdrawal. The third factor 
loaded highly on suspiciousness/persecution only. 23.8% of the variance is 
unaccounted for in this analysis
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Table 10
Correlations (Pearsons) of factors with test performance
TEST FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
Externalising bias .411 -.142 .228
Personalising bias .470* .298 .046
Rivermead profile -.110 -.599** .225
Hints task -.012 -.385 .128
NART IQ -.300 -.179 -.090
Quick IQ -.236 -.337 -.337
* P<05 
**  P < 0 0 1
Factor 1, characterised by positive symptomatology, showed a significant 
relationship with external-personalising bias for negative events. Factor 2, 
characterised by negative deficit signs, correlated highly with episodic memory 
performance. Factor 3, characterised by solely suspiciousness/persecution i.e. 
paranoia, did not correlate significantly with any test performance.
DISCUSSION
The present study attempted to examine the relationship between attributional 
style, mentalising or ‘theory of mind’ ability and episodic memory functioning of 
psychotic patients assigned to groups defined by common clinical presentation. 
It was hypothesised that there would be a significant relationship between
external-personalising biasing, poor ‘theory of mind' ability and episodic memory 
dysfunction in a group of patients with predominantly paranoid/grandiose 
delusions and/or delusions of reference. It was also predicted that an empirically 
related group of symptoms or ‘subsyndrome' of illness characterised by 
paranoid/grandiose delusions and/or delusions of reference would be 
significantly related to external-personalising biasing and poor ‘theory of mind’ 
ability. Also, a subsyndrome defined by behavioural signs would be significantly 
related to poor episodic memory functioning.
The first part of the study compared groups of psychotic patients generated by 
statistical clustering to those used by Corcoran et al. (1995) and Frith and 
Corcoran (1996)which were selected by ‘hierarchical’, but poorly defined, 
methods representing various putative psychological abnormalities in the 
formation of various groups of symptoms.. Cluster analysis was initially 
performed using a comprehensive set of psychotic symptom data, in the 
generation of the patient groups. The procedure was then repeated using 
selected psychotic symptoms deemed pertinent to Frith’s (1992) cognitive 
neuropsychological model of schizophrenia. The third part of the study attempted 
an alternative analysis of the relationship between the above psychological 
functions through a comparison with empirically related groups of symptoms, or 
factors, again using the ‘Frith’ symptoms. This procedure was derived from the 
studies of Liddle and Barnes (1990) and Liddle and Morris (1991). This final
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analysis was completed to overcome any heterogeneity of clinical presentations 
encountered within the cluster comparisons. The hypotheses were tested by 
using multiple correlation procedures within each patient group generated by 
cluster analysis. In the third part of the study the psychological performance data 
was correlated with the emergent factors to test the above hypotheses.
In the first analysis four patient clusters were generated and selected for further 
analysis. The groups represented; i) ‘grandiosity/delusions of reference’, ii) 
‘remission’, iii) ‘abnormal experiences and thinking, iv) ‘negative behavioural 
signs’ or ‘deficit state symptoms’. ‘Suspiciousness/persecution’ was experienced 
by all groups at least to a ‘mild’ level but no greater than ‘moderately’. Therefore, 
‘paranoia’ was not definitive of any group. The groups, therefore, did not reflect 
the groups defined by ‘hierarchical’ symptom status as used by Corcoran et al.
(1995) and Frith and Corcoran (1996). In the present study, behavioural signs, 
attesting to thought disorder, were represented greater in patients who were also 
experiencing delusions and hallucinations rather than those expressing deficit 
behavioural signs. Thought disorder and deficit signs were grouped together in 
the above ‘hierarchical’ studies. Therefore, in the present study, a closer clinical 
relationship was uncovered between positive symptoms and positive behavioural 
signs than had been accounted for in the previous studies.
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The present study did uncover a group of patients characterised by 
‘grandiosity/delusions of reference’. Although there was no evidence to show the 
nature of the delusions of reference here, Kaney and Bentall (1989) showed that, 
although patients with persecutory delusions tended to blame others for negative 
occurrences, if something went right the patients would ‘overcredit’ themselves. 
The authors believed that persecutory and grandiose delusions may be different 
manifestations of the same cognitive bias i.e. both show a self-serving bias but 
the delusional content depends on environmental factors. In the Frith (1992) 
model paranoid delusions and delusions of reference were seen as 
representations of similar cognitive abnormalities. The present study 
hypothesised that the same cognitive abnormality may underpin delusions of 
reference and grandiose delusions. Future studies might examine the content of 
the delusions of reference to see if they are informed by the delusional state of 
either paranoia or grandiosity. Therefore, clinical status, in the present study, 
shows a discrete group of putative grandiose patients whereas persecutory 
delusional symptoms are more widely dispersed throughout the groups, and to a 
lesser degree of severity.
Although there was no specific ‘paranoid’ group, as grandiosity and delusions of 
reference are examples of similar cognitive abnormalities, it was predicted that 
this group would show a significant relationship between external-personalising 
biasing, ‘theory of mind’ deficits and episodic memory dysfunction. In the event,
294
the ‘grandiose’ group did show a high index of personalising biasing, in the 
context of intact episodic memory functioning but poor mentalising 
performance. However, subsequent analyses failed to show any significant 
relationship between any of these psychological measures. Thus the 
hypothesis was rejected.
Elevated tendencies for personalising biasing were also observed with the 
‘abnormal experience/thinking group’ and the ‘negative behavioural signs’ 
group. The deficit state group performed poorly on both the mentalising and 
episodic memory tests, which may explain the poverty of social behaviour in 
this group to a certain extent. However, no subsequent analyses of this group 
were performed due to the extremely small sample (n=3) as the statistical 
demands of multiple correlations based on ranked data suggested a 
likelihood of type 1 errors with this group.
The ‘abnormal experiences/thinking’ group also showed elevated 
externalising/personalising biasing, poor mentalising ability and poor episodic 
memory functioning. However, no significant relationships were observed 
between any of these functions. This group was ‘highly symptomatic’ 
containing a range of positive and behavioural psychotic symptoms. 
Therefore, although as a group, they scored poorly on the tests in the context 
of heightened personalising biasing, the group may represent an 
amalgamation of sub-types of positive/behavioural psychotic
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patient which may be reflective of the arbitrary nature of cluster analysis with 
such an initial small sample. Cluster analysis with greater numbers of patients 
may reveal such subgroups as clustering would be more protracted, increasing 
the likelihood of more exclusive groups (see later for details).
The subsequent ‘Frith’ analysis, of eight pertinent symptoms, which was 
predicted to reflect the Frith (1992) model more closely, produced two clusters of 
patients. The larger group was defined by ‘abnormal experiences/thinking’, 
similar to the third group in the comprehensive analysis, while the second group 
was relatively ‘symptom-free’. Both groups showed similar levels of 
‘suspiciousness/persecutory’ beliefs at a mild-moderate level. No significant 
group differences in test performances were observed nor were there any 
significant relationships between performance variables within the groups. This 
analysis, therefore, provided less information about the interrelation between 
personalising biasing, mentalising ability and episodic memory functioning, than 
the first analysis. The groups did not resemble Frith’s hierarchical groupings at 
all. This may support the need to include a comprehensive set of psychotic 
phenomena in the analysis to allow the production of more discrete groups.
It is of note that because such small clinical groups were generated from the 
cluster analysis the ensuing multiple correlational analyses required a Bonferroni 
correction placing the significance level for each within group bivariate
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correlation at the .003 level. This is, of course, very high and with such small 
groups it may not be surprising that no significant relationships were observed 
between the psychological measures on this basis. It is of interest that, at face 
value, several correlations were very high, between the measures, i.e. between 
the hints task and personalising biasing performance data in the ‘abnormal 
experiences/thinking’ group (>.8). This would have provided a degree of support 
for the study’s main hypothesis if not within the context of a multiple correlational 
procedure requiring the statistical modifications described above.
The interrelation between the performance variables and symptoms was 
analysed alternatively using factor analysis. This could only be carried out using 
the eight ‘Frith’ symptoms due to the sample size to fulfil the criteria for factor 
analysis (n=number of symptomsxS). The emergent groups of related symptoms 
were characterised by, ’abnormal experiences/thinking’, ‘negative signs’ and 
‘suspiciousness/persecution’. The emergence of a discrete persecutory factor or 
‘subsyndrome’ might explain that, although ‘paranoia’ was not characteristic of 
any group of patients it may exist as a common illness entity with all the patient 
groups i.e. distributed widely but moderately, a subpathology common to all 
clinical presentations in the sample. However, against prediction, persecutory 
delusions were not related to personalising biasing, rather such biasing was 
related to ‘abnormal experiences/thinking’. This might reflect the fact that 
persecutory delusions were experienced at such a low level of severity in this
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sample while the expression of grandiosity/delusions of reference was of 
elevated severity and characteristic of the latter group. The ‘negative sign' factor 
was significantly associated with episodic memory performance and thus attests 
to the reduced ‘cognitive capacity' for memory functioning with patients in severe 
deficit states and, perhaps, underpins a great deal of their gross social 
dysfunction.
Factor analysis has been used recently in the conceptualisation of putative 
‘subsyndromes' of illness (Liddle and Barnes, 1990; Liddle and Morris, 1991). 
Such studies have consistently generated three factors pertaining to 
‘psychomotor poverty’, ‘disorganisation’ and ‘reality distortion’. In the present 
study only the ‘negative signs’ factor could be comparable to ‘psychomotor 
poverty’ whereas ‘reality distortion’ and ‘disorganisation’ were combined in the 
‘abnormal experiences/thinking’ factor. Previous studies have not revealed a 
singular ‘suspiciousness/persecution’ or ‘paranoid’ factor. This is probably due to 
the lack of differentiation of the ‘delusions’ category in their measures. The 
present study provided a more accurate appraisal of specific types of delusion in 
comparison to other specific psychotic symptoms. There was an aberration in the 
inter-rater reliability on the modified ‘delusions of control’ category. However, this 
may be due to the inexperience of the second rater in the interpretation of the 
PANSS rating system or may be due to the difference in the familiarity of the
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patients between the two raters. Subsequent studies ought, therefore, to employ 
blind raters for tests of inter-rater reliability utilising video equipment etc.
Despite the lack of support for any relationship between the psychological 
measures used in any of the groups generated, the groups showed various poor 
performances on the measures. Although personalising bias was presented as 
an index, mentalising ability was compared to normative data from the Frith and 
Corcoran (1996) study and episodic memory was assessed on a standardised 
measure, the present study was limited by the lack of a matched healthy control 
group. Such a comparison would have accurately indicated whether the 
individual group performance means were statistically different from normal 
functioning. The inspection of the group means compared to normative data from 
other sources constituted a means of comparison in the absence of a matched 
healthy control group. There is an obvious need for matched control data in 
subsequent studies.
The psychiatric rating data was manipulated by exploratory statistical analyses, 
to overcome the limits of studies using heterogeneous groups of patients. Both 
cluster and factor analysis require arbitrary decisions to be made at an early 
stage in the analysis in choosing the set of clusters and factors for subsequent 
analysis (Blashfield, 1984). In fact, such statistical analyses will generate 
clusters or factors to whatever the data set they are applied (Kendell, 1975). In
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the case of cluster analysis, in particular, there are no clearly defined criteria for 
evaluating the meaningfulness of any emergent clusters (Bentall et al. 1988). 
The criteria in the present study was thus consistent with the arbitrariness of 
these procedures. However, the production of both dendrograms and 
multidimensional scaling plots provided a comparison of information for the 
selection of groups in the present study.
Despite the above difficulties in terms of deriving ‘meaning’ from the groups 
generated from cluster analysis, a major criticism of the study was the use of 
such statistical classification procedures with a very small initial sample of 
patients. It was hoped that as many patients could have been recruited as 
possible, as although there is no specified power analysis for cluster analysis, 
the more patient data entered gives a greater likelihood of more homogeneous 
clusters to be selected as exclusive and perhaps more ‘meaningful’ entities due 
to the stepwise analysis of the statistical ‘space’ between each case. As the 
selection of the groups is arbitrary, fewer patients reduces the scope for 
exclusive sets to be established and, therefore, although groups can be 
schematically selected from the dendrograms, the composition of such groups 
maybe ‘noisy’ i.e. containing statistically related cases but not ‘meaningful’. On 
this basis it may have been somewhat ambitious to expect any meaningful 
results using such techniques that require patient samples preferably in the 
hundreds, with the present sample of 24. With hindsight, in the time allocated,
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alternatively it may have been better to use a comparative design with matched 
healthy control data in the analysis of the psychological measures under 
investigation. In spite of this, most importantly, the design attempted to account 
for the heterogeneity of schizophrenic diagnoses, therefore, group mean studies 
of various schizophrenic’ patients’ psychological performances would have been 
meaningless. It would appear that, in the present instance, the design might be 
valid but the statistical procedures used demanded vastly greater numbers of 
patients for meaningful analysis. Therefore, the actual successful completion of 
the procedure and testing of the hypotheses with the present numbers could be 
considered overambitious. This was the first study of this type to the author’s 
knowledge and thus is not comparable to contemporary literature for additional 
analysis of its strengths or weaknesses.
In terms of the factor analysis, again the sample of 24 was quite small but 
considering its ratio to the 8 ‘Frith’ symptoms entered, did fulfil the basic 
requirements of such an analysis i.e. three times the cases as variables entered 
(West, 1991). It is of note that the studies on which this second part of the study 
was based used 57 patients and 15 symptoms (Liddle and Barnes, 1990) and 49 
patients and 15 symptoms (Liddle and Morris, 1991). These studies used ratios 
in the range 3-4 patients per symptom but had an advantage over the present 
study by using samples twice as large. As the three patients per symptom criteria 
is a ‘rule of thumb’ and not a specific power analysis, the present study may have
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fulfilled the basic criteria. However, as with the cluster procedure the more 
patient data entered into the factor analysis the greater the likelihood of 
generating more exclusive and meaningful factors through a greater number of 
stepwise analyses.
The psychological measures used in the study were chosen to assess 
attributional style, mentalising or ‘theory of mind' ability and episodic memory 
functioning. These measures may be criticised on two major counts. Firstly, the 
patients may not have had the ability to do the tests for reasons other than 
specific performance deficits. Secondly, the tests may not be appropriate or valid 
measures of the functions to be assessed. In the first regard, the IPSAQ, which 
is rather more a questionnaire than a test, required the patient to imagine 
themselves in either pleasant or unpleasant social situations. Difficulties will be 
encountered actually ‘imagining’ a scenario if the individual is already 
experiencing difficulties in abstract thinking and/or conceptual disorganisation. 
Also, as an overt test of defensive attributional style, some of the more 
paranoid/grandiose patients believed that some of the negative situations were 
‘unimaginable’. Defensive biasing was seen before attributions could be 
produced for measurement. The modification of presentation with such patients
i.e. ‘what if it happened to a friend?’...’would that be the same for you?’, 
generated attributions but may have invalidated the responses. Fortunately, this 
did not happen often.
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The mentalising test required the patients to comment on the intentions of a 
person removed from themselves. Therefore, if there is a link between theory of 
mind and cognitive biasing in a particular negative social situation, difficulties 
would be less likely to occur when the individual’s ‘self was not involved. The 
patients as a whole did score poorly on the mentalising test, however, the 
‘removed nature’ of the test might have masked more poorer performance if their 
sense of ‘self was involved.
The Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT) was chosen as a 
standardised test of ‘everyday’ or episodic memory to investigate any 
fundamental neuropsychological deficits that might underpin the above two 
functions of social behaviour. Although poor RBMT performance had been 
shown to be characteristic of heterogeneous groups of schizophrenic patients 
(see McKenna et al. 1990), it may be too general a test to measure the specific 
memory dysfunction associated with biasing and mentalising ability. It has been 
suggested that the memory dysfunction observed with schizophrenic patients is 
specifically related to an impairment for contextual information (Schwartz et al., 
1991) and this has been supported experimentally showing ability to recall 
contextual information is disproportionately poorer that recall for non-contextual 
information (Rizzo et al. 1996). Although recalling contextual information is a 
form of episodic memory functioning, a specific impairment may be more relevant
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to the social dysfunction characteristic of schizophrenic patients. As 
heterogeneous groups of schizophrenic patients have been shown to be 
impaired on their appreciation of social knowledge and conventions (Cutting and 
Murphy, 1990), it is possible that the recall of such information depends heavily 
on the ability to recall (socially) contextual information instead of reflecting a 
general deficit in episodic memory. Schizophrenic patients, in real life, may not 
appear to have great difficulty remembering where to buy a newspaper but they 
might have difficulty in appropriately perceiving their interaction with the 
newsagent. If the patient is short changed, an appropriate perception of the 
situation may be heavily dependent on contextually appropriate social recall 
which underpins mentalising ability about the intentions of others. If appropriate 
socially contextual memory is impaired, then the ‘mistake’ of short changing may 
be attributed to the negative intentions of the shop keeper. The use of measures 
for contextual recall may, therefore, be more accurate in assessing the 
relationship between the three functional components in future studies. Control 
data may also be required in such studies.
CONCLUSIONS
The present study attempted to examine the relationship between attributional 
style, ‘theory of mind’ and episodic memory functioning with a group of psychotic 
patients. It was predicted that external-personalising biasing, poor ‘theory of
mind’ ability and poor episodic memory functioning would be significantly related 
as psychological abnormalities underpinning groups of patients characterised by 
paranoid/grandiose delusions and/or delusions of reference. Also, that episodic 
memory dysfunction might underpin the social dysfunction synonymous with the 
behavioural signs of psychosis characteristic of another group of patients. After 
statistical clustering of a heterogeneous group of schizophrenic patients, the first 
hypothesis was tested on a group defined by grandiose delusions and delusions 
of reference. No significant relationships were observed between the 
psychological performance data with the members of this group. The second 
hypothesis could not be tested due to the extremely small sample of 
predominantly deficit state patients derived from clustering. After factor analysing 
the symptom rating data emergent factors were correlated with the psychological 
performance data. A highly positively symptomatic ‘subsyndrome’ of illness was 
significantly related to external-personalising biasing, but against prediction a 
‘paranoid’ factor was not related to any psychological variable. A deficit state 
factor was related to poor episodic memory functioning, which perhaps informed 
the above second hypothesis which was unable to be tested.
The theoretical basis and design of the study were largely based on the need to 
account for the methodological shortcomings of heterogeneous group studies 
common in the contemporary literature on psychosis or ‘schizophrenia’. Overall, 
the study did not support the integrated psychological explanation of certain
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‘related’ groups of symptoms outlined in the introduction/hypotheses. This may 
necessitate a review of such a theoretical basis and/or the present design that 
involved the use of more but not absolutely homogeneous groups of psychotic 
patients compared to the previous literature. The expression and interaction of 
psychotic symptoms, even within an individual, may be more complex than can 
be assessed using the above methods. However, a major criticism of the present 
study is that the recruitment of patients for the statistical design was poor. 
Although as many patients as possible were sought to be involved in the study, 
time limitations resulted in too small a sample for the complex statistics used.
This undermined the ‘meaningfulness’ of the analyses and thus the chances of 
successfully testing the hypotheses. In terms of results none of the hypotheses 
were supported apart from a significant connection between deficit state 
symptoms and poor episodic memory functioning. This may not have been 
surprising with regard to the above criticisms.
In conclusion, therefore, the basis of the study was considered to be valid but the 
actual materialisation of the aims could not be confidently carried out due to poor 
recruitment to deliver meaningful results. The present study, in hindsight, could 
be considered overambitious in this respect, but the theoretical basis of the study 
might pave the way for a more long term assessment of the psychological 
abnormalities under investigation with numbers of patients suited to the demands 
of the statistical means of classification used here.
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APPENDICES
1. Scenarios and scoring criteria for the 'Hints task' (Corcoran et al., 1995)
2. The Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ: 
Kinderman and Bentall, 1996).
3. The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS: Kay et al., 1987).
4. Dendrogram of patient clusters by all 15 symptoms of the PANSS
5. Dendrogram of patient clusters by 8 'Frith' symptoms
APPENDIX 1
Scenarios presented (verbally and on cards) as the 'Hints task' (Corcoran 
et al. 1995)
1. Fred arrives in Angela’s office after a long and hot journey down the 
motorway. Angela immediately begins to talk about some business ideas. Fred 
interrupts Angela saying, ‘My, my, it was a long hot journey down that motorway!’
2. Mary goes to the bathroom for a shower. Anne has just had a bath. Mary 
notices the bath is dirty. She calls upstairs to Anne, ‘Couldn’t you find the Ajax, 
Anne?’
3. Andrew goes to the supermarket with his mum. They arrive at the sweetie 
aisle. Andrew says, ‘Cor! Those treacle toffees look delicious!’
4. Paul has to go to an interview and he’s running late. While he is cleaning his 
shoes, he says to his wife Jane, ‘I want to wear that blue shirt but it’s very 
creased.’
5. Lucy is broke but she wants to go out in the evening. She knows that David 
has just been paid. She says to him, Tm flat broke! Things are so expensive 
these days!'
6. Steve wants to run a project at work, but Richard, his boss, has asked 
someone else to run it. Steve says, ‘What a pity, I'm not too busy at the moment.’
7. Sue’s birthday is approaching. She says to her dad. ‘I love animals, especially 
dogs!’
8. Andrea and Michael moved into their new house a week ago. Andrea has 
been unpacking some ornaments. She says to Michael, ‘Have you unpacked 
those shelves we bought, Michael?’
9. Jane and Max are playing with a train set. Jane has the blue train and Max 
has the red one. Jane says to Max, ‘I don’t like this train.’
10. Pat is just getting off the train with three heavy cases. John is standing 
behind her. Pat says to John, ‘Gosh! These cases are a nuisance!’
Scoring scheme for the 'Hints task'
Scenario:
1. The correct answer involves some indication that Fred wants a drink after his 
journey. It is not adequate to say things such as, 'he’s fed up’, ‘he’s tired’, ‘he 
wants a break’, ‘he needs to have a rest’, ‘he doesn’t want to talk about business 
ideas’.
2. The correct answer refers to the fact that Mary wants Anne to clean the bath. 
Acceptable answers also include, ‘why didn’t you clean it?’, ‘can’t you clean the 
bath after you?’, ‘couldn’t you have cleaned the bath?’ Unacceptable answers 
include, ‘the bath needs cleaning’, ‘she didn’t clean the bath’, ‘are you feeling 
lazy tonight?’, as these do not explicitly refer to the fact that Anne is required to 
clean the bath.
3. The correct answer involves Andrew indicating that he wants his mother to but 
some sweets. Acceptable responses include, ‘Andrew wants some sweets’, ‘he 
wants some’. It is unacceptable to say, ‘he needs something sweet in his diet’.
4. The correct answer is that Paul wants Jane to iron his shirt. It is acceptable for 
the subject to say, ‘he wants it ironed’. Unacceptable responses include, ‘get the 
iron out’, ‘he means his clothes should look neat for interview’, ‘his shirt hasn’t 
been ironed’.
5. The correct response is that Lucy wants David to give/lend her some money. 
An acceptable response would also be, ‘she wants him to pay for the evening 
out’. Unacceptable answers include, ‘Would you take me out?’ ‘she hasn’t got 
enough money,’ as these don’t explicitly refer to David giving or lending Lucy 
money.
6. The model answer is that Steve wants Richard to give the project to him to 
run. Acceptable answers include, ‘Steve would rather run the project’, ‘he wants 
it himself, ‘he wants to do it/run if, ‘why don’t you get me to do it?’ ‘he means 
that he should be allowed to run if. Unacceptable answers are those which don’t 
explicitly refer to Steve wanting the project e.g. ‘he could do with the work’, he 
means he could run better’, or those which imply that Steve would have liked the 
project, but it’s now too late e.g. ‘he means he could have done if, ‘he would 
have liked to run if, ‘he wanted to run if, ‘he wishes he was the one doing if, 
‘why didn’t you ask me to do it?’
7. The correct answer is that Sue wants her father to buy he a dog for her 
birthday. It is also acceptable to say, ‘she wants a dog'.
8. The correct answer must refer to Andrea wanting Michael to put the shelves 
up. Acceptable alternatives include, ‘assemble the shelves' or ‘fix the shelves'. 
Unacceptable answers include, ‘unpack the shelves', ‘get the shelves together’, 
‘put the ornaments on the shelves’, or ‘she wants somewhere to put her 
ornaments.’
9. The correct answer is that Jane wants Max’s red train to play with. Acceptable 
alternatives include, ‘I want your train’, ‘do you want to swap trains?’ 
Unacceptable answers are, ‘she doesn’t like the colour of her train’ or ‘she 
prefers Max’s train’.
10. The correct answer is that Pat wants John to carry the cases for her. 
Alternative acceptable responses are, ‘she wants some help’, ‘John should help 
her’, ‘she’s asking him to give her a hand’.
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A friend gave you a lift home.
What caused your friend to give you a lift home7 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a Something about you ?
d Something about the other person or other people ?
c. . Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend talked about you behind your back.
What caused your friend to talk about you behind your back? 
(Please write down the one major cause) t
Is this :
a Something about you ?
b Something about the other person or other people ?
i P  Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 7
A friend said that he(she) has no respect for you.
What caused your friend to say that he(she) has no respect for you 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend helped you with the gardening.
What caused your friend to help you with the gardening? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
4d  * Something about you 7
h Something about the other person or other people 7
c Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 7
A friend  th inks  you are tru s tw o rth y .
What caused your friend to think you are trustworthy? 
(Please write down fhp one major cause)
Is this : .
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend refused to talk to you.
What caused your friend to refuse to talk to you? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend thinks you are interesting.
What caused your friend to think you are interesting? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend sent you a postcard.
What caused your friend to send you a postcard? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a Something about you 9
b Something about the other person or other people 7
c Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 7
A friend th inks  you are un friend ly .
What caused your friend to think that you are unfriendly? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
" Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend made an insulting remark to you.
What caused your friend to insult you? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend bought you a present.
What caused your friend to buy you a present 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
12. A friend picked a fight with you.
What caused your friend to fight with you? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a Something about you ?
b Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
3
A friend  th inks  you are d ish o n e s t.
What caused your friend to think you are dishonest7 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this .
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend spent some time talking to you.
What caused your friend to spend time talking with you? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
is this
a. Something about you ?
b Something about the other person or other people ?
c Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 7
A friend thinks you are clever.
What caused your friend to think you are clever? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend thinks you are sensible.
What caused your friend to think that you were sensible? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
is this
a Something about you 7
b Something about the other person or other people 7
c Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 7
17. A friend refused to help you with a job.
you ^  ^  -ob?
Is this
a Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?c.
18. A friend thinks you are unfair.
What caused your friend to think that you are unfair? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
is this
a. Something about you ?
b Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
19. A friend said that he(she) dislikes you.
What caused your friend to say that he(she) dislikes you? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
20. A friend rang to enquire about you.
What caused your friend to ring to enquire about you? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
5
A friend ignored you
What caused your friend to ignore you? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
. a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend said that she(he) adm ires you.
What caused your friend to say that she(he) admired you? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
is this :
a. Something about you ?
b Something about the other person or other people 7
c Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 7
A friend said that he(she) finds you boring.
What caused your friend to say that he(she) finds you borinq? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend said that she(he) resents you.
What caused your friend to say that she(he) resents you? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a Someth ing about you 7
b Something about the other person or other people 7
c Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 7
A friend visited you for a friendly chat.
What caused your friend to visit you for a chat? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
26. A friend believes that you are honest
What caused your friend to believe that you are honest? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend betrayed the trust you had in her.
What caused your friend to betray your trust? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b. Something about the other person or other people ?
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?
A friend ordered you to leave.
What caused your friend to order you to leave? 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a Something about you 7
b Something about the other person or other people 7
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 7
29. A friend said that she(he) respects you.
• -p e c s  you’
Is this
a. Something about you ?
30. A friend thinks you are stupid.
majo/cause^ ^  S‘UPid?
Is this
a. Something about you ?
b ' Something about the other person or other people ?
Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?c
1. A friend said that he(she) liked you.
Is this :
a. Something about you ?
b l ^ emin9 a?out the other Person or other people ?
Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) ?c.
A neighbour invited you in fo r  a drink.
What caused your friend to invite you in for a drink7 
(Please write down the one major cause)
Is this
a Something about you 7
b Something about the other person or other people 7
Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 7c
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APPENDIX 4
Dendrogram for patients clustered by all IS symptom ratings from the 
PANSS
Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
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APPENDIX 5
Dendrogram of patients clustered bv 'Frith* symptoms
Dendrogram using Average Linkage (Between Groups)
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
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